Bloom's Modern Critical

INTERPRETATIONS

Edited and with an Introduction by HAROLD BLOOM

Homer's
The Iliad

UPDATED EDITION



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Homer's
The Iliad
Updated Edition

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Editor's Note

My introduction compares and contrasts the poet of the *Iliad* and the J Writer or Yahwist, who wrote the oldest narrative strand in what now we call Genesis, Exodus, Numbers.

Graham Zanker traces how Homer invented what, two or three centuries later, was to become Athenian tragedy.

Helen is seen by Norman Austin as suffering from shame, and a sense of nemesis, both of them absent from Paris, to whom Aphrodite has abandoned the beautiful woman who remains the mortal goddess of Western literary tradition.

Book 8's account of the second day of fighting is seen as crucial to the entire epic by Malcolm M. Willcock, while Donald Lateiner emphasizes the role of body language, particularly in the *Iliad*'s final book.

Achilles, to Christopher Gill, is an epitome of passion that transcends all bounds, after which the solitude of the *Iliad*'s hero is set forth by Ahuvia Kahane in terms of its "rhythmic properties."

Derek Collins explores ritual aspects of the death of Patroklos, and informs us that some of these aspects cannot now be recovered.

Dean Hammer takes us into Homer as a performer of political thought, and expounds it as a contingent mode of an ethics founded upon vulnerability.

In this volume's final essay, D. N. Maronitis considers the pity of war as *Iliad*'s dominant theme.

HAROLD BLOOM

Introduction

Hektor in his ecstasy of power
is mad for battle, confident in Zeus,
deferring to neither men nor gods. Pure frenzy
fills him, and he prays for the bright dawn
when he will shear our stern-post beaks away
and fire all our ships, while in the shipways
amid that holocaust he carries death
among our men, driven out by smoke. All this
I gravely fear; I fear the gods will make
good his threatenings, and our fate will be
to die here, far from the pastureland of Argos.
Rouse yourself, if even at this hour
you'll pitch in for the Akhaians and deliver them
from Trojan havoc. In the years to come
this day will be remembered pain for you
if you do not.

Iliad, Fitzgerald translation, bk. 9, II. 237–50

For the divisions of Reuben there were great thoughts of heart.
Why abidest thou among the sheepfolds, to hear the bleatings of the flocks?
For the divisions of Reuben there were great searchings of heart.

> Gilead abode beyond Jordan: and why did Dan remain in ships? Asher continued on the sea shore, and abode in his breaches.
>
> Zebulun and Naphtali were a people that jeoparded their lives unto the death in the high places of the field.
>
> Judges 5:15–18

I

Simone Weil loved both the *Iliad* and the Gospels, and rather oddly associated them, as though Jesus had been a Greek and not a Jew:

> The Gospels are the last marvelous expression of the Greek genius, as the *Iliad* is the first ... with the Hebrews, misfortune was a sure indication of sin and hence a legitimate object of contempt; to them a vanquished enemy was abhorrent to God himself and condemned to expiate all sorts of crimes—this is a view that makes cruelty permissible and indeed indispensable. And no text of the *Old Testament* strikes a note comparable to the note heard in the Greek epic, unless it be certain parts of the book of Job. Throughout twenty centuries of Christianity, the Romans and the Hebrews have been admired, read, imitated, both in deed and word; their masterpieces have yielded an appropriate quotation every time anybody had a crime he wanted to justify.

Though vicious in regard to the Hebrew Bible, this is also merely banal, being another in that weary procession of instances of Jewish self-hatred, and even of Christian anti-Semitism. What is interesting in it however is Weil's strong misreading of the *Iliad* as "the poem of force," as when she said: "Its bitterness is the only justifiable bitterness, for it springs from the subjections of the human spirit to force, that is, in the last analysis, to matter." Of what "human spirit" did Weil speak? That sense of the spirit is of course Hebraic, and not at all Greek, and is totally alien to the text of the *Iliad*. Cast in Homer's terms, her sentence should have ascribed justifiable bitterness, the bitterness of Achilles and Hector, to "the subjections of the human force to the gods' force and to fate's force." For that is how Homer sees men; they are not spirits imprisoned in matter but forces or drives that live, perceive, and feel. I adopt here Bruno Snell's famous account of "Homer's view of man," in which Achilles, Hector, and all the other heroes, even Odysseus, "consider themselves a battleground of arbitrary forces and uncanny powers." Abraham, Jacob, Joseph, and Moses clearly do not view

themselves as a site where arbitrary forces clash in battle, and neither of course does David or his possible descendant, Jesus. The *Iliad* is as certainly the poem of force as *Genesis*, *Exodus*, *Numbers* is the poem of the will of Yahweh, who has his arbitrary and uncanny aspects but whose force is justice and whose power is also canny.

II

The poet of the *Iliad* seems to me to have only one ancient rival, the prime and original author of much of *Genesis*, *Exodus*, *Numbers*, known as the Yahwist or J Writer to scholars. Homer and J have absolutely nothing in common except their uncanny sublimity, and they are sublime in very different modes. In a profound sense, they are agonists, though neither ever heard of the other, or listened to the other's texts. They compete for the consciousness of Western nations, and their belated strife may be the largest single factor that makes for a divided sensibility in the literature and life of the West. For what marks the West is its troubled sense that its cognition goes one way, and its spiritual life goes in quite another. We have no ways of thinking that are not Greek, and yet our morality and religion—outer and inner—find their ultimate source in the Hebrew Bible.

The burden of the word of the Lord, as delivered by Zechariah (9:12–13) has been prophetic of the cultural civil war that, for us, can never end:

> Turn you to the stronghold, ye prisoners of hope: even today do I declare that I will render double unto thee;
>
> When I have bent Judah for me, filled the bow of Ephraim, and raised up thy sons, O Zion, against thy sons, O Greece, and made thee as the sword of a mighty man.

Like the Hebrew Bible, Homer is both scripture and book of general knowledge, and these are necessarily still the prime educational texts, with only Shakespeare making a third, a third who evidences most deeply the split between Greek cognition and Hebraic spirituality. To read the *Iliad* in particular without distorting it is now perhaps impossible, and for reasons that transcend the differences between Homer's language and implicit socioeconomic structure, and our own. The true difference, whether we are Gentile or Jew, believer or skeptic, Hegelian or Freudian, is between Yahweh, and the tangled company of Zeus and the Olympians, fate and the daemonic world. Christian, Moslem, Jew, or their mixed descendants, we are children of Abraham and not of Achilles. Homer is perhaps most powerful

when he represents the strife of men and gods. The Yahwist or J is as powerful when he shows us Jacob wrestling a nameless one among the Elohim to a standstill, but the instance is unique, and Jacob struggles, not to overcome the nameless one, but to delay him. And Jacob is no Heracles; he wrestles out of character, as it were, so as to give us a giant trope for Israel's persistence in its endless quest for a time without boundaries.

The *Iliad*, except for the Yahwist, Dante, and Shakespeare, is the most extraordinary writing yet to come out of the West, but how much of it is spiritually acceptable to us, or would be, if we pondered it closely? Achilles and Hector are hardly the same figure, since we cannot visualize Achilles living a day-to-day life in a city, but they are equally glorifiers of battle. Defensive warfare is no more an ideal (for most of us) than is aggression, but in the *Iliad* both are very near to the highest good, which is victory. What other ultimate value is imaginable in a world where the ordinary reality is battle? It is true that the narrator, and his personages, are haunted by similes of peace, but, as James M. Redfield observes, the rhetorical purpose of these similes "is not to describe the world of peace but to make vivid the world of war." Indeed, the world of peace, in the *Iliad*, is essentially a war between humans and nature, in which farmers rip out the grain and fruit as so many spoils of battle. This helps explain why the *Iliad* need not bother to praise war, since reality is a constant contest anyway, in which nothing of value can be attained without despoiling or ruining someone or something else.

To compete for the foremost place was the Homeric ideal, which is not exactly the biblical ideal of honoring your father and your mother. I find it difficult to read the *Iliad* as "the tragedy of Hector," as Redfield and others do. Hector is stripped of tragic dignity, indeed very nearly of all dignity, before he dies. The epic is the tragedy of Achilles, ironically enough, because he retains the foremost place, yet cannot overcome the bitterness of his sense of his own mortality. To be only half a god appears to be Homer's implicit definition of what makes a hero tragic. But this is not tragedy in the biblical sense, where the dilemma of Abraham arguing with Yahweh on the road to Sodom, or of Jacob wrestling with the angel of death, is the need to act as if one were everything in oneself while knowing also that, compared to Yahweh, one is nothing in oneself. Achilles can neither act as if he were everything in himself, nor can he believe that, compared even to Zeus, he is nothing in himself. Abraham and Jacob therefore, and not Achilles, are the cultural ancestors of Hamlet and the other Shakespearean heroes.

What after all is it to be the "best of the Achaeans," Achilles, as contrasted to the comparable figure, David (who in Yahweh's eyes is clearly the best among the children of Abraham)? It is certainly not to be the most complete man among them. That, as James Joyce rightly concluded, is

certainly Odysseus. The best of the Achaeans is the one who can kill Hector, which is to say that Achilles, in an American heroic context, would have been the fastest gun in the West. Perhaps David would have been that also, and certainly David mourns Jonathan as Achilles mourns Patroklos, which reminds us that David and Achilles both are poets. But Achilles, sulking in his tent, is palpably a child, with a wavering vision of himself, inevitable since his vitality, his perception, and his affective life are all divided from one another, as Bruno Snell demonstrated. David, even as a child, is a mature and autonomous ego, with his sense of life, his vision of other selves, and his emotional nature all integrated into a new kind of man, the hero whom Yahweh had decided not only to love, but to make immortal through his descendants, who would never lose Yahweh's favor. Jesus, *contra* Simone Weil, can only be the descendant of David, and not of Achilles. Or to put it most simply, Achilles is the son of a goddess, but David is a Son of God.

III

The single "modern" author who compels comparison with the poet of the *Iliad* and the writer of the J text is Tolstoy, whether in *War and Peace* or in the short novel which is the masterpiece of his old age, *Hadji Murad*. Rachel Bespaloff, in her essay *On the Iliad* (rightly commended by the superb Homeric translator, Robert Fitzgerald, as conveying how distant, how refined the art of Homer was) seems to have fallen into the error of believing that the Bible and Homer, since both resemble Tolstoy, must also resemble one another. Homer and Tolstoy share the extraordinary balance between the individual in action and groups in action that alone permits the epic accurately to represent battle. The Yahwist and Tolstoy share an uncanny mode of irony that turns upon the incongruities of incommensurable entities, Yahweh or universal history, and man, meeting in violent confrontation or juxtaposition. But the Yahwist has little interest in groups; he turns away in some disdain when the blessing, on Sinai, is transferred from an elite to the mass of the people. And the clash of gods and men, or of fate and the hero, remains in Homer a conflict between forces not wholly incommensurable, though the hero must die, whether in or beyond the poem.

The crucial difference between the Yahwist and Homer, aside from their representations of the self, necessarily is the indescribable difference between Yahweh and Zeus. Both are personalities, but such an assertion becomes an absurdity directly as they are juxtaposed. Erich Auerbach, comparing the poet of the *Odyssey* and the Elohist, the Yahwist's revisionist, traced the mimetic difference between the *Odyssey*'s emphasis upon

"foregrounding" and the Bible's reliance upon the authority of an implied "backgrounding." There is something to that distinction, but it tends to fade out when we move from the *Odyssey* to the *Iliad* and from the Elohist to the Yahwist. The *Iliad* may not demand interpretation as much as the Yahwist does, but it hardly can be apprehended without any reader's considerable labor of aesthetic contextualization. Its man, unlike the Yahwist's, has little in common with the "psychological man" of Freud.

Joseph, who may have been the Yahwist's portrait of King David, provides a fascinating post-Oedipal contrast to his father Jacob, but Achilles seems never to have approached any relation whatever to his father Peleus, who is simply a type of ignoble old age wasting towards the wrong kind of death. Surely the most striking contrast between the *Iliad* and the J text is that between the mourning of Priam and the grief of Jacob when he believes Joseph to be dead. Old men in Homer are good mostly for grieving, but in the Yahwist they represent the wisdom and the virtue of the fathers. Yahweh is the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob, even as He will be the God of Moses, the God of David, the God of Jesus. But Zeus is nobody's god, as it were, and Achilles might as well not have had a father at all.

Priam's dignity is partly redeemed when his mourning for Hector is joined to that of Achilles for Patroklos, but the aged Jacob is dignity itself, as his grandfather Abraham was before him. Nietzsche's characterization is just. A people whose ideal is the agon for the foremost place must fall behind in honoring their parents, while a people who exalt fatherhood and motherhood will transfer the agon to the temporal realm, to struggle there not for being the best at one time, but rather for inheriting the blessing, which promises more life in a time without boundaries.

Yahweh is the source of the blessing, and Yahweh, though frequently enigmatic in J, is never an indifferent onlooker. No Hebrew writer could conceive of a Yahweh who is essentially an audience, whether indifferent or engrossed. Homer's gods are human—all-too-human—particularly in their abominable capacity to observe suffering almost as a kind of sport. The Yahweh of Amos and the prophets after him could not be further from Homer's Olympian Zeus.

It can be argued that the spectatorship of the gods gives Homer an immense aesthetic advantage over the writers of the Hebrew Bible. The sense of a divine audience constantly in attendance both provides a fascinating interplay with Homer's human auditors, and guarantees that Achilles and Hector will perform in front of a sublimity greater even than their own. To have the gods as one's audience enhances and honors the heroes who are Homer's prime actors. Yahweh frequently hides Himself, and

will not be there when you cry out for Him, or He may call out your name unexpectedly, to which you can only respond: "Here I am." Zeus is capricious and is finally limited by fate. Yahweh surprises you, and has no limitation. He will not lend you dignity by serving as your audience, and yet He is anything but indifferent to you. He fashioned you out of the moistened red clay, and then blew his own breath into your nostrils, so as to make you a living being. You grieve Him or you please Him, but fundamentally He is your longing for the father, as Freud insisted. Zeus is not your longing for anyone, and he will not save you even if you are Heracles, his own son.

IV

In Homer, you fight to be the best, to take away the women of the enemy, and to survive as long as possible, short of aging into ignoble decrepitude. That is not why you fight in the Hebrew Bible. There you fight the wars of Yahweh, which so appalled that harsh saint, Simone Weil. I want to close this introduction by comparing two great battle odes, the war song of Deborah and Barak, in Judges 5, and the astonishing passage in book 18 of the *Iliad* when Achilles reenters the scene of battle, in order to recover his arms, his armor, and the body of Patroklos:

> At this,
> Iris left him, running downwind. Akhilleus,
> whom Zeus loved, now rose. Around his shoulders
> Athena hung her shield, like a thunderhead
> with trailing fringe. Goddess of goddesses,
> she bound his head with golden cloud, and made
> his very body blaze with fiery light.
> Imagine how the pyre of a burning town
> will tower to heaven and be seen for miles
> from the island under attack, while all day long
> outside their town, in brutal combat, pikemen
> suffer the wargod's winnowing; at sundown
> flare on flare is lit, the signal fires
> shoot up for other islanders to see,
> that some relieving force in ships may come:
> just so the baleful radiance from Akhilleus
> lit the sky. Moving from parapet
> to moat, without a nod for the Akhaians,
> keeping clear, in deference to his mother,
> he halted and gave tongue. Not far from him

> Athena shrieked. The great sound shocked the Trojans
> into tumult, as a trumpet blown
> by a savage foe shocks an encircled town,
> so harsh and clarion was Akhilleus' cry.
> The hearts of men quailed, hearing that brazen voice.
> Teams, foreknowing danger, turned their cars
> and charioteers blanched, seeing unearthly fire,
> kindled by the grey-eyed goddess Athena,
> brilliant over Akhilleus. Three great cries
> he gave above the moat. Three times they shuddered,
> whirling backward, Trojans and allies,
> and twelve good men took mortal hurt
> from cars and weapons in the rank behind.
> Now the Akhaians leapt at the chance
> to bear Patroklos' body out of range.
> They placed it on his bed,
> and old companions there with brimming eyes
> surrounded him. Into their midst Akhilleus
> came then, and he wept hot tears to see
> his faithful friend, torn by the sharp spearhead,
> lying cold upon his cot. Alas,
> the man he sent to war with team and chariot
> he could not welcome back alive.

Exalted and burning with Athena's divine fire, the unarmed Achilles is more terrible even than the armed hero would be. It is his angry shouts that panic the Trojans, yet the answering shout of the goddess adds to their panic, since they realize that they face preternatural powers. When Yahweh roars, in the prophets Isaiah and Joel, the effect is very different, though He too cries out "like a man of war." The difference is in Homer's magnificent antiphony between man and goddess, Achilles and Athena. Isaiah would not have had the king and Yahweh exchanging battle shouts in mutual support, because of the shocking incommensurateness which does not apply to Achilles and Athena.

I began this introduction by juxtaposing two epigraphs, Odysseus shrewdly warning Achilles that "this day," on which Hector may burn the Achaean ships, "will be remembered pain for you," if Achilles does not return to the battle, and a superb passage from Deborah's war song in Judges 5. Hector's "ecstasy of power" would produce "remembered pain" for Achilles, as power must come at the expense of someone else's pain, and ecstasy results from the victory of inflicting *memorable* suffering. Memory depends upon

pain, which was Nietzsche's fiercely Homeric analysis of all significant memory. But that is not the memory exalted in the Hebrew Bible. Deborah, with a bitter irony, laughs triumphantly at the tribes of Israel that did not assemble for the battle against Sisera, and most of all at Reuben, with its scruples, doubts, hesitations: "great searchings of heart." She scorns those who kept to business as usual, Dan who remained in ships, and Asher who continued on the sea shore. Then suddenly, with piercing intensity and moral force, she utters a great paean of praise and triumph, for the tribes that risked everything on behalf of their covenant with Yahweh, for those who transcended "great thoughts" and "great searchings of heart":

> Zebulun and Naphtali were a people that jeoparded their lives unto the death in the high places of the field.

The high places are both descriptive and honorific; they are where the terms of the covenant were kept. Zebulun and Naphtali fight, not to be the foremost among the tribes of Israel, and not to possess Sisera's women, but to fulfill the terms of the covenant, to demonstrate *emunah*, which is trust in Yahweh. Everyone in Homer knows better than to trust in Zeus. The aesthetic supremacy of the *Iliad* again must be granted. Homer is the best of the poets, and always will keep the foremost place. What he lacks, even aesthetically, is a quality of trust in the transcendent memory of a covenant fulfilled, a lack of the sublime hope that moves the Hebrew poet Deborah:

> They fought from heaven; the stars in their courses fought against Sisera.
>
> The river of Kishon swept them away, that ancient river, the river Kishon. O my soul, thou hast trodden down strength.

GRAHAM ZANKER

Values in Tension

> Indeed so intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions—and consequently of the goods external to the goods internal to the practices in question—that institutions and practices characteristically form a single causal order in which the ideals and the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care for common goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institution. In this context the essential, function of the virtues is clear. Without them, without justice, courage and truthfulness, practices could not resist the corrupting power of institutions.
>
> —A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*

Cooperation Eroded

We have now, I believe, surveyed the main reasons why the Iliadic warrior should want to act loyally or kindly to his group or to outsiders like suppliants or *xeinoi*. However, they are clearly inadequate to curb the disaffection and violence that feature so prominently in the *Iliad*, let alone to ensure generosity. How can we account for the subversion of these constraints and the ensuing quarrels and acts of cruelty in the poem?

From *The Heart of Achilles: Characterization and Personal Ethics in the* Iliad. ©1994 by the University of Michigan.

The essential factors are that the war is in its tenth year, that both sides are exhausted, and that feelings have become brutalized, a state that has ushered in the fragmentation of loyalties and moral values. The *Iliad* offers many scenes of the horrors of war, but a passage that perhaps speaks with a particular directness to readers today is the moment when the Achaians, spurred on by Diomedes, refuse Priam's offer to restore the possessions that Paris took with Helen to Troy—Paris will not part with Helen—but Agamemnon takes up Priam's request for a truce so that both armies might bury their dead. They meet soon after sunrise, coming face-to-face, but they find that it is difficult to recognize the individual corpses, and they have to wash off the gore for their identification before carting them away and burning them, which the Trojans do in silence, because Priam has forbidden lamentation out loud (7.421–32).[1] Priam has no difficulty maintaining discipline and curbing his men's non-Greek habit of crying aloud,[2] and thus he preserves his entourage's dignity before the Achaians. But it is a bitter and horrific thought that the two armies should intermingle in a brief truce, confronted by images of death, disfigurement, and namelessness, immediately after an attempt has been made to bring hostilities to an end once and for all. The passage's pathos also underlines the naked brutality of Diomedes' recommendation to the Achaians not to accept Paris' acquisitions or even Helen, the object over which the whole war has been raging (as if she were on offer), simply because Troy's doom seems imminent (400–402), an impression probably fostered by the fact that Hektor has just had a mere draw in single combat with Telamonian Aias. Although the herald, Idaios, has just reminded everybody present that Paris is the cause of the war (388), Diomedes appears to have forgotten the original reason for the Achaians' expedition, which has become submerged in his mind by a desire to press on to nothing less than the total destruction of Troy.[3]

Elsewhere, the origin of the war is remembered all too clearly, but the drive to restore Menelaos' honor results in excessively cruel reactions. A familiar example of this is the episode where Menelaos and Agamemnon dispatch the unfortunate Adrestos (6.37–65). Three aspects of the scene are of special interest here. First, there are the words of Agamemnon to his brother as Menelaos is on the point of accepting Adrestos' formal supplication, which is backed by the offer of the ransom customary in such cases. Agamemnon asks why Menelaos should have any concern for Adrestos; have the Trojans, he asks, shown the best treatment of Menelaos' household? The mention of Menelaos' household makes us think of Paris' seduction of Helen, but the reference to the Trojans tout ensemble is likely to have been prompted by Agamemnon's continuing fury over the attack on Menelaos during the truce. In any case, Agamemnon is right in implying that

the Trojans have impugned the honor of Menelaos, though he has spread the responsibility noticeably wide. But does Paris' and his people's offense really justify Agamemnon's wish that no Trojan whatsoever escape the Achaians' retaliation, not even the Trojan child still carried in his mother's womb or the man who flees, but that they all die without distinction, unlamented, and leaving no trace? Second, there is the hideous moment when Menelaos breaks the physical contact between himself and Adrestos that is an obligatory and obligating step in the supplication ritual, and Agamemnon stabs him in the flank. The honor-incentive for vengeance and death has overridden the honor involved in sparing a suppliant and, in this case, acquiring the ransom-gifts. Moreover, there are instances of captured warriors being ransomed during the earlier stages of the war, though the prevailing mood is no longer one of mercy. Quite apart from Achilles' change of heart when he comes across Lykaon for the second time, Agamemnon kills Isos and Antiphos, even though he recognizes them as warriors whom Achilles once spared (11.101–12); the recognition throws Agamemnon's choice to kill into stark relief. These examples of former mercy demonstrate the hardening of feelings now. Third, immediately after the killing of Adrestos, we find Nestor shouting general advice to the Achaians not to hold themselves up by accumulating as many trophies as they can but to get on with killing, leaving the collection of spoils till afterward, when it can be done with ease (6.66–71). Nestor is saying that the pursuit of honor-trophies is actually hindering the progress of the battle: individual warriors are jeopardizing the corporate endeavor of the army by their imprudent concern with the pursuit of personal honor. Nestor recognizes that the quest for honor is becoming undisciplined and that the communal enterprise is in danger of being fragmented. Coming where it does, it seems likely that Nestor's advice is meant to include Menelaos and Agamemnon, in which case it is a further reflection on the excessiveness of their cruelty to Adrestos. The Adrestos episode as a whole signals the degree to which feelings have become brutalized by the time of the events depicted in the *Iliad*, illustrating the obsessiveness with which warriors are now prepared to assert themselves and the shattering of the norms of proper behavior toward any outsiders at their mercy and toward their own group.[4]

A further indication of the volatility of the warriors' ethical world is provided by their changing attitudes toward returning home and the thought of peace, though other quite natural impulses, such as simple homesickness and war-weariness, are at work here. When Agamemnon makes his fatal test of his force's morale, he repeatedly talks of the shame in which he will return to Argos, his purpose unaccomplished against the numerically vastly inferior Trojans, but he concludes in feigned despair that the whole force should head

for home (2.140–41); and, we are told, "in their eagerness for home their shouts reached heaven" (153f.). Now that the king has effectively undermined the hope of honor and promised the reverse, the army is left with nothing more than their natural inclinations, which dictate their movements without hindrance. But once the king's authority has been reasserted and Nestor feels confident enough to state that Zeus guarantees the success of the Achaian expedition, presumably referring back to the portent at Aulis that confirmed that the Achaians would take Troy in the tenth year of the war (301–29), the yearning for home recedes: "at once war became sweeter to them than returning in the hollow ships to their beloved homeland" (453–54).[5] In contrast with such bellicosity is the constant longing for peace expressed by both sides. When Paris and Menelaos come forward to settle their differences in single combat in book 3, Achaians and Trojans alike have a real moment of hope that hostilities will cease once and for all (111–12), and they even pray that they will have a *philotês* ratified by trustworthy oaths (319–23). The case of Helen is interestingly different, for she is now so conscious of her responsibility for the war that when Iris tells her of the truce and the single combat between her two husbands, she is overtaken by a "sweet longing" for her former husband, her city, and her parents (130–45), and her sense of guilt over following Paris is all too clearly expressed to Priam in the Teichoskopia (172–80). The war has sensitized Helen, so that she now desires to return to her home, whereas once she had willingly and, as she now sees, culpably fled from it. This change of heart is made more poignant when she fails to see her brothers, Kastor and Polydeukes, in the Achaian force, and we are informed that they are dead and have been buried in their homeland (236–44). So complete is Helen's separation from the home that she longs for; she can only explain her brothers' absence on the grounds that they are avoiding the shame that attaches to their sister.

Apart from a figure like Helen, the people of the *Iliad* undeniably show the effects of brutalization, so neither a sense of justice, nor affective considerations like the longing for home, nor even the incentive of *tîmê* any longer provide infallible guides for behavior. In such an atmosphere, where the gentleness of the past is contrasted with the harshness of the present, it hardly comes as a surprise to find warriors on the battlefield operating often with no other motive than naked self-assertion, which may increase their personal *tîmê* but does not necessarily at all make them feel bound to "honor" either unprivileged outsiders or even the interests of their own group. Shorn of these applications, the drive for honor becomes a matter of every man for himself, more obsessive and more excessive.

This state of affairs is thrown into sharp relief by the occasional vignettes in the *Iliad* describing the part justice plays in times of peace and normality. The trial scene on Achilles' shield is particularly instructive. In it, a quarrel has arisen because a man's relative (no further details are given) has been murdered. There are two major rival views of what is going on. One argues that the murderer claims he has paid the blood-price in full (18.499), but the kinsman denies having received anything (500), and that they are both eager to "accept the decision at the hands of an arbitrator" (501). Elders plead on either side of the case before the arbitrator, who will assign two talents of gold to the elder who "pronounces his judgment in the most straight manner" (508). The other interpretation, probably to be preferred, maintains that the quarrel is over whether the kinsman of the dead man should accept a ransom from the murderer or demand revenge (in the form of execution or exile); the murderer is claiming that he has a right to pay everything and so avoid other penalties, the kinsman is refusing to accept the option of monetary compensation, and the court is setting the "limit" of the penalty. In either view, the sense of justice will be the decisive factor, and the litigants will be expected to abide by the arbitrator's decision.[6] Elsewhere, as we have seen, Aias argues with Achilles that he should accept Agamemnon's gifts because normally men accept blood-price for the murder of a brother or son, and the killer remains in the community (9.632–36). Here, justice, in the form of worthy compensation and involving the concept of *tîmê*, is expected to restore peaceful relations. And if men pervert the course of righteousness and justice and "pronounce crooked rulings," justice will be restored by Zeus' punishment of that community, the doctrine of the simile at *Iliad* 16.384–92.

Another prime example of the part justice can play in moments of normality is provided by the altercation between Menelaos and Antilochos after the chariot-race of the funeral games for Patroklos (23.566–611). Antilochos' claim to the prize mare is challenged by Menelaos. In a solemn procedure reminiscent of the assembly, the herald gives Menelaos the scepter and commands general silence (567–69). Menelaos makes his accusation that Antilochos was guilty of foul play and reckless driving in the race, thus unjustly impugning Menelaos' excellence as a charioteer. He calls on the Achaian leaders to act as an impartial, mediating jury (574) to ensure that he will not lay himself open to the charge of having pulled rank (575–78). But then he says he will adjudge the case himself, without fear of anyone taking exception, because "it will be done straightly" (580). This "straight judgment" takes the form of demanding that Antilochos swear an oath to Poseidon that he did not mean to commit a foul against Menelaos' chariot (581–85). This has the immediate effect of making Antilochos adduce his

"flighty" youth as the cause of his behavior, a face-saving method of admitting to the charge; moreover, he claims that he will hand over the mare and that he is prepared to do anything rather than fall in Menelaos' esteem and be an offender against the gods (587–95). Relations are restored peacefully. Menelaos' heart is warmed, and with a warning to the young man not to try to trick his superiors again, he compliments Antilochos by saying that he has been persuaded more readily by him than he would be by any other Achaian, because Antilochos has fought hard for the Atreidai. He even gives him the mare, saying that he is responsive to his plea for it, which puts Antilochos in the position of a petitioning subordinate; and the Achaian witnesses see that the king can be generous (596–611).

These glimpses of moments of peace and normality show that justice is expected to prevail. How different the standard behavior of warriors in battle is, at least as the *Iliad* presents it. Moreover, the vignettes of peace and normality seem to suggest that when war has become as protracted and desperate as it is in the *Iliad*, how much more necessary a factor that will finally predispose people to fairness is. Such a factor will be Achilles' sympathy for and consequent generosity toward a fellow mortal in suffering.

The Case of Hektor

The fragmentation of ethical values can be seen clearly in the person of Hektor, who is presented, if anybody in the *Iliad* is, as the mainstay of his community. Perhaps the most important text in this regard is Hektor's angry rejection of Poulydamas' advice that the Trojan force should retreat into the city when Achilles returns to the Achaian cause (18.285–309). His main reason for fighting on beside the ships is that Zeus has granted that he will win *kûdos* there and will drive the Achaians into the sea (293–94), which prompts him to declare that he will face Achilles himself, in man-to-man combat (305–9). With this reasoning, he is jeopardizing his city, because he is the lesser warrior. He admits as much to Achilles (20.434), his father shares his assessment (22.40), and so does Achilles (22.333). During the pursuit around the walls, he is called "noble" while Achilles is styled "much the superior" (22.158), so his inferiority must have been tacitly accepted long before it is expressed in so many words. But the background reason for his choice is also important. We can understand all too well his frustration when he asks Poulydamas whether he hasn't yet had enough of being cooped up inside the city's towers and when he backs up his challenge by recalling how men formerly used to talk of Troy's wealth whereas its treasure is now exhausted, much of it having been sent as payment to allies in Phrygia and Maionia, "since great Zeus was angry" (18.287–92; cf. 17.220–26). It is

legitimate to assume—reconstructing the direction of Hektor's thinking from the text—that Hektor's frustration over the thought that his city has been reduced to such dismally inglorious straits is a major factor in his desire to bring matters to a head. It is equally legitimate to conclude that he is to some extent compensating for his frustration over the faded glory of his city by pursuing individual glory and honor for himself. Now that the Zeus who has caused the Trojans to empty their coffers is offering him personal glory, should he not make the best of his opportunity? In this context, Hektor makes his decision not to retreat. The passage illustrates just how much the war has sapped the Trojans' morale. It also shows how in circumstances of such desperately low morale, the hero grows obsessed with his personal glory, to the detriment of his community. Later, Hektor will call this pursuit of glory "recklessness" (*atasthaliai*, 22.104), and he will see that it has led to the destruction of his community, but knowledge of that fact will in no way encourage him to subordinate his need for personal glory to the common good.

In his attempt to convince Hektor to retreat, Poulydamas argues that because Achilles is at large again, he will move the battle from the plain to the city, and the Trojans will be fighting for their city and their women (18.261–65). He touches on an area of human life, the family, which might seem to exert an indefeasible claim on the warrior's loyalty, a claim based on affection, but no less compelling. In his rejection of Poulydamas' advice, Hektor nowhere explicitly addresses this argument. His family has been relegated to being associated with being "cooped up inside the towers" and has been overridden in his mind by the desire for the only *kûdos* that he seems to think he can aspire to with any confidence.[7]

This is a development of the way Hektor thinks and speaks in his farewell to Andromache and Astyanax in book 6. His famous reply to Andromache's plea to him to come inside the walls and save her from becoming a widow and their son from becoming fatherless is based on his shame in the face of the community at not living up to his reputation for winning fame for himself and Priam (441–46). When he pictures the inevitable fall of Troy, he says that he will sense no greater pain for the Trojans, his father, his mother, or his brothers and sisters than for Andromache, by which it is clear that he by no means lacks love for his family. But even so there is a strong indication that shame also permeates his thinking, because he wishes that he will be hidden beneath the earth before he hears Andromache's cries as she is dragged into slavery, and he imagines with horror how her captors will say that she was the husband of Hektor, "who was best among the Trojans at fighting" (447–65). He seizes the other end of the stick and shows his preoccupation with honor when he prays that

Astyanax will grow up to be “renowned” among the Trojans and that people will say of him that he “is better by far than his father” as he brings home the armor of his enemies (476–81). Already in book 6, the constraints of shame and honor have proven stronger than that of the family; precisely shame at the thought of what will become of his family, love them as he assuredly does, forms the greater part of his decision to return to battle. By book 18, however, there is no more talk of his wife and son at all, and by book 22 Hektor is too far caught up in the web of his honor and his sense of dishonor to be persuaded by the appeals of Priam and Hekabe to fight Achilles from inside the walls, although Priam gives Hektor the explicit advice to do so to save the whole populace of Troy (56f.); and Hekabe is even more direct in her plea than Priam is, as she holds out her breast in a mother’s desperation (82–85). The potency of the image of the family as a reason for caring behavior is reserved for reassertion until book 24, when Achilles is reminded of Peleus by the sight of the grieving Priam (503–12). Until that moment, family ties provide no effective sanction for social cohesion—at one point Achilles too subordinates Peleus and his son, Neoptolemos, to Patroklos in his affections (19.321–37)—and they are restored to that role not by the side in the Trojan War naturally most often pictured in the context of their families but by a member of the Achaian force, physically separated as he is from his family, and in the end painfully aware of the rift.

The Attenuation of Sanctions

We can detect signs of fragmentation in all other areas of social contact—in relations with people outside the group, such as suppliants and strangers, and in the relations of people inside the group, with the result that the leader of the group can disaffect his fellows, who can then elect to be unresponsive to the group’s needs. The sanctions, both ultimate and proximate, that govern right behavior in the case of outsiders have become attenuated. We have seen just how attenuated from Agamemnon’s treatment of Adrestos and of Isos and Antiphos. In the case of Adrestos, Agamemnon’s desire for *tîmê* has become excessive and is directed to individual profit. In that of Isos and Antiphos, his progress to glory makes him ignore the ties that the two Trojans have with a member of his own group. In both cases, Agamemnon’s cruelty contrasts with the right behavior that Achilles once showed to suppliants like Isos and Antiphos and to Lykaon, which points up the distance between the past and the present in the warriors’ ethical outlook.

To outsiders who pose some threat to his claim on an honor-gift (*geras*), Agamemnon is no respecter of rank or sanctity, as his attitude toward Chryses shows. Chryses is a suppliant and a priest of Apollo, so

Agamemnon's rejection of his plea to accept his ransom and return Chryseis is especially charged. When he supplicates the Achaians, he does so with the fillets and golden staff that go with his priestly office (1.14f.), he frames his request moderately, and he states that by complying the Achaians will be respecting Apollo (20f.). The Achaians respond by approving the idea of reverence for the god (22f.). Though Agamemnon sends him away "ignobly," he tacitly admits that the priest should be respected, when he says that if he catches him in the camp again, the god's staff and fillets will not be any protection (26–28). The king is thus said to have treated the priest dishonorably (*atîmazô*, 11, 94). The general reaction of the Achaians, the comment about Agamemnon's "ignoble" dismissal of Chryses, and his giveaway disclosure about the respect he feels for priestly trappings reveal that it is intrinsically good to honor a priest, so when Apollo sends the plague in punishment, it is not merely a matter of reinstating his *tîmê* and that of his earthly representative, though that factor persuades Agamemnon to honor the priest. Moreover, there is an element of affection between the god and his priest in return for past services: Chryses seems to use that as a bargaining point in his prayer to the god when he mentions the construction of a temple and the sacrifice of bulls and goats (39–41). None of these considerations sways the king for the moment, though the practicalities of the situation finally force his hand. At a juncture when the drive for honor has become such an excessive and individuated affair, neither respect and honor for a suppliant on their own nor even respect and honor for a suppliant with a god's special backing are capable of ensuring right relations toward an outsider.

Within Agamemnon's group is a seer who has knowledge of factors that represent a threat to the king's *tîmê*, to whom there is every likelihood that the king will respond with excessive self-assertion and, in a word, badly. This seer, Kalchas, feels it necessary to win Achilles' protection against Agamemnon, whom he knows he will anger (78) when he explains the causes of Apollo's displeasure. He comments that "a king is the stronger man when he is angry with an inferior" (80), and that such a king will be unable to restrain his "anger" and "wrath" for long (81–83). Agamemnon only offers verbal abuse to the seer, though he proceeds from it, after accepting the fact that Kalchas' advice is correct and should be acted on, to his more menacing demand for compensation for the loss of his *geras*. In this highly charged atmosphere, especially after Agamemnon's treatment of Chryses, Kalchas is wise not to put too much reliance on his status as the Achaians' soothsayer.

Through Achilles it is shown most clearly how the king's overinsistence on being paid due honor can disaffect a member of the group. That Agamemnon's demand for Briseis is excessive and hence bad is beyond

reasonable doubt. Nestor's advice that Agamemnon should give up his claim to the girl "even though he is an *agathos*, as the Achaians gave her as a prize to Achilles in the first place" can only be taken to mean that Agamemnon, as a man of high standing, might expect to have a claim on the girl, but would be a morally bad *agathos* if he acted on such a claim.[8] A few lines earlier, Agamemnon advises Achilles, "even though he is an *agathos*," not to cheat him (131f.), which obviously entails morally reprehensible behavior, and in book 24 Apollo threatens Achilles with the gods' *nemesis* "although he is an *agathos*," because he has passed the bounds of fair behavior in his treatment of Hektor's corpse (53f.). Apollo's phraseology is particularly illuminating, because it shows that among the gods some connection is perceived between the word *agathos*, with its primarily social reference, and the expectation that a man so designated will behave "in accordance with his station" or, if he does not, will earn the gods' "indignation" as a person acting beneath his position, which appears to be the mental process denoted here by *nemesis*. This is a god's view; men like Nestor and Agamemnon use *agathos* in a purely social sense and talk separately about the advisability of fairness. Apollo and, following him, Zeus seem to make the connection between social and moral nobility more directly, "sanctioning" the expectation that men in positions of significance will behave "becomingly." Poseidon puts it similarly when he comments that Zeus will move beyond the bounds of acceptable behavior for an *agathos*, if he tries to restrain him, a deity "of equal honor" (15.185f.). In any case, the conclusion is inevitable that Agamemnon's self-assertion is excessive The ultimate moral constraints to behave fairly have broken down, and all constraints proximately based on *tîmê* are ineffectual. Agamemnon associates the impulse to assert *tîmê* so totally with the defense of his personal worth and dignity that he nullifies all the applications of *tîmê* to relationships in society.[9]

The *Iliad* describes this disaffection in terms of *cholos*, "anger," and *eris*, "strife." These are negative drives: *eris* is commonly coupled with the adjective "soul-destroying."[10] In one remark, significant for the light it sheds on the *Iliad*'s results-culture, Agamemnon describes his argument with Achilles as one of the "strifes which take away the fulfillment of one's purpose" (2.376), admitting how the strife which he started (378) has destroyed the cooperation that would have achieved more immediate results in the war.[11] In Achilles' case, anger and strife are preconditioned by Agamemnon's unacceptable assertion of his dignity. Later, he rejects and curses anger and strife, even wishing that the object over which they had arisen, Briseis, had been killed the day he took her in captivity from Lyrnessos (18.107ff., 19.56ff.), and he rejoins the group and furthers its interests, even if for reasons that the group would not have understood.

Social cohesion and the prevailing reasons for commending it have thus been shattered, at least for one member of the group, but we have seen enough to convince ourselves that at the time of the *Iliad*'s events, the problem is general, if less acute than in the case of Achilles, whose disaffection is what the *Iliad* is about.

A Son's Feelings of Guilt

We have now seen examples of the heroic sense of fairness that exists in the *Iliad* and even more instances of its repudiation. From the period before the main narrative we have the moment of respect, heroic propriety, and fair play when Achilles gives his enemy King Eëtion a funeral with full military honors (6.416–20). One final and fundamental question remains in our analysis: does the text of the *Iliad* permit us to see any other stimulus for the Iliadic warrior's sense of fairness and, beyond that, his feelings of generosity?

As with the constraints to act loyally, the psychological machinery operates on two levels, one ultimate, one proximate. It operates ultimately on the level of guilt and proximately on that of shame, not on just one or the other, though some scholars have opted for a more exclusive model.[12] D.L. Cairns' discussion of shame and guilt carefully defines the emotions. Broadly speaking, Cairns accepts the view that

> when one feels shame at one's moral conduct, one focuses on the kind of person one is, on the whole self, on one's failure to match one's self-image or to manifest a prized moral excellence; guilt, on the other hand, focuses on the specific transgression of an internalized injunction, dealing not with the whole self but with the discrepancy between one's moral self and one's (immoral) act.

Cairns is, however, at pains to point out the difficulty of distinguishing between focus on the self alone and focus on self as agent of special acts; he rightly doubts that popular usage respects the distinction, and he admits a degree of overlap.[13] His abstract models of shame and honor correspond easily with my layering of proximate and ultimate pressures.

Hektor's debate with himself whether to retreat behind the walls of Troy (22.99–130), often regarded as a key text in this connection, is couched in terms of shame. He fears the rebuke (100) of Poulydamas for not following his good tactical advice, has shame (*aideomai*, 105) in the face of the citizens of Troy and what they will say about his disastrously misplaced confidence in his own might (106–7), expresses the preference to die "with fair fame" (110) before the city rather than face his shame, and finally rejects

the possibility that he might offer restitution to the Achaians on the grounds that Achilles would have no reverence for him in any case and would kill him once he had taken off his armor and was naked and like a woman (124f.). As he expresses it, honor demands that he stand his ground, even if it is his last stand, and even more so now than in his speech to Andromache in book 6, where in similar phraseology he refused his wife's entreaty to fight from inside the walls, talking of his shame before the Trojans if he were to avoid combat like a coward (6.441–46). Now he has the added shame of knowing that his self-confidence has proven inadequate and that a lesser warrior is in a position to rebuke him for it.

Hektor's words and reasoning require closer inspection. He may express his reactions to his situation in terms of shame and honor, but here and in general, what function could shame and honor fulfill unless some anterior impulse were present? It is difficult to imagine a society cooperating or not cooperating on the basis of shame and honor alone, and we have already considered the likelihood that a sense of fairness lies behind such sanctions. We can in turn, I suggest, discern the workings of guilt behind the notion of justice. At the back of Hektor's honor-terminology, a core of guilt seems to exist over his having destroyed his community through his own "recklessness" (22.104). If ruining his people were purely a matter of shame and honor, we might justifiably still feel a little puzzled over what the shame and honor were about—why they were there in the first place. The sense of guilt is the ultimate driving force, though in Hektor's speech and in Iliadic society generally, its voice, like that of justice, is heard only faintly. In the case of justice, words like *just* are rare, because, as I argue, the quality is not effective by itself and needs the more tangible mechanisms of honor-based social institutions to make it so.[14] Likewise, guilt more often than not can only be expressed and actuated through the more immediate sanctions of honor and shame.

That guilt is a living impulse in the psyche of the Iliadic hero and is demonstrated by a passage that has received surprisingly little attention from scholars interested in such things. In book 24 Achilles responds to Priam's supplication for Hektor's corpse with the image of the two jars of Zeus, a consolatory explanation of the mutability of human fortune. But from the beginning he is amazed by the "iron heart" of Priam, who has dared to enter the presence of the man who has killed so many of the king's sons (518–21). His thoughts easily turn to his own father and Peleus' mixed fortunes. Peleus, he says, was preeminent in wealth and sway, but Zeus allotted him the misfortune of having only one son, who was to be "completely untimely" (540), in terms of his early death. Achilles goes on to say, in reference both to Peleus' misfortune and to his own feelings about his father, that he is not

"caring for" Peleus in his old age but is sitting idly before Troy causing "care" for Priam and his children (540–42). How are we to interpret the emotions behind these words? We may justifiably see here regret about the misery he is causing Priam and his family. Moreover, care for aged parents had a sanction in honor and shame,[15] and shame may be something else that we can legitimately impute to Achilles. But can we not plausibly identify the dominant feeling that Achilles is expressing as guilt over the fact that he is not supporting Peleus in his old age, brought on because of the deaths he is dealing out at Troy? The passage demonstrates the need for us to be receptive to pluralistic interpretations—sorrow for an enemy, shame, guilt—rather than to be straitjacketed into reductive, minimalist approaches like Adkins'. Achilles allows guilt to speak more directly here perhaps than anywhere else in the poem.

This is even true of when Achilles recriminates himself for not being present to defend Patroklos from death. He tells Thetis that life has no pleasure for him now that his "dear" friend is dead, whom he "honored" (18.80–81), not until Hektor has "paid the penalty" for killing Patroklos (*apotînô*, 93), who needed Achilles' defense (98–100); so now he will rejoin the battle and win "noble glory" (121), reminding the Trojans' wives of how long he has been absent from the fray by killing many of their men (122–25). The coexistence of affection and honor in friendship in the *Iliad* is brought out very well here, but not a sense of guilt. Achilles expresses his emotions exclusively in terms of affection, shame, and honor, though now that we have reason to believe that guilt was a reality in the human world of the *Iliad* and that the heroes characteristically translate into shame what we would call guilt, we are at liberty, if we choose, to postulate the activity of guilt-feelings behind Achilles' reactions and words. In a later speech of lamentation, a direct address to the corpse of Patroklos, Achilles states that he could not suffer more, even if he were to be told of Peleus' death or that of his son, Neoptolemos (19.321ff.). It is interesting to compare his words on Peleus with those in book 24. In his speech over the dead Patroklos, he pictures his father in Phthia shedding tears of longing for his son while Achilles is abroad fighting the Trojans over Helen (19.323–25), and he surmises that Peleus is either already dead or grieving in his old age and ever expecting news of his son's death (334–37). These are undeniably words of rift and sadness, even if those feelings are subordinated to Achilles' overriding emotional concern for Patroklos, but they are not words expressly of guilt, however significant a factor that emotion may be behind the words.

The presence of such guilt is the ultimate mechanism behind the Iliadic hero's sense of justice—for example, when he is revolted by displays of excessive self-assertion. A hero's feelings of guilt may be swamped by other

considerations, such as the desire for honor when the deed is hot: guilt hardly plays a role in Agamemnon's decision to insult Apollo's priest and his own prophet and to rob his loyal followers of the spoils of war that have fairly been allotted them. A mediator like Nestor, however, can, presumably by his experience of guilt at some juncture in his own life or by the transference of the feeling from the collective conscience, judge that Agamemnon should feel guilt as a consequence of his injustice. For his part, Agamemnon reacts to his internal guilt-feelings and realizes that he has acted unjustly (though he admittedly expresses his repentance without any recourse to guilt-terminology), but only when the impulses that have overridden his sense of guilt have evaporated. The expectation is, therefore, that the sense of guilt will deter men from unjust behavior. Moreover, Zeus and other gods reduplicate the motivation of guilt and therefore emphasize its importance.[16] The trouble is, as the example of Agamemnon illustrates, that the sense of guilt is all too easily ignored in the pursuit of the very values that normally substantiate its claim on the heroes to behave appropriately and worthily. The problem is especially pointed in the ethical climate of the warrior-society at the stage of the Trojan War at which the *Iliad* takes up the tale. At least in part, the crisis in values that exists in the *Iliad* is based on what have turned out to be the conflicting claims of guilt and shame or honor, though ironically shame and honor are normally expected to buttress the claims of guilt and the fairness-principle that originates in guilt. As we have seen, the balance has tipped in favor of honor and shame, though it is redressed at the end of the poem, when the voice of guilt is heard once more, and a hero responds with generosity.

A Tragedian Reflects

The tension that could arise between an essentially honor-based heroism and the claims of affection and fairness on heroic behavior apparently fascinated the Greeks into at least the fifth century. Proof of such an interest is provided by the *Aias* of Sophokles, which is in important respects a meditation on the *Iliad* and its ethical world.[17] Because Sophokles' play explores the ethical tensions within heroism and nobility in terms that are strikingly similar to those of the *Iliad*, it lends support to the model that I have proposed in this chapter and proves that the problems inherent in heroism that I have suggested lie at the very heart of the *Iliad* were perceived by Greek society in Sophokles' day not as mere poetic constructs but as live issues. This increases the likelihood that at least this aspect of Homeric society was historical.

In the course of its analysis of what it means to be "noble" (*eugenês*), that is, to be nobly born and to behave appropriately, the *Aias*, I suggest, pits

the claim of *tîmê* against those of affection and justice, *dikê*. It resolves the tension by acknowledging the different sorts of nobility involved in both sets of criteria and by demonstrating the need for a combination of fairness and a generosity that is based on such human emotions as pity and on friendship.

The champion of the *tîmê*-standard is Aias. At lines 764–75 the messenger recalls the parting advice of Aias' father, Telamon, to his son as he set forth on the expedition to Troy—that Aias should desire to be victorious in battle, but to do so with the gods on his side (764–65). We saw the motif of the father encouraging his son to be preeminent and at the same time entering a caveat when we examined Peleus' words to Achilles. In the *Aias* the caveat has been turned from advice about being cooperative into a stricture about the need to maintain right relations with the gods, which is a comparatively minor element in Peleus' counsel. In both cases the advice is directed at the son's particular weakness, and in the *Aias* Telamon's suggestion is met with Aias' proud insistence that even nonentities can win might with the aid of the gods. Aias has confidence that he will win *kleos* even without their support; he later tells Athene to stand by other sections of the Achaian army on the grounds that wherever he is there to defend the line, it will never be broken (766–75). The idea that a hero might boast that he does not need divine aid is foreign to the *Iliad* and belongs more properly to fifth-century tragedy,[18] but a hero's confidence in his own prowess is quite within the realm of Iliadic concepts of heroism.

Aias is devastated by shame after his failure to be allotted the armor of Achilles and his subsequent crazed attack on the cattle and sheep. When Tekmessa and the Chorus first meet him after the carnage, which he now recognizes as such, he makes a bitterly ironic comparison between his former martial prowess and the might with which he has attacked mere animals, and he grieves over how he has been reduced to a laughingstock and how he has been shamed (364–67).[19] Later, addressing the River Skamandros, he uses a vaunting tone typical of epic when he claims that Troy never saw his equal, but he doses his assertion with the comment that he now lies prostrate, without honor (41.8–27); the epic tone and sentiment—we think especially, perhaps, of Achilles' remark that he has no equal among the Achaians (*Il.* 18.105), a remark made precisely when he is racked by feelings of shame, guilt, and grief on hearing of Patroklos' death—add significantly to the bitterness of Aias' reference to his loss of *tîmê*. The thought is developed in the speech that immediately follows, in which Aias compares his achievements with those of Telamon, who came to the same place and through his prowess won Hesione, the fairest prize of all the army (435), bringing home "all glory" (436), while Aias, after no less effort, is perishing without *tîmê* among the Greeks (440). Aias deplores the thought of

appearing before Telamon without gifts of honor, the source of Telamon's "great crown of glory" (462–66).[20] He declares it ignoble that a man who has unvaryingly bad fortune should want to have a long life (473–74), and he concludes that the man who is nobly born, *eugenês*, should either live nobly or die so (479–80).

Here is heroism's competitive drive in all the shapes in which the *Iliad* presents it, apart, that is, from Aias' proud disclaimer of the need for any divine aid. Sophokles confronts it head-on, first with the claims of affection, or to use his own word, *charis*. In her answer to Aias' speech of shame, Tekmessa uses almost all the arguments with which Andromache implores Hektor to fight from within the walls of Troy,[21] but she also uses some of those with which Priam supplicates Achilles for Hektor's corpse. Significantly, she echoes the Iliadic Hektor as he pictures Andromache's captors gloating over the depths to which his wife will sink and as he hopes that he will be dead and buried before hearing her cries in captivity (*Il.* 6.459–65). She picks up the shame motif and makes a forceful point out of it: "These words will be shameful to you and your family" (505).[22] So shame does form part of her entreaty. But the burden of her plea is directed at Aias' affections. She argues that Aias should have reverence for his old father and for his mother, who longs for his homecoming (506–9), a thought that in all likelihood goes back to Priam's persuasive words to Achilles about Peleus.[23] He should pity their son, Eurysakes, whose fate she goes on to describe (510–13), just as Andromache does for Astyanax at *Iliad* 22.490–98, after she has seen that Hektor has been killed. And he should pity Tekmessa. She introduces this consideration early in her speech, when she reminds Aias that she is his allotted slave and has shared his bed, so she is concerned for his well-being and can entreat him in the name of Zeus of the Hearth not to abandon her to his enemies (487–99). Later she argues that Aias is all to her (514–19). Here she echoes Andromache's famous words to Hektor (*Il.* 6.411–30), with the difference that Achilles, the enemy, destroyed Andromache's homeland, but Aias destroyed Tekmessa's, making Tekmessa's dependence on Aias even more poignant.

All this is merely a prelude to the appeal that forms the climax of her speech. She reasons that a man should not forget "if he has anywhere enjoyed something pleasant," because kindness, *charis*, always begets kindness, *charis*, and whoever forgets being treated well is not a nobly born man or is not acting in accordance with his station (520–24). With these words she directly challenges Aias' competitive definition of the noble man as one who must either live or die nobly, and with the word *pleasant*, she is answering his question about what "pleasure" the day can bring when a man's misery is unrelieved (475–76). She is doing nothing less than defining the noble man

as one who is responsive to kindness and affection. Aias' reaction is instructive. He admits that at Tekmessa's appeal, even he, who formerly was as hard as tempered steel, felt his edge grow soft, "unmanned," "made like a woman,"[24] and that he feels pity for her and Eurysakes (650–53), though this is insufficient to change his resolve to die.[25] The word for "made like a woman" illustrates the honor-driven warrior's contempt for the affective appeal, but Aias is far from entirely unmoved.

This is by no means the sum total of what the play has to say about *charis*, "kindness" or "kind favor." For one thing, there is the thought that "gratitude" should be shown for past services. Aias gives indirect expression to this when he says that if his old repute has been destroyed, he will have nowhere to flee, and the Achaians will kill him (404–9). The Chorus lament the fact that the Atreidai do not appreciate Aias' former deeds of the greatest *aretê* (616–20). Teukros makes the point most clearly, perhaps, in his speech to Agamemnon, when he turns to address the dead Aias and takes the ingratitude of the Atreidai as proof of how quickly *charis* disappears (1266–71). In all this we remember Achilles' complaint to the embassy at *Iliad* 9.316f. that there has been no *charis* forthcoming in return for his continual fighting against the Trojans, so here too Sophokles seems to be picking up a theme cardinal to the epic.[26]

It is time to consider the thought behind the arguments of the characters in the play who are prepared to take Aias' part before Agamemnon and Menelaos. Teukros concludes his speech to Agamemnon by saying that it is more noble for him to labor on Aias' behalf than on that of the Atreidai over Helen (1310–12). He has just been defending himself against Agamemnon's taunts about his low, barbarian birth (1288–1307; cf. 1228–35, 1259–63), so context would seem to suggest that the word for "noble" here, *kalon*, involves the aristocratic *agathos*-standard of virtuous behavior, from which Teukros never really deviates. At 1125 he urges the claims of justice, and he does so in the face of Menelaos' insistence that as a mere archer he has no right to have "high thoughts" (1120–25). But he does so only after he has defended his bowmanship against the charge of being a "skill unworthy of a free-born man." At 1299–1303, he argues that his parentage was "really" noble; and at 1093–96 he expresses the traditional thought that the nobly born should set an example for the lowborn.[27] Within the competitive *tîmê*-framework, Teukros praises Odysseus as "best," *aristos*, for his justice and generosity toward Aias (1381, 1399).

The attitude of Odysseus is most important for our inquiry. Tekmessa and Teukros, as people dear to Aias (*philoi*), have reason to defend the hero, but Odysseus and Aias are rivals and enemies, and Odysseus still extends *charis* to his dead opponent. When Agamemnon expresses surprise at this,

Odysseus admits that Aias was an enemy but says he was noble all the same, and he says that Aias' competitive *aretê* moves him more than their enmity (1354–57). He says he cannot approve of "a hard heart" (1361). What are Odysseus' reasons for wanting to see the body of his enemy honored with decent burial? To Agamemnon he says that he himself would not dishonor Aias, for he was "the best" among the Achaians after Achilles, and he says further that the king would be unjust (1342) to dishonor him: Agamemnon would be attacking not him but the laws of the gods, and it is in any case "not just to harm the morally noble man [*esthlos*] when he dies, even if you happen to hate him" (1336–45). Here a sense of justice, located in the laws of the gods, tempers the heroic tîmê-response illustrated by Agamemnon. Odysseus reveals even deeper motives much earlier in the play, when Athene has goaded Aias into attacking the cattle and sheep. The goddess has just asked Odysseus whether it is not the "sweetest mockery" to mock one's enemies, and he has replied that it would have been sufficient for him that Aias stay inside, an oblique way of saying that he did not want to look on Aias' misery (79–80). After the display of Athene's power, Odysseus can only say that he pities (121) Aias because he has been yoked to an evil doom, and he perceives that his own position is no less precarious than Aias', because all humans are mere images or insubstantial shadows (121–26). Here, as in the *Iliad*, we have the ultimate factor preconditioning the just and generous response: pity for one's fellowman, even one's enemies, motivated by the experience of the suffering that human life can entail. Near the close of the play, Odysseus even offers to join in and help with the burial and to do all that mortals should do in the case of "the best men" (1376–80), which prompts Teukros to praise him, in traditional terms maybe, for his generosity and for his sole defense of his former enemy (1381–99); "Be assured," he says, "that you are an *esthlos* as far as we are concerned" (1398f.).

Once again Sophokles is evidently thinking of the *Iliad*. The model for Odysseus is the Achilles of *Iliad* 24, who pities his enemies Priam and Hektor in part because of his experience of the meaning of mortality (*Il.* 24.503, 516, 540). Achilles is prepared to bend the rules and keep Priam's presence a secret from Agamemnon (650–55), he has Hektor's corpse washed and anointed, and lifts it onto the wagon himself (580–95), and he promises an eleven-day truce while Hektor is buried. Sophokles has shaped the model in his own way, in particular by making the theme of justice more explicit and direct, but the use of Odysseus to mediate in the denouement of the quarrel over Achilles' armor is even more powerful when we realize that his sentiments and moral outlook are based on those of the "original" Achilles. Thus Odysseus' generosity represents the crowning form of nobility of birth and the behavior expected of it in the *Aias*. However grand and awe-inspiring

Aias' devotion to *tîmê*, however moving the appeal to affection given expression by Tekmessa, Odysseus' combination of the sense of justice and the conditioning factor of emotional responses like pity finally succeeds in resolving the quarrel over Achilles' armor in its last stages.

In Aias' unwillingness to compromise himself in his standing as a *tîmê*-warrior, in Tekmessa's appeal to him (partly) in terms of affection, in Teukros' and especially Odysseus' insistence that the Atreidai behave justly toward Aias' corpse, and in Odysseus' generosity in accepting that he has a duty to his rival and enemy that is founded on the pity he feels for a fellow mortal, we have all the ingredients of the tension in moral values that I suggest operates in the *Iliad*.[28] The remarkable overriding similarity between the two sets of heroic values helps to substantiate my reading of the *Iliad*'s values and points to the probability that the problems posed by the conflicting claims of honor and generosity were as real and engaging for the early audiences of the *Iliad* as they evidently were for those of a dramatic production like the *Aias*.[29]

NOTES

1. For discussion, see Griffin 1980, 48, 137f. Recently, critics like Marg (1973, 10), Griffin (1980, 94f., with lit.), Mueller (1984, 68–76, 77–89), Schein (1984, 67–88, with lit. at 67 n. 1), and Silk (1987, 73–78) note such gruesome moments but prefer to view the *Iliad* as a poem of death rather than war, reflecting the current opinion of the epic as a "cleaned up" version of the Trojan theme; see also now the disturbing picture sketched by Fehling (1989) of the Trojan story before the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. When I draw attention to the *Iliad*'s depiction of the brutalization of values, one of my aims is to demonstrate that, for all the epic's purgation of the gruesome, the grotesque, and the gratuitously cruel, it can still analyze the effects of war in their full horror, while accepting war as a datum of human life.

2. See Leaf 1886–88, ad loc.; cf. Kirk 1990, on 7.427.

3. See Mueller 1984, 67, for the view that Homer "holds that war does not come into its own until its 'original' cause is lost." On brutalization in the Trojan War, especially when the plan of Zeus has been initiated, see Redfield 1975, 167–69.

4. Recently, Taplin (1992, 162f.) has explained Agamemnon's attitude toward Adrestos on the grounds that, as he sees it, in battlefield supplication scenes the captor gains ransom-gifts and "gives out some concern"; because concern for a Trojan like Adrestos is "inappropriate," Agamemnon is at liberty to order Adrestos' immediate dispatch. I am unconvinced by this "anthropology" for reasons that should by now be apparent; in particular, I find the honor-component in the ransom-gifts sufficient obligation on the captor's benevolence and respect, where considerations of "concern" (which Taplin does not fully explain) are much less compelling than Taplin allows. A comparably hideous example of the contravention of normal correct behavior is Odysseus' rejection of Dolon's supplication at 10.454–64, where Odysseus actually turns around and devotes Dolon's armor and weapons to Athene. The Doloneia is, however, unlikely to be part of the monumental *Iliad*; see most recently Danek 1988; Taplin 1992, 11, 152f. See also Taplin 1992, 53f., for Agamemnon's rejection of Chryses' supplication at the very beginning of the poem, entailing a lack of *aidôs* for Chryses as a priest; but the ransom-gifts offered by Chryses command respect as well.

5. Cf. 11.13–14, 19.339.

6. For discussion of the court scene see especially Edwards 1991, on 18.497–508, 498–500, with lit.; Edwards argues persuasively for the second interpretation.

7. On the analysis of Schofield (1986, 18–22), the debate between Hektor and Poulydamas demonstrates the "dynamism" inherent in the heroic code, the conflict between the "intended results" that the code sanctions—defense of one's community and so forth—and its "goal,"—glory; that may be so, but Schofield seems to me to ignore the emotional aspect of Hektor's decision.

8. Against Adkins 1960b, 37f.: Dover 1983, 37f.; Rowe 1983, 264f.; Schofield 1986, 29. Cf. Long 1970, 126–28, with Rowe, loc. cit.; Gagarin 1987, 303–6; Cairns 1993, 95–103. Moreover, when Nestor points out to Achilles that Agamemnon has superior *tîmê* as a scepter-bearing king (278–79), he may be again tacitly criticizing the king, because in Homeric thinking the Zeus-given *tîmê* of the king imposes on him the obligation to wield the scepter and pronounce *themistes*; so, e.g., Odysseus at 2.197, 205–6. It is therefore "appropriate" that the man with the highest *tîmê* exercise the greatest moral and legal force and also act appropriately. In that case, Nestor could be suggesting that Agamemnon in particular should "live up to his position."

9. My analysis differs from that of Schofield (1986), who considers that "excellent counsel" is necessary to adjudicate between the claims of honor and is therefore external to it. I would accept that rationality is a heroic virtue, but I suggest that, in the settlement of conflicting claims to honor, honor gives a more direct indication of "appropriate" behavior than Schofield allows.

10. See, e.g., 19.58; cf. 16.476.

11. See further, e.g., 5.890f. (= 1.177f.).

12. Championing shame: Dodds 1951, 17f., 28–63; Finley 1978, esp. 108–26; Adkins 1960b, 48f.; 1971, 4f. Lloyd-Jones (1983, 2, 15, 24–27; 1987a, 1–7; 1987b, 307f.) and Dickie (1978) accept the importance of shame in Homeric society, but Lloyd-Jones underemphasizes it to discover a guilt-based sense of justice in the *Iliad*, while Dickie seeks "internalized moral imperatives" alongside the shame-factor. I agree that a shame-culture could never be totally devoid of some element of guilt and some internalized sense of what is intrinsically right. See Lloyd-Jones 1983, 15, 25–27; 1987a, 1f.; Gould 1973, 87–89; Cairns 1993, 27–47 (with extensive argumentation and lit.).

13. Cairns 1993, 22, 23–25.

14. See Hoffmann 1914, 39ff., esp. 43, 107; Gagarin 1973, 87. On Hektor's sense of guilt, Dickie (1978, 94) argues that Hektor's speech to Andromache in *Il.* 6 provides evidence "that men have personal convictions about the right thing to do." His point is amplified by Cairns (1993 79–83), who argues that in *Il.* 22 Hektor has an awareness of his misdeed that is likewise subjective and thus demonstrates the "germ" of an idea of retrospective conscience. Cairns' discussion of both passages seems to me, however, to underestimate the operation of *tîmê* on Hektor's mind. In both cases, the negative, inhibitory drive of *aidôs* is present, but equally powerful is the positive impulse of the "learnt" desire to be *esthlos* among the front-line fighters and to win *kleos* (6.445f.), or to face and kill Achilles or die "with fair *kleos* in front of the city" and see whom Zeus will give the triumph, ideas picked up later with the wish to die not "without *kleos*" but "having done something great for men to come to learn of" (22.110, 130, 304f.). What Hektor naturally feels, *aidôs*, and what he has "learnt" (and internalized) are not the same thing, though they are, as I have expressed it elsewhere, "opposite ends of the same stick." This is an important reservation, which I sense generally in Cairns' treatment of the pressures on Homer's warriors, however excellent its analysis of the shame-component.

15. *At Works and Days* 185–88, for example, Hesiod complains that the young in the present Age of Iron "do no honor to" their aging parents, by, among other things, not paying them back for rearing them; see also, in the *Iliad*, 4.477f., 17.301f.

16. Lesky 1961, 27f., on "Nachdrücken."

17. Discussions of the influence of the Homeric view of heroism on the *Aias* include Knox 1961, 1–37; Winnington-Ingram 1980, 15–19; Gould 1983, 32–45, esp. 38–40; Easterling 1984; Goldhill 1986, 154–61; Easterling 1987, 52–61. What follows is a modified version of my remarks at Zanker 1992.

18. N.B. 127–33 (Athene on self-restraint). Aias' *hûbris* is absent from his words at *Il.* 17.634, but the concept is present in the *Odyssey*, when the Locrian Aias defiantly asserts that he will cross the sea in safety "without the good will of the gods" (4.504); Sophokles seems to have transferred the *hûbris* of the Locrian Aias to the Telamonian; see Kamerbeek 1953, on *Aias* 767, 768. The handling of this theme in the *Aias* has most recently been discussed by Crane (1990, 89–101, esp. 99–101); for prior studies of Sophokles' fifth-century perspective on Homeric heroism see the preceding note.

19. The effect of Aias' dishonor on his followers graphically illustrates the socially competitive aspect of shame. At 141–47, 154–61, 173f., and 187–91 the Chorus of Aias' men bewail their insignificance and their consequent inability to defend themselves on a competitive level against the charges of dishonor to which their master has exposed them.

20. With ironic appropriateness, therefore, it is the gift of Aias' enemy Hektor, the sword that the Trojan gave him when they ceased hostilities at *Il.* 7.303ff., with which Aias chooses to end his life (815–22); because he obtained it from Hektor, he has received nothing "of value" from the Achaians, which on the heroic logic of esteem must include any gift (661–65). Moreover, Sophokles makes Hektor and Aias guest-friends as a result of the exchange, so the sword is a gift given in guest-friendship, and the dramatist can play on the incongruity of the inauspiciousness of the gift (665) and of the idea of a guest-friend being "most hated" (817f.); see Herman 1987, 60 n. 56, with Easterling 1984, 6f. The case of Hektor, whom Sophokles makes receive Aias' belt after the duel, is similarly ironic, for the belt is used to bind Hektor's corpse to Achilles' chariot; together with the irony of Hektor's gift to Aias, it makes Teukros conclude that the gods have planned the neat coincidence (1028–39).

21. See Easterling 1984, 1–5.

22. Her reminiscence of Hektor's evocation of what an anonymous man will say in time to come powerfully amplifies the shame/honor-aspect of her appeal; on such speeches, see Wilson 1979, 1–15; de Jong 1987b.

23. *Il.* 24.486–94; see esp. 487, and cf. *Aias* 506f., for the similarity of phrasing on the *gêras*, the "old age," of Peleus and Telamon.

24. Cf. his low estimation of men who weep, reported by Tekmessa at 319f., and his impatience with the tearfulness of women, expressed at 525–28 and 578–82.

25. See Easterling 1984, 5f., on the limited but real softening of Aias' attitude toward people dear to him (*philoi*) that is discernible in the Deception Speech; see now also Crane 1990, 89–101, esp. 94–99, with lit.

26. The motif is also used in connection with Tekmessa, when she is made to say that she has been cast out of "the favor [*charis*] in which (she) was formerly held" (807f.).

27. See Adkins 1972, 65–67.

28. Gill (1990, 19–22) argues persuasively that in the *Aias* we can see the operation of his "character"–"personality" distinction, which he bases essentially on, respectively, perspectives of character that are objective and moral, and perspectives that are subjective and empathetic; in the Deception Speech, for example, we see Aias presented from the

perspectives of both "character" and "personality." Gill's distinction is by and large compatible with my ethical model, "character" comprehending the proximate drives, "personality" the ultimate.

29. In the *Philoktetes* of 409, we observe Sophokles in some ways reduplicating the scheme of values that he explores in the *Aias*. He reflects not only on his sources from epic, in particular the *Kypria*, *Little Iliad*, and *Iliou Persis*, but on the plays of the same name by Aischylos and Euripides, by introducing Neoptolemos as the agent for securing Philoktetes' bow. Neoptolemos is characterized as compassionate, generous, and thus ultimately concerned to see that Philoktetes is treated fairly (906, 965f., 1074f., 1224–34), in stark opposition to Odysseus, whose exclusive interest is to achieve his purpose (75–85, 108–34, 1049–62); see in general Jebb 1898, xixf., xxivff. Success, which Odysseus calls "victory," is an essential component of the competitive *tîmê*-mentality. This opposition of values is very different from what we can glean of the *Problematik* of Aischylos' and Euripides' plays on Philoktetes; see Jebb 1898, xiv–xxvi. It is possible that in the *Philoktetes* he uses the tension to shape his cast and their characterization. In the case of the *Elektra*, however, Sophokles' reading of Homeric epic, this time the *Odyssey* with its revenge theme, feeds into a very different set of moral concerns; see most recently Davidson 1988, 45–72. This suggests, perhaps, that Sophokles particularly regarded the tension as one inherent in the warrior-ethic of the epic tradition.

NORMAN AUSTIN

The Helen of the Iliad

Helen of Troy is no doubt the most famous woman in European history after the Virgin Mary, and certainly the most fascinating. The story reverberates through the ages, and mysterious Helen is still a poet's theme, appearing most recently in Derek Walcott's *Omeros*. Such long-enduring fame raises the inevitable question, Was there a real Helen of Troy? Put another way, Was Helen no more than a story?

Time was when the Trojan War was taken to be no more than a story, richly embroidered by folk imagination, but archaeology has taught us caution. Troy has been uncovered, several Troys in fact, layer upon layer, and Mycenae too. Treasures enough have been found in both citadels to make King Agamemnon and King Priam at least plausible historical figures. But Helen? Here scholars balk. Modernists, we smile at the fables of the ancients, and when they talk of thrones and diadems we see economics.

Perhaps a devastating war was fought in the late Bronze Age between the Myceneans and the Trojans for economic motives. No one, reading Agamemnon's majestic offer of goods and property, including his own daughter, to Achilles in *Iliad* 9, could miss the economics of the Trojan War. Homer's Greeks and Trojans loved their commodities with a passion and required ever new territory, it seems, to preserve and enlarge their treasuries.

From *Helen of Troy and Her Shameless Phantom*. ©1994 by Cornell University Press.

The new technology, which required ore and mines, and shipping lanes to those mines, had the whole Mediterranean in thrall.

But above economics Homer places a more seductive cause—the quest for beauty. Beauty is among the greatest, if not the greatest, of all the archetypes in Homer's pantheon. Whoever possessed beauty in Homeric society would possess the world, so high was the value placed on beauty. Aphrodite may be wounded by a mere man (in *Iliad* 5) or abused by Hera and Athena for her soft, womanish ways, but we should not be misled by such temporary insults to her dignity. Hers was the power to undo even the political arrangements of Olympus (as in *Iliad* 14, when Hera borrows Aphrodite's charms to divert the will of Zeus). Beauty in the *Iliad*, as in Plato's cosmology, is the Subject to which every signifier turns, like the compass point to its magnetic pole.[1]

On one side Homer places the other commodities for which men fight—horses, bronze, chariots, breastplates, greaves, silver, gold, slaves male and female. But Helen belongs in an economic category of her own. If we take the Helen tradition as a whole, we see that Helen, though often captured, is not, never was, and never will be a slave. Of all the women in the *Iliad*, Helen alone escapes the slavery in store for the others—Chryseis, Briseis, Andromache, Hecuba, the seven beautiful and gifted women of Lesbos whom Agamemnon gives to Achilles in book 19—the list is almost endless. Helen is conspicuously different.

To heighten the difference even further, Helen, with nothing more to lose but her reputation, will be responsible, or held responsible at least, for the slavery that befalls the other women. They will be reduced to the level of commodities "through" or "because of" Helen, while Helen herself remains a free woman. Homer's formula for Helen, "the daughter of Zeus," reminds us that Helen transcends economic categories. Like Aphrodite, Helen's Olympian archetype, Helen transcends categories altogether. Beauty writes its own laws. Helen, like Aphrodite, may be wounded but never bought, sold, or killed.

Could Homer's uncouth pirates have waged war for beauty? We smile at the romanticism. The tribal imagination spins complex social history, which today is generally read as the politics of acquisition and dominance, into romance—the "Rape of Helen," the "Judgment of Paris," the "House of Atreus," the "Trojan War." The Homerist, asked to sift through the romance for "the real Helen," responds with the scholar's shrug. The archaeologist, on one hand, will settle for nothing less than material proof, and no spade has yet uncovered Helen's sandal.[2] On the other hand, the literary critic needs no facts. No historical documents or artifacts will ever diminish Homer's Helen or improve her. What has art to do with history? Beauty is truth; that is all we need to know.

But while Homerists of whatever stripe may dismiss the real Helen as irrelevant, whether for history or for literature, the story goes on, retold from generation to generation, and curious listeners continue to ask, "Was there ever a real Helen?" The question may be naive, yet in its innocence it shows a surer instinct for Homer's art than the scholar who brackets the question to attend to questions of graver import. The question is, in fact, central to Homer's *Iliad*, and we can still hear its echo in the *Odyssey*. Whoever asks the question is Homer's true reader, responding to the enigma that Homer himself named "Helen, daughter of Zeus."

When we ponder "the real Helen," we venture beyond the simple historical question that might be asked of Homer's other characters.[3] We have no difficulty imagining an overbearing, truculent king like Agamemnon, a garrulous old soldier like Nestor, a vain, young hotspur of the royal house like Paris. But Helen stands on another ontological plane. Was she goddess or human? Was she seduced by Paris or raped? Was she a libertine or the victim of society? Helen will never die for her honor, as Achilles will, and a host of others, including Agamemnon, Patroklos, and Hector. Helen will lose neither life nor honor; instead, she will be given, according to the syntax peculiar to the Homeric epic, immortality in return for having no honor to lose. That is to be her sign for eternity: to be the woman with no shame.

Disgraced in life, Helen is spared punishment, and even death, which is the common fate of all other women, whether virtuous or not. Instead, Helen is fated to spend eternity in a state of grace, or as close to grace as human impersonations of the gods can reach. In the version given to us in the *Odyssey* (4.561–69), Menelaus will be transported to the Islands of the Blest, where we may infer that he and Helen will be united for all eternity, though other stories outside the epic suggested that if Menelaus were rewarded with a place in Elysium, Helen herself would be advanced even higher, to the very skies. Yet other stories arose, which told of Helen and Achilles as lovers after death, two eidola—icons, images, shadows—consummating their secret, spiritual union on Leuke, the island in the Black Sea where Achilles was honored in cult after his death.[4] Even in death Helen's state was undecided—whether she remained with her husband or rejoined her brothers, the Dioskouroi, or found true love with Achilles. Neither Homer's Greeks nor his Trojans knew what to make of Helen, who was as hated as she was privileged, and Helen herself was as perplexed as they.

Achilles and Helen—the two occupy a position of supreme privilege in Homer's world, she as the daughter of Zeus, and he as the son of Thetis. She is the fairest of the Achaeans, and he the best. But the terms are synonyms in Homer's shame culture: the best is the fairest; the fairest, the best.[5] Achilles

is the most beautiful and the best in the masculine form; Helen, the most beautiful and best in a woman's form.

But privilege in myth is double-edged. Seen by their peers, Helen and Achilles stand on the pinnacle of good fortune, their being bordering Being itself, to borrow Parmenides' eloquent phrase.[6] But seen through Homer's eyes, the gap between their being and the full, extravagant being of the gods, slight as it is, is the focus for the deepest existential anxiety. Born of the archetypes (the gods), they are not themselves the archetypes but only their icons in human form. Heroes can only approximate the gods, though this they do heroically, so heroically in Helen's case that she is destined to enjoy a paradise that is a simulacrum of Olympus itself.

As if to mark their privilege in his own way, Homer makes Helen and Achilles his two surrogates, seers and poets. Far removed in time from the plains of Troy, relying on hearsay ("the Muses"), Homer stations Achilles as his one seer in the Greek camp, and Helen, his other, in the bedroom at the heart of the Trojan affair. Placing the two at the vortex of the storm, Homer forthwith removes them to the periphery. Achilles, "the best of the Achaeans"—as athlete, horseman, and warrior—is banished by his pride, which is his internalized representation of the code of honor, from the arena where a hero's honor is established.[7] Idled at the ships, Achilles is a hollow shell with perhaps potential, but no actual, significance. Helen is banished too, but to her own room, secluded not only from the men but from the grieving wives and widows, to hide her shame. Whether compassionate or not, how could Helen join the other women in their mourning, being herself the cause of their grief, at least in their eyes? Both Helen and Achilles, situated exactly where mortality grazes immortality, are thus marginalized and made to observe the action from the spectator's seat. Sequestered, each learns to sublimate life into art, as they watch their own being drained from them to render them into icons for posterity. To diagram honor and shame in their culture, Achilles would serve as the icon of glory, and Helen as the icon of shame.[8]

Whatever Achilles' existential doubts when he is banished from the field of glory, Helen perhaps plumbs the ontological abyss more deeply when she wonders (to Hector, at *Iliad* 6.357–58) whether the gods designed her life with Paris specifically that she and Paris might be a theme for singers, by which she means a byword for generations to come. Achilles, watching his brief life unravel, may come to perceive that he will one day be no more than a story, but such a realization is far from his mind when he is rampant in the heat of success. Irony comes late to Achilles, but Helen was born to it. Achilles never hazards the possibility that the sole reason for his life was that he should figure in someone else's story. Until the death of Patroklos

transformed his story into the "Death of Patroklos," Achilles could still live in the illusion that the story was his own to shape as he chose, whether gloriously or ingloriously. Helen is allowed no such illusions, certainly not at least after *Iliad* 3. Only Helen is compelled to read her own life as a ghost story. Only she must, consistently and from the beginning, learn to convert (or subvert) the stuff of her daily life into her function as the glyph for "shame/ shamelessness" in the storybook of the tribe.

Helen first appears on the European stage in Homer's *Iliad* 3, when Iris takes us from the battlefield directly into Helen's private room. The rupture between Achilles and Agamemnon in book I has been glossed over. The two armies have marched forth, ready for war again. Menelaus, sighting Paris in the Trojan lines, beautiful in his leopard skin, rejoices like a lion sighting his prey. But Paris, who is, as the *Iliad* presents him, short on substance, on first sight of Menelaus shrinks back into the Trojan ranks. But then stung, for the moment at least, by Hector's insults to his manhood, Paris strikes a noble attitude to recoup his (and Hector's) honor. He calls for a truce and offers to settle the issue of the war in a duel between himself and Menelaus.

Heralds are dispatched to the city and to the ships to fetch the sacrificial animals to secure the covenant. While some race to fetch old king Priam from his palace to witness the covenant, Iris, normally the messenger of the gods but acting this time without waiting for her instructions, takes the opportunity to fly to Helen's rooms, to lure her out to the city walls.[9] At once we are in the forest of ambiguity.

Why is Helen needed at the city walls? To witness the duel that will decide her status once and for all, between Menelaus and Paris, whatever we may call them—her two lovers, her two husbands, her husband and her lover, her past and her present husband. But why should Helen witness the duel? We, the audience, will be fascinated, of course, but we are not Helen. The question is more pointed if we have read ahead and know the true, but ignominious, conclusion of the duel—Helen and Paris in bed, at the end of book 3.

Will one duel between two spearsmen, however noble, really settle the issue that a protracted war between two great armies has only exacerbated? "You will be declared the beloved wife of the victor," Iris explains to Helen (3.138). But Iris is naive. She does not know the mind of Zeus, or of Homer, as we do. Menelaus will win the duel, by default; Aphrodite will steal her darling from the field of shame and put him to bed, where Helen will comfort him for his lack of manhood on the battlefield. On the field the duel will end in Paris' disgrace, but then, in the bedroom, we will witness the true end and function of the duel, when Helen capitulates and joins Paris in his disgrace.[10] Outside the bedroom Pandaros will objectify the disgrace in a

more public way by shooting an arrow that tears the truce to pieces. The war will resume, and everything will be as it was before the duel. Helen's status remains as it was—undecided—except that for the moment she is to be found in Paris' bed, which signifies the disgrace that attends upon undecidedness.

Why is Helen really needed at the city gates? The answer is obvious. If Helen is required as witness to the covenant between the Greeks and Trojans, the plot requires also that she be witnessed. She may observe, but more important she must be observed. Her function is to be proudly displayed by the Trojans from the tower, and gazed at by the tormented Greeks, as the prize worthy of such a contest. As Deianeira watches Herakles wrestling with Achelous, with herself as the prize, Helen's part in the story is to stand witness to her own value as the prize in a contest of such heroic dimensions. But the two cases are not symmetrical. At least Herakles had the blood of Zeus in his veins; Helen's prize is Paris, whom his brother Hector calls a travesty of manhood (and Paris cheerfully agrees, at 3.39–66).

Far from witnessing the decision to clarify her status, Helen is asked to witness instead that her status cannot be decided. Behind the human contests are ranged three contestants on Olympus—Hera and Athena on one side, and Aphrodite on the other. Helen, so close to godhood herself, must function as Aphrodite's sign, and Aphrodite's favors are not bound by the normal social contracts. Like all signs, Helen must be equivocal. The greater the sign, the more equivocal its meanings: that is in the nature of the sign. Men cannot agree on her meaning, even when they stage a contest secured by oaths sworn in the presence of the upper and nether gods, because Aphrodite, the archetype of which Helen is the human copy, is not to be netted in human signifiers.

To add to the complications, Helen must be both woman-as-sign and woman, person and impersonation, at the same time. Without the woman herself, who would want the woman-as-sign? What use is the icon if the god will not dwell therein? Were Helen an icon empty of substance, the sign would lose all value. In the story spun for her by the gods, Helen must be both the object of desire and its subject, the source of desire and its goal. To fulfill this function she must not only appear equivocal; she must also equivocate, if she is to appear credible.

For a clearer vision of Helen as the Subject we could turn to the local cult of Helen at Sparta. Herodotus tells a lovely story of this Helen, the goddess, beautifying an ugly child, who grew up to become the mother of the Spartan king Demaratos.[11] Of the stories told of Demaratos, two were particularly remarkable. One concerned the marriage of his parents; the other, the peculiar fortunes of his mother, who was a living witness to Helen's power to beautify the ugly.

The first story tells of the parents of Demaratos and the clouded circumstances of his birth. Ariston, one of the kings of Sparta, was still without heirs after two marriages. He then took a fancy (an erotic itch, in Herodotus) for the woman who was considered the most beautiful of Spartan women. She, however, was already married, and to Ariston's good friend Agetos. Undaunted, Ariston conceived a clever plan. He persuaded his friend to make an agreement of exchange, no doubt in token of their friendship, in which each would hand over to the other that one thing, whatever it might be, which his friend desired. The agreement was secured under oath. We already know the end of the story. The trusting Agetos lost his wife, notwithstanding his protests that she had not been included in the agreement. Ariston promptly divorced his barren second wife and took as his wife the woman who was remembered as the most beautiful of Spartan women. The gods were kind, and Ariston's third wife, the anonymous beauty, now the queen, produced an heir at last, whom the people called Demaratos (Prayed for by the People), since Ariston was a much-loved king.

This story is the *Iliad* repeated in compact, local form: two men, friends, compete for the most beautiful woman, who is already married to one of them. A friendship is betrayed, a marriage is annulled, the woman is exchanged.[12] To make the story truly Iliadic, the man who wins the "most beautiful" woman (*kallistê*) is himself named "the best" (Ariston), though his means are foul. "The best," here as in the *Iliad*, is immediately problematic. Ariston's behavior—deceit, trickery, abuse of friendship (the typical gifts of Aphrodite)—comports poorly with his name. But where the libido is concerned (or where there are dynastic considerations), liberties are allowed.

Herodotus plays out the problematics of the story at some length. The marriage of the best man and the most beautiful woman should have produced the best of heirs. And so it did. Demaratos, welcomed at his birth, would grow up to become the king. But no story in Herodotus is complete without its blind curve. Given his heritage, we could surmise that Demaratos would have an equivocal history. When Ariston was brought the news of his son's birth, as he was seated in council with the ephors, he counted the months on his fingers and concluded that Agetos might be the father. Ariston refused to acknowledge the child as his legitimate son. In years to come, when Demaratos, "prayed for by the people" but disinherited by his own father, grew to be exactly the son Ariston had prayed for, Ariston regretted his early suspicions. But by then it was too late; the damage had been done. As in the *Iliad*, winning the most beautiful woman does not guarantee a man happiness.[13]

The second plot concerns the mother of Demaratos, whose story is even more striking than his. Though known in her maturity as the most

beautiful of Spartan women, the mother of Demaratos had been born the ugliest of babies. Her nurse, sympathetic to the distress of her parents at having a baby so ill formed (for they were prosperous people, Herodotus adds), made it her daily practice to take the baby to Helen's shrine at Therapne, a suburb of Sparta, across the Eurotas River. She would carry the baby heavily swathed, being under strict instructions from the parents to let no one see their disgrace. Her practice was to place the baby at the foot of the cult statue (the *agalma*—Helen's idol), and beseech the goddess to change the baby's "misshapenness" (*dusmorphia*).

One day, as she was leaving the shrine with the unsightly child heavily shawled against prying eyes, the nurse encountered a woman who inquired about the bundle in the nurse's arms. At length the nurse confessed it was a baby, but she would not show it; that was strictly forbidden. The strange woman persisted, the nurse's opposition melted (as whose would not?), the parents' prudish injunction was forgotten, and the ugly baby was exposed to the stranger's view. The stranger (Helen, of course, in a cameo appearance) then stroked the baby's head and said she would become "the most beautiful" (*kallistê*) of Spartan women. From that day, Herodotus concludes, the baby's appearance changed for the better.

This story points on the literal level to the idol of Helen—her *agalma*—in her shrine, but the beauty of the story is Helen, who is not the idol but the source of all beauty, Beauty herself, far transcending her idol, yet deigning to inhabit it on occasion, taking on human form and playing the visitor at her own temple, when a devotee reaches her heart. When gods deign to visit their shrines, we expect miracles. The ugly is changed into the beautiful, and another girl becomes Helen's latest idol and idolater.

Centuries after Herodotus, Pausanias, our guide to the shrines and monuments of ancient Sparta, tells the same story in an abbreviated version, leaving out the first plot (the contest between the two men for the most beautiful woman), and concentrating on the second plot (Helen as the source of beauty). Helen's miraculous power to beautify the ugly was no doubt more germane to his tour of the Spartan temples and shrines.[14]

In paring down the tale to a bare summary, Pausanias diagrams the mythologem even more sharply. Herodotus, in love with the particular, gives us the myth. But myth and mythologem together reveal how deeply mythopoeic thinking permeated ancient Greece into the historical period. The terms of the mythologem are *kalos* (beautiful), with its superlative, *kallistos* (most beautiful); *agathos* (good), with its superlative *aristos* (best); and, at the other end of the scale a single term, *aiskhros* (cause for reproach, disgraceful, ugly) and its superlative, *aiskhistos* (most disgraceful, the ugliest).

The axis of the mythologem is shame, over which Helen presides, being herself the signifier of beauty and therefore delineating, while transcending, shame. At one pole is the cluster of synonyms for the good and the beautiful, and at the other pole a single term will suffice as the common antonym, disgrace and the ugly being synonymous. In the shame or, more correctly, the honor culture of archaic Greece, the beautiful was good, and ugliness a disgrace. To quote Isocrates: "Of the things that lack beauty we will find not one that is loved and cherished [*agapômenon*], but all are despised except those that partake of this form [namely, Beauty.]"[15]

Putting the two stories together, as told by the two authors, we have a single story that is dominated from beginning to end by Helen's awesome and equivocal power. Through Helen's intervention the ugliest of babies became the most beautiful of women; the disgrace of her infancy was transformed into her undying glory. Thus transformed, she was in time married to the best of men (Ariston), though the circumstances of the marriage bring her again into disrepute. Her son, who would not have been born had she not been beautified by Helen in her infancy, is then disinherited by his father for—ironically—his questionable paternity. The boy, who was "prayed for by the people," is the shadow that haunts the woman's fame, the signifier of a beauty won at the cost of honor, as it is in the *Iliad*. The final touch of shame is added when Demaratos learns that his father was the donkey boy, but even this disgrace is turned to glory, since "donkey boy" here is a code for a god in disguise.

Helen, by virtue of her beauty, transcends both ugliness and disgrace. Hers is the power to transform disgrace into the beautiful; yet she is also the woman who brings men into disgrace. The Helen of our *Iliad* seems to recognize the chilling aspects of such equivocal power, when she uses terms and formulas to represent herself as someone in whose presence people shiver, with cold Stygian fear.[16] Stories of this power may be charming when told by Herodotus, though even in Herodotus Helen's power is far from benign. But in the *Iliad* the force that transforms the ugly into the beautiful is death. Once in the field of the signifiers, where men fight for their meaning, there is no access to the luxury of Being, where signifiers dissolve into the Subject, except through death.

Lured to witness the spectacle from the city tower, Helen will discover (as if she did not already know) that of spectacles she is the spectacle.[17] The duel between Menelaus and Paris is inconsequential, except for the image of Paris prancing on the field in his leopard skin and then snatched from death by the sweetly smiling Aphrodite. But who would forget the following scene in the bedroom, where the libido is declared victorious over honor?

Helen will not be declared the legitimate wife of the man who wins the duel by honorable means. Instead, after witnessing her lover's disgrace on the battlefield, which is also her disgrace, she will be returned, to her own greater shame, to the bed of the man without shame. Aphrodite, Helen's Olympian protector, knows nothing of shame cultures.[18] Her birth preceded the age of shame, though as shame cultures developed the mythic mind would fabricate stories to compress Aphrodite into the confines of the developing social codes. Eros, in Hesiod's cosmology, is self-generated, one of the four prime elements or principles.[19] The libido precedes all stories. Helen, to impersonate such a goddess, must learn to dispense with shame.

Helen, alone in her room, weaving her silent record of the war that rages all around her, is an unforgettable image. On the loom is her crimson tapestry, on which she weaves (or embroiders?) the "many contests that the horse-taming Trojans and the bronze-chitoned Achaeans were suffering for her sake in deadly war" (3.125–28). The image, where Homer's art is at once most simple and most profoundly suggestive, has justly prompted much discussion.[20] It calls to mind the later scene, in book 9, when Agamemnon's ambassadors come upon Achilles at his (or rather, Andromache's) lyre, singing "the famous deeds of men." Lyre and loom, singer and weaver—Achilles and Helen are two impersonations of the poet, transmuting nature into art, Being into Meaning.[21]

For Achilles, "men's deeds of valor" (*klea andriôn*) are his paideia, both his childhood education into manhood and his adult ideal. Achilles' songs of valor console him for his occluded glory, but they are also an incantation of the victor's crown, which Athena promises him in book 1. His glory eclipsed for the moment, Achilles will yet assimilate himself to the mighty heroes of earlier generations, like his father Peleus or his great ancestor Aiakos.

Achilles is at one remove from the center of his song, since the glory, fame, or radiance that men win (their *kleos*) can be won only in the field of action, in contest with other men. Achilles is excluded from the contest, but Helen is inevitably at the center. Her tapestry tells of men's valor too, but the deeds she commemorates are those waged for her sake, or in her name. The figures of her tapestry are not of the past, as we assume Achilles' heroes are. They are the very men fighting to the death on the fields below the city walls. Her theme is the Trojan War and its subject (or object), Helen.

Homer calls the tableaux on Helen's tapestry *aethloi* (contests), rather than using a more specifically military term. *Aethloi*, as Linda L. Clader notes, are "contests for a prize."[22] Such contests in archaic Greek tradition lead in two directions: to athletic contests, on the one hand, like the celebrated Olympian Games; and to bride competitions, on the other, where heroes gathered as a woman's suitors and competed for the woman-as-prize.

Athletic contests were held for a variety of reasons besides bride competition (to honor the death of a local hero, for example). But Greek myth curiously preserves several stories of women won through bride competition—Thetis, Hippodameia, Deianeira, Penelope, the fifty daughters of Danaos, and, of course, Helen. Even Herakles, wrestling Thanatos (Death) to retrieve Alkestis from the dead, is a variant on the same theme.

Bride competitions continued into historical times, if we are to believe Herodotus, who tells us of Kleisthenes, tyrant of Sikyon, announcing a public competition for the hand of his daughter, Agariste (Best Woman by Far), wishing, as Herodotus says, to discover "the best" man (*aristos*) in Greece for his son-in-law.[23] A certain Hippokleides, an Athenian distinguished for his wealth and looks, was one of the two finalists, having acquitted himself with honor both in the gymnasium and at the table. On the final night the suitors competed in contests of music and after-dinner oratory. Hippokleides, alas, under the convivial effects of the drink, disgraced himself by dancing upside down on the dinner table, waving his legs in the air and exposing what should not be exposed (what in Greek were called *ta aiskhra*, "the disgraceful parts"), and certainly not to the prospective father-in-law. Hippokleides lost the competition—all honors garnered in a full year of competitions were turned to shame by a single indiscretion—but he was too far gone to care. Megakles, the other Athenian contestant, was declared the winner. From his marriage to Agariste was born the celebrated Kleisthenes, and feckless Hippokleides drops from view.

The *Iliad* is bride competition told in epic fullness. Helen weaves on her tapestry all such bride competitions, recording her own as the common paradigm shared by all other women. But Helen's bride contest is significantly different from all other contests in that the competition in her case is perpetually renewed and perpetually undecided. Helen's tapestry, indeed Helen herself, if she is to be true to her own story, must portray indecisiveness. If to win Helen is, as Clader notes, to win immortality, the nature of this immortality and how it is to be granted remain mysterious.[24] Helen's privilege is to signify for men that zone where quotidian being borders Being itself, where all meanings are in perpetual dispute, and misinterpretation is death.

The Helen myth is a story of bride competition repeated again and again.[25] In her childhood she was seized by Theseus, from whom she was rescued by her brothers, the Dioskouroi (the "sons of Zeus" rescuing "the daughter of Zeus"). When Helen reached marriageable age, her (human) father, Tyndareus, held the contest in Sparta, where the heroes gathered from all over Greece to compete as her suitors. Here, oddly, the winner was the man who did not, in fact, compete. Agamemnon acted on behalf of his

brother Menelaus, while Menelaus stayed at home. Being already married to Helen's sister Klytaimestra, and therefore hors de combat, Agamemnon acted as the proper go-between, cementing the diplomatic (and military) alliance between the two great Mycenean houses, the house of Atreus and the house of Tyndareus.[26]

Now, despite all the oaths sworn by the contestants to honor the marriage of Menelaus and Helen, the contest for the bride has been reopened. It is no longer a rivalry between the Greek tribal chieftains but has become an issue between Greece and its allies on one side, and Troy and its allies on the other. A local conflict has been globalized, since the contestants are not simply the Greeks and the Trojans; they have become signifiers warring in the field of Meaning for the Subject, which, alas, is never to be found in the field of Meaning but only in the arcane recesses of Being.

Helen, Homer's eyewitness at the center of the action, becalmed except when she is needed for her public function as the spectacle, becomes, like Homer, a weaver of stories.[27] She has special gifts for this part, being uniquely both Greek and Trojan. Helen's stereoscopic vision will serve Homer well, as it serves Priam on the city walls. Yet such privilege, to be the poet's poet, only marks Helen's impotence. Her tapestry is a woman's composition, woven in solitude and privacy—who would ever visit Helen's rooms, except Paris and her own slaves? The woman's view is not solicited in the contests that Helen represents in her tableaux. Helen may, indeed must, observe, but she must keep her silence. One day, perhaps, assuming the war ends and peace returns, Helen's tapestry may hang in a king's halls to entertain the king and his barons. But perhaps not. Perhaps it was never intended for men's perusal, or for women's perusal either, since Helen was even more alienated from women than from men.

Helen, always compliant to any tug on her emotions, hurries from her seclusion to witness the contest for her significance. Now her contradictions will be blazoned forth for all to see. Excluded from the decision-making process, except as the prize, Helen is a participant all the same, being intimately related, through the marriage bed, to both contestants. Iris, painting the stirring scene of the armies marshaled on the field, and Helen's two husbands at the center, prepared to duel to the death, had aroused in Helen a "sweet yearning for her former husband, her city, and her parents" (3.139–40).

But Helen's sweet yearning, though a sufficient motive to draw Helen from her room, is beside the point. Helen's first function is to be the sign that will guarantee either happiness or immortality or both. Her second is, by witnessing the contest, to ratify it in her unique and mysterious way, to validate herself, and therefore her value as sign. Her personal investment is

not germane to such mathematics. It must be occluded in favor of Helen's meaning, which others will decide. Helen must be the dispassionate spectator.

Yet, such is Helen's paradox, a dispassionate Helen would lose all value. If Helen is to impersonate Aphrodite, she must play a woman of unbridled passion, since unbridled passion is precisely Aphrodite's nature, or the play would have no meaning. If Helen is to be the object of men's desire, the equation will not compute without Helen's libido included. Who would Helen be without her libido?

At the Scaean Gates, Helen, in the role reversal characteristic of her, finds herself, once outside her own private space, not the spectator but the protagonist on the most public of all stages, with the old men of the city, buzzing like cicadas, as her tragic chorus. So much we should have inferred when Iris captivated Helen's emotions and drew her to the public stage. Why else was Helen posted to the city gates if not to be seen? Helen's voyeurism, to which Iris appeals in erotic excitement, is a thin disguise. We are the voyeurs. When Iris calls Helen "dear bride" (*numpha*, at 3.130), the formula is for our benefit as much as it is for Helen's. We are the audience impatient to witness the duel for a bride whose beauty overrides shame.

The status of the city elders is ambiguous, as if everything to do with Helen falls into indeterminacy. They are no longer the strong warriors of the city but the speakers (*agorêtai*, "those who speak in the assembly"). Like Helen, they are removed from the field of action where men determine significance. Seeing Helen, the elders, though past the age of indiscretion themselves, can allow for the hormonal storm that would precipitate war among the younger men for such an emblem: "for she looks terribly like the deathless goddesses"; but even so, they say, "let her sail home in the ships so that she may not be left here as a woe to us and our children hereafter" (3.156–60).

The old men's response to Helen epitomizes her ambiguity. "It is no disgrace that the Greeks and the Trojans suffer long evils for such a woman," they say, using the word *nemesis*, the strongest term in Homer's shame culture for "blame."[28] The Trojan War is no cause for shame on either side. More pointedly, there is no cause for blame, and no reason to fear retribution, when the object is Helen, who awes the beholder into believing himself a witness to a god's epiphany. There is neither shame nor blame when men war for the hidden Subject to which all signs refer. But the elders of Troy could not be more mistaken, thinking their war over Helen was free of nemesis. Helen is nemesis.[29]

The old men are good speakers, Homer adds (at 3.150–52), "like the cicadas in the leaves, which pour forth their lily voices." Dry husks they may

be, the elders, with all passion and substance transmuted into voice, but it is still the liquid, fragrant voice of experience.[30] Theirs is the guiding voice of the city. But, alas, like cicadas, old men are no more than voice. Wisdom will not prevail over youthful ambition in this contest. Helen will one day be returned to Greece, but not through old men's diplomacy. Face-to-face with Helen's compelling significance, the elders have only words, but words too fail. Helen, transcending words, is truly terrible. When old men's words fail, the contest will be returned to the young warriors, who can still believe that trial by arms can reach a meaning where words cannot.

Priam breaks in on the elders' murmuring to call Helen to his side, and Helen, chameleonlike, reverses herself again, from spectacle to spectator (3.161–63): "Come, dear child, and sit here by me so you may see your former husband, your people, and your friends."

Dear child? A moment earlier Helen was a virtual goddess; before that she was a bride; now she is an old man's child. It is a formula, of course; by convention Helen has become Priam's daughter, as he has become her father. But around Helen even mundane formulas resonate. Has Priam, the eldest of the elders, fallen under Helen's spell that he would, as if inadvertently, from sheer custom, address Helen as he might address Andromache or any other of his daughters-in-law but Helen?

Priam interrupts his own train of thought, as if to gloss his indiscreet show of affection (3.164–65): "To me, you are not the cause. The gods I hold responsible, who have roused this long, grievous war against us from the Achaeans." The Trojan elders give a general absolution to both sides, Greek and Trojan, for the war. But specifically they absolve the men on the field, the warriors on both sides, for consenting to go to their death when the prize is of such daimonic significance. Priam, however, standing in for Helen's father, reverses the equation and absolves Helen. And rightly so. She is, in fact, but a child in the social order, to be passed from one supervisory male to another as the rules dictate. Priam's counselors would do without the sign altogether, given its cost. But Priam is not of their persuasion. Bewitched by both the woman and the war, he calls Helen to witness the great spectacle of men fighting to their death to calibrate the cost of beauty.

They make an odd couple, Priam and Helen, so like and unlike father and daughter. Helpless to influence the action (Priam disqualified by age, Helen by her sex), both are cast as spectators, though the spectacle in this case is their lives. They chat like father and daughter, as if war were in the far distance. Priam asks his daughter-in-law to identify the enemy (Helen's onetime family and people), much as if they were at an entertainment, the rivalry between a woman's two clans, her biological family and her in-laws, formalized into an afternoon's athletic contest. Helen, decorous in all her

functions, lends Priam her eyes, as a daughter would, and gracefully submits to being his military aide.[31]

But Helen is more than a military scout. Depending on the point of view, she is either a hostage or a wanton fugitive from the Greek side. In either case she is a captive. The point is made, however graciously. The plot is transparent: the hostage sits in the commander's box, where she is seen to chat amicably with him, while her ransom is being arranged on the field below. Helen obliges, and as if this were a holiday at the races, the hostage turns her knowledge to her captor's use.

But Helen, serving as Priam's eyes, is never allowed to forget that she is the real spectacle (3.173–76): "Would that death had come on me," she replies to Priam's graceful invitation, "before I followed your son hither, leaving my own room, my people, my child, and my friends of my youth. But that was not to be, and I waste away in grief." But Helen's shame is her private affair, irrelevant both to the contest on the field below for the fairest and the best, and to her function as the woman with no shame. As the daughter of Nemesis (as she is represented, for example, in the *Cypria*), Helen must be completely dispassionate.[32]

Putting her own investment aside, Helen obediently reads off the roll call of the enemy—friends in her eyes, though enemies in Priam's—as if she were reading the program notes to an aged father with failing eyesight.[33] Her grief and shame pass unnoticed. Priam's gaze is fixed on the majesty of Agamemnon and the magnificence of the bronze-chitoned Achaeans.

Concluding her roll call of the Achaean heroes—its subtext being the list of her own suitors, with Priam standing in for her father—Helen, overtly the prize but implicitly the judge, since beauty sets the rules, discovers an absence that, but for her keener sight, would have been overlooked. Our attention, like Priam's, is drawn to the warriors on the field; if we had noticed an absence, it would have been the absence of Achilles. But Helen, scanning the field, finds her brothers, the Dioskouroi, nowhere to be seen. We would expect to find them, now that our attention has been drawn to them, in the front lines, defending their family honor as Agamemnon defends his brother's honor. If Achilles, Ajax, and Odysseus were prepared to fight for Helen to the death, what motivation could have kept Helen's own brothers from the field?

Greek myth and tradition credited the Twin Riders, Castor and Pollux, with miraculous rescues both on land and at sea. In cult they were known as *sôtêres* (saviors). They had rescued Helen when she was captured by Theseus. Where were they now? They were, after all, "the sons of Zeus" (*dios kouroi*), and Helen, their sister, was "the daughter of Zeus."[34] Why did they not race to their sister's rescue, as they had in the past? Helen assumes the worst: her

brothers, kinsmen and dauntless warriors though they be, did not dare show themselves on the battlefield for shame (3.326–42). Her assumption is incorrect, but that is less important than Helen's reminder that the spectacle to which she has been so gracefully invited, by Iris first on the divine plane, and then by Priam on the human plane, is the spectacle of her own shame, or lack of it.[35]

Helen's shame deepens when Aphrodite herself, with Paris freshly bathed and perfumed and safely to bed, sallies forth to lure Helen to her next assignment. Playing the familiar old crone of romance, tugging at Helen's sleeve, Aphrodite is all breathless lubricity, coaxing Helen into Paris' bed. Iris was lubricious too, though she veiled her voyeurism under the rubric of "contests"—who does not want to see a contest, especially a contest for love? And what bride would not want to witness her own bridal competition? But now the libido is undisguised. Rescued and restored, Paris awaits Helen in full sexual arousal.

Helen's contempt for Aphrodite is magnificent, but useless, when Aphrodite abandons her crone persona and, revealing her true being, threatens to withdraw her love if Helen disobeys (at 3.414–17): "I may come to hate you as greatly as now I love you." Love? Words take on manifold meanings where Helen is concerned. Helen may continue to enjoy Aphrodite's charisma, provided she subsume her personal being within her broader public function, which, in her case, is to expose all social convention as so much flotsam in the tide of the libido. Helen will survive, as Aphrodite's favorites do, provided she accept Aphrodite's terms, that her honor be compromised.[36]

Commanded by Aphrodite to forgo her shame, Helen displaces onto Paris the anger that she is forbidden to direct toward Aphrodite, who, as a god, is taboo. But Paris is no more accessible as a target than Aphrodite. He is all sexual arousal, and Helen's sarcasm has no effect, unless perhaps to stimulate his erotic imagination. Helen's sarcasm is an arrow that reaches only its archer, since only she knows shame: "Would that I had married a man who knew the meaning of nemesis and shame," Helen will later say to Hector (6.350–51). But Paris is impervious to shame.[37] On the contrary, Paris revels in his luxury, possessing the queen of the world, while Helen must both live with her shame and accept her function as the spectacle of shamelessness. Shame may govern families and order cities, but it is an empty word in Aphrodite's cosmology. What better illustration of the extravagance of the libido than the sight of Helen, for whom grown men die, playing the fairy godmother, indulging the sexual fantasies of a boy who has never outgrown infantile narcissism?

Notes

1. For the place of beauty in the archaic pantheon, cf. Hesiod (*Theogony* 120), who calls Eros "the most beautiful [*kallistos*] among the deathless gods." Cf. also Isocrates *Encomium on Helen* 54: Helen "possessed the greatest share of beauty [*kallos*], which of *things that exist* is the most venerated, most honored, and most godly." "Things that exist" (*ta onta*) was, in Isocrates' day, the conventional philosophical term for Being itself. Beauty for Isocrates is next to Being, if not Being itself.

2. "Helen's Sandal" was a shrine in Sparta where the sandal that Helen lost in her flight from Sparta was venerated; see Roscher, 1: 1950. But apparently at Iapygia in southern Italy there was another shrine where other sandals of Helen's were venerated: cf. the story told by Lycophron (*Alexandra* 852–55) of Menelaus dedicating a krater, his shield, and Helen's fur-lined slippers at Iapygia when he was roaming the Mediterranean in search of the lost Helen after the fall of Troy.

3. A point made by Bassi (1993, 60).

4. Pausanias 3.19.11. The distinction between local cult traditions and the tradition of the epic, which Nagy emphasizes (1979, 1990b), is extremely significant in any treatment of Helen in ancient myth. While alluding to, or echoing, the cults of the various Greek heroes included in the Trojan expedition, the Homeric poems lay a trail of their own. In the tradition outside the Homeric texts the major heroes of the Trojan expedition have passed through the mortal state to a quasi-divine state. Many were thought to have reached islands somewhere far at sea (whether in the Black Sea in the far northeast, or in the Atlantic in the far west), where they became the tutelary spirits of their respective islands. These were collectively the Islands of the Blest. "Blest" here refers to the hero whose cult was maintained on the island. As the daimon of the island, the hero was blest himself with the perquisites of the gods (i.e., the devotion of his worshipers) and blessed his devotees in return for their devotion. Some heroes—Diomedes, for example—were claimed as the local daimon of several separate locations. The distribution of the hero cults throughout the Mediterranean suggests that on the historical level the cults on the various islands probably represent traditions that the Myceneans carried with them in the diaspora after the fall of Mycenae. The hero cult on the island was testimony to the islanders' descent from the true Myceneans.

Homer's heroes, however, have no such consolation to look forward to. After death the best that they can expect is to fade into ghosts or eidola, mere images or shadows of themselves, perpetuated by bardic memory. Of Homer's heroes, only Menelaus reaches the state granted to the heroes in the religious cults, to escape death and reach the closest approximation to Being in the Elysian Fields, as his compensation for being the husband of Helen. Homer's other heroes must hope to find their immortality through their *kleos*—their fame as it was transmitted through the epic tradition.

5. For *kallistos* and *aristos* as synonymous in Homer, see *Iliad* 3.124, where Iris takes the form of Laodike, who "of the daughters of Priam was best in physical form" (*eidos aristê*); cf. also Alcaeus 42.11 LP, where Thetis is "best of the Nereids." For one extended conversation in antiquity regarding the good, the beautiful, and the ugly, see Simonides, frag. 542 PMG, and Plato's commentary on the poem at *Protagoras* 339a–346d. See Dodds 1951, 26 n. 109, on *kalon* and *aiskhron* as significant terms in the shame culture of ancient Greece; also Adkins 1960, 154–58; 185–89; Cairns 1993. For the supreme significance of *aristos* (the best) in the *Iliad*, see Nagy 1979. To call ancient Greece an "honor," rather than a "shame," culture would be more in alignment with its own orientation.

6. Frag. 348.4–5 KR: "For all is full of Being. Wherefore the all adheres. And Being borders Being [*eon gar eonti pelazei*.]." Even Parmenides, while denying the possibility of an interval between Being and Being, must compose a second section of his poem to explain the *apparent* space between the two. In myth, the heroes illuminate that same *apparent* space, as a zone of intense friction between quotidian being and Being, where signifiers shade into what they signify, which is Being itself.

7. *aristos Akhaiôn* (best of the Achaeans) is a regular formula in the *Iliad*; for its significance see Nagy 1979, esp. chap. 2.

8. See Dodds (1951), who applies to classical Greek thought the distinction drawn by anthropologists between shame and guilt cultures. But no hard line can be drawn between the two. Some cultures may be more shame-oriented, and others more guilt-oriented; but probably both guilt and shame are to be found to some degree in every culture. My view is that literacy contributes significantly to increasing guilt and devaluing shame, since it moves the locus of judgment from the public arena to the private screen of the individual reader. Readers learn to internalize what in nonliterate cultures is played out on the highly public stage. For the enormous influence of literacy in reshaping thought and culture, see Havelock 1963; Ong 1982; Svenbro 1988.

9. Cf. Edwards 1987, 192: "Iris is really the messenger of the poet." See his pp. 191–97 for many apt remarks on the ensuing scenes in book 3.

10. Slatkin (1991, 43 n. 30) observes that while Aphrodite's beneficiaries (Paris and Aeneas) "escape destruction and survive the *Iliad*, their individual heroism, from an epic standpoint, has been permanently compromised."

11. 6.61.

12. See Boedeker 1987, 188–89, for the pattern of the Helen myth in the story of Demaratos.

13. As we might have predicted, neither Ariston nor Agetos was, it turned out, the father of Demaratos. The true father was the stable boy; see Herodotus 1.68. When Demaratos pleaded with his mother to tell him the true story of his birth, she explained that the story of the "stable boy" (*onophorbos*, "donkey boy") as his father was pure gossip. His real father was the cult hero Astrabakos (He of the Mule Saddle). Astrabakos, she further explained, had visited her in disguise, as gods are wont to do, taking on the form of her husband, the king Ariston. The *Iliad* comes full circle: the most beautiful woman "chooses" not the best of men but the likeness of the best, who turns out to be either the donkey boy (in the local gossip) or (in his mother's version) the god of the stable. Nagy (1990b, 335–36) discusses the mule theme, as it was used by Demaratos' opponents to disparage his pedigree. See Burkert 1965 for more on the strange hero Astrabakos.

14. Pausanias 3.7.7.

15. *Encomium on Helen* 54.

16. See Clader 1976, 41–62, on Helen's character as revealed through epic diction. Note the words of reproach that Helen uses of herself, and Clader's discussion, pp. 18ff., of those epithets and phrases that allude to Helen's "hateful; i.e. deadly" nature (*stugeros*; cf. Styx, the ice-cold river that puts even gods into a coma).

17. For Helen as spectacle, cf. Hesiod *Catalogue of Women*, frag. 204. 58–63 MW, where the poet describes Idomeneus coming in person from Crete to Helen's bride contest "so that he might see Argive Helen for himself and not only hear from others the *mythos* that had already spread throughout the land."

18. Cf. the point made by Slatkin (1991, 43 n.30), that Aphrodite's effect is to compromise those whom she protects.

19. *Theogony* 120. At 173ff. Hesiod recounts the myth of the castration of Ouranos as, in effect, a second explanation for the origin of desire. In this version Aphrodite was born

of the severed genitals (i.e., the semen), and the Erinyes (spirits of revenge) sprouted from the spilled blood. The primal, undifferentiated libido here divides into two, with sex and life on one side, and shame, guilt, and death on the other. The goddess has been revised into polar opposites—into the chthonic Furies on one hand, and the smiling daughter of the celestial father on the other. See also Bergren 1989 on Aphrodite's primeval power to tame gods, humans, and animals, which is tamed in turn by Zeus.

20. On the associations in ancient Greek between weaving and poetic composition, with good references to the scholarship on the subject, see Clader 1976, 7; Bergren 1979; 1983, 79. On Helen's tapestry, see also Kennedy 1986.

21. On Helen as poet, see Clader (1976, 8), who calls Helen "both author and subject of her work." Cf. also Bergren 1983, 79: Helen "is both the object of the war and the creator of its emblem." On Achilles as the singer in *Iliad* 9, see Whitman 1958, 193. See also Murnaghan 1987, 152, on the poets or surrogate poets in the Homeric poems (e.g., Helen and Achilles), who are all in some way "disqualified from heroic action."

22. 1976, 7. See also her discussion of Helen as the prize of the Trojan War, through whom the heroes win their fame (*kleos*), and therefore symbolic immortality.

23. 6.126–29. Note also Herodotus' explicit statement that Agariste's suitors were "the best in looks and birth."

24. Clader 1976, 11–12.

25. On the Trojan War as Helen's bride competition, see Clader 1976, and cf. Bergren (1983, 82), who perceptively notes that Helen "is the female forever abducted but never finally captured." In a similar way the contest between Penelope's suitors and Odysseus in the *Odyssey* replays the original competition for Penelope. For curious stories of Penelope's original courtship, see Pausanias 3.12.1–2, 4; 13.6.

26. See Hesiod, frags. 196ff. MW, for the list of Helen's suitors. Even the contest between Menelaus and Paris, as Greek versus Trojan, repeats itself in the *Iliad* at 13.516, when Deiphobos hurls his spear at Idomeneus. The scholiast (= Ibycus, frag. 297 PMG) explains that Deiphobos and Idomeneus were deadly enemies, as rivals for Helen's love.

27. For Helen as weaver and storyteller, and the associative links between woven fabric, poetry, and intelligence (*mêtis*), see Bergren 1983, 73; Zeitlin 1981, 203–6. Extrapolating from these links, Bergren reads the marriage of Zeus and the goddess Mêtis (Cunning Intelligence) as a story told to explain "the semiotic power assigned to the female and its (re)appropriation by the male."

28. LSJ defines *nemesis* as "distribution of what is due; but in usage always retribution, esp. righteous anger." In the same entry *aidôs* is distinguished as subjective (shame), and *nemesis* as objective (retribution). I would refine the distinction, to call nemesis the fear that attends the violation of shame taboos, projected as retribution, whether human or divine. On nemesis in the *Iliad*, see Redfield (1975, 113–16), who notes that nemesis is represented as an excited condition. He cites *Iliad* 8.198–200, where Hera, experiencing nemesis, shakes on her throne, "and great Olympus trembled"; and 15.101–3, where Hera grins through her teeth, but her face is not smiling.

29. Cf. the connection between Helen and nemesis at Hesiod, frag. 197.8 MW, where Helen's courtship "aroused the nemesis of the gods." See also frag. 204–82 MW, where Tyndareus exacts the oath from Helen's suitors that they would exact vengeance on any man who, "putting aside nemesis and *aidôs*," would take Helen by force. On the frequent association of nemesis and Helen in Greek art, see Ghali-Kahil (1955, 1: 59–60), who discerns two possible influences here. On the literary side, the *Cypria* gives us the story of Helen as the offspring of Zeus and Nemesis (see Cypria 7 Allen); and significant on the religious side was the cult of Nemesis at Rhamnous in Attica, where she was worshiped as

"The Rhamnousian [Goddess]." We can trace the confluence of these two sources in the epithet Rhamnousian, which the Alexandrian poet Callimachus used of Helen (*Hymn to Artemis* 232).

30. On the men's "lily voices" and the comparison with the cicadas' sound, see Stanford 1969. On voices as liquid, see Svenbro (1988, 101 n. 39), with his citations from Pindar's odes.

31. On the power of Helen's eyes, cf. Stesichorus, frag. 201 PMG, where he is reported as saying that the men who advanced toward her to stone her "at the sight of Helen dropped their stones to the ground."

32. On the goddess Nemesis, see Roscher, 3: 117–66, s.v. "Nemesis"; and 1: esp. 1930–31, s. v. "Helena II." On Nemesis as goddess of vegetation, and Helen's connection with both Nemesis and vegetation, see Cook 1925, 3: 1015; Clader 1976, 73. Worth noting also is Stesichorus, frag. 223 PMG, where Helen and Klytaimestra are the punishment visited on their father, Tyndareus, by Aphrodite, when he sacrificed to the other gods but omitted her from his devotions. Aphrodite in her anger punished him by making both his daughters promiscuous.

Farnell (1921, 324) finds no "true mythic tradition" in the story of Helen's birth given by the poet of the *Cypria*, who makes her the daughter of Nemesis. He considers the story "studied and didactic," an extrapolation from Helen's role in epic as the daughter of "divine wrath." In my view, however, the story as told in the *Cypria* of the mating of Nemesis (Apportionment) and Zeus has the ring of a genuine, archaic cosmogony dating from the mythopoeic age, rather than of a fiction invented by a sophisticated reader of the *Iliad* to explain Helen's role and behavior in the epic. According to further details supplied by later authors, Nemesis, resisting Zeus by changing from one form into another, finally changed herself into a goose (a fish in Athenaeus 8.334c), whereupon Zeus did likewise (or chose the swan form), and thus they consummated their love. From their union Nemesis gave birth to an egg (the cosmic egg), from which in turn Helen emerged; that is, Beauty herself. The stories told of Zeus pursuing Leda and Nemesis are remarkably similar, suggesting that both were cognates of an older archetype. In one story, which explicitly connects Leda and Nemesis, Nemesis is given as Helen's true mother, but she gave Helen to Leda to raise, and Helen was thus mistaken for Leda's daughter. See Lindsay 1974, chap. 12, "Nemesis," for a sympathetic discussion of Nemesis as Helen's mother.

33. Clader (1976, 9) notes the oddity of Helen as the reader of the roll call: "It is striking that a woman should be the poet of a catalogue of this sort. Traditionally, such a scene should be dominated by a member of the opposing side, who could provide information about his former comrades on the basis of his own material experience." Clader concludes that Helen's "catalogue of the troops" represents her own bride competition, when all the Greek heroes gathered at Sparta as her suitors: "The *Teichoscopeia*, then, is a reminder that the Trojan War is a second contest for the possession of Argive Helen" (10). Clader suggests further that the absence of Menelaus and Achilles from Helen's roll call of the Achaean heroes at Troy may reflect her original bride contest, where the same two heroes were notably absent. On the Teichoscopeia as a traditional catalogue of warriors shaped to its present position, with Helen being its focal point, see Edwards 1980, 102–3. See also his discussion of Helen and Paris (1987, 149–58, 191–97). We should also note that the duel in *Iliad* 3 replays, on the field of battle, the original offense, when Paris violated the code of honor and abducted Helen from her lawful husband. The contest is restaged, and once again honor loses to the libido. On honor and shame in the *Iliad*, see also Schein 1984, 168ff.

34. On the Dioskouroi as heavenly saviors, see Alcaeus, frag. B2 LP, and Page (1955, 265–68), who lists the other major testimony from ancient literature on the subject; also Cook 1925, 2: 431–40, in connection with other divine twins, and 1003–19, "Dioskouroi and Helene in Folk-Tales." Farnell, (1921, 175–228) discusses the wide distribution of their cult through Greece, but particularly in western Greece (Sicily and Magna Graecia), where the Doric presence was strong. In frag. adespota 1027(c) PMG, they are addressed as *kallistoi sôtêres* (most beautiful saviors); in Euripides' *Helen*, the Chorus invokes them as "the saviors of Helen" (line 1500), which, in the *Iliad*, they conspicuously are not.

35. For Helen's shame in the epic tradition, cf. Hesiod, frag. 176 MW: "Helen disgraced the bed of Menelaus." See Redfield 1975, 113ff. If we can accept the Dioskouroi as cognate forms of the Twin Riders of the Vedic tradition, as Clader (1976, 48–53) argues, her suggestion that Helen's twin brothers have been replaced in the epic tradition by the two Atreidai, Agamemnon and Menelaus, and are thus rendered superfluous to the plot is attractive. Farnell (1921, 175–228) is not sympathetic to the theory that the Dioskouroi represent the Greek version of the Twin Riders, but see Nagy 1990b, 93 n. 46, for further references, and 255–56. The prominence of the twin element in the Helen myth, both in Homer and outside the Homeric texts, suggests an enigma that is not easily explained as a "fiction" invented by the poet of the *Iliad*, which would then have to be imported into a large number of Helen's non-Iliadic myths. Rather, this element alone suggests that the Iliadic Helen is a portrait shaped by the epic but drawn from a much wider Helen tradition. Among the double or twin elements are Helen's two brothers absent from Troy; the two sons of Atreus warring to recover her from the two sons of Priam; Theseus and Peirithoos associated in the story of Helen's childhood rape, with the two Dioskouroi as her saviors; her two brothers' twinned destiny: the two alternating between life and death, and each alternating with the other; the two sisters born from the same egg; and the two mothers. In art, Helen is frequently represented as flanked by two men; see Roscher, 1: 1969. Cook (1925, 2: 447ff.), in discussing the twin theme in myth, notes that in some instances one of the twins is effeminate. We hear the echo of this distinction in Homer, in both the sons of Atreus and the sons of Priam. In each case the one brother is a mighty warrior, while the masculinity of the other is deeply problematic; then the problematic males must define their masculinity vis-à-vis Helen. Cf. the comic version of the Helen story in Petronius *Satyricon* 59.11–12, which has Diomedes and Ganymede as Helen's two brothers (the warrior and the effete).

36. Boedeker (1974, 34) notes that Helen's reluctance to join Paris "recalls the motif of shame which in epic poetry is frequently attributed to characters under the influence of sexual desire." See also p. 35: "Aphrodite is represented as an effeminate and debasing love goddess."

37. Cf. Redfield 1975, 114: "Paris accepts himself as he is; he did not make himself he says, and he cannot be otherwise. For the poet of the *Iliad* such an attitude is fundamentally unheroic—because it is unsocialized."

M. M. WILLCOCK

The Importance of Iliad *8*

Introduction

One of the more surprising sentences in Homeric publications in recent years comes at the end of Professor G.S. Kirk's introduction to Book 8 (vol. II, p. 294) in the large, six-volume, Cambridge commentary on the *Iliad* (now happily completed). After discussing some perceived weaknesses in the book, Kirk offers the following judgement: "It remains possible that Book 8 was still under refinement at the time of Homer's retirement or death." Retirement or death! How could an intelligent and clear-headed scholar write in these terms? What can we possibly know about Homer's retirement? There was no system of pensions for superannuated bards. And surely uncertainties about the text of the *Iliad* are not to be related to the biography of the poet.

The reason for this strange speculation by Kirk is that he, like others of the editors of the Cambridge commentary, appears to have begun from Leaf, as the previous large-scale commentary in English. Leaf was of course an excellent Homerist, and his judgement on individual lines and words is always to be considered; but his overall view of the construction of the *Iliad* is of his day, and has dated badly. It is hardly sensible to begin from old-style analytical arguments about authenticity when we are now over sixty years after Milman Parry's thesis and over fifty years after Schadewaldt's

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Iliasstudien. My aim in this paper is twofold: to consider the difficulties perceived in book 8 by analytical scholars, in the light of our modern discussions of oral poetry; and to discuss the structural reasons for the four days of fighting that articulate the *Iliad*.

Book 8 has indeed come in for quite a lot of criticism. Leaf, who judged that the only purpose of this book was to motivate the Embassy of 9, objected that a large number of lines here recur in other books, and that there is (as he puts it) "a rather monotonous interference by Zeus". Influenced by Grote particularly, who had made 8 follow 1 in his original *Iliad*, for reasons which we shall soon see, Leaf went further, and argued that 11 originally followed 1, 9 (the Embassy), with 8 introducing it, having been 'intruded' comparatively late. We should remember that Leaf came before Milman Parry, and so could have no knowledge of oral theory. The great German scholars paid a lot of attention to this book. Wilamowitz, in *Die Ilias und Homer*, begins his discussion with book 8. He sees it as composed by a later poet who wished to insert the Embassy of 9 and the Doloneia of 10 into an *Iliad* which previously went straight from 7 to the beginning of 11. Schadewaldt too, in *Iliasstudien*, treats 8 as of central importance. He begins with 11, devoting over half his book to discussion arising from it; then 8 takes up half of what is left. He proves to his own satisfaction, and presumably to most of ours, that the poet of 8 is the same as the poet of 11, and that he is the poet of the *Iliad.* Schadewaldt is thus directly contradicting Leaf and Wilamowitz. His arguments for cross-connections between different parts of the *Iliad* are to my mind decisive for the question of authorship. Finally, Reinhardt, in the book *Die Ilias und ihr Dichter*, put together from thousands of fragments by Professor Hölscher, has more discussion based on book 8 than on any other book. He begins with the statement that 8 is the most indispensable book (das unentbehrlichste Buch) in the epic between 1 and 16. So he agrees with Schadewaldt against the analytical tradition (Leaf and Wilamowitz). He spends much time on the lines that recur elsewhere. However, as he too has no use for theories based on oral poetry, when a phrase occurs more than once he assumes that it is the task of the scholar to establish priority between the occurrences. This he tries to do.

I describe the contents of this contentious book, in twelve parts:

1–52: Zeus forbids the other gods to interfere. Athene (pro-Greek) protests. Zeus goes to Ida to watch.

53–67: The two armies join battle. There is an even struggle until midday.

68–77: Zeus thunders and throws a thunderbolt in front of the Greeks.

78–112: All withdraw except Diomedes, who initially intervenes to rescue Nestor.

113–129: Diomedes attacks the Trojans, and kills Hektor's charioteer Eniopeus.

130–136: Zeus throws another thunderbolt in front of Diomedes.

137–197: Diomedes reluctantly retreats. Hektor shouts abuse. Three times Diomedes considers turning round to fight again; and threes times Zeus thunders from Ida. Hektor attacks.

198–211: Hera resents the Greek defeat. She tries to persuade Poseidon to join her in open opposition to Zeus. He refuses.

212–334: Agamemnon, inspired by Hera, urges the Greeks to fight back. There is a rally, led by Diomedes. Teukros the archer has a short *aristeia*, during which he kills Hektor's replacement charioteer Archeptolemos. Hektor gets his own brother Kebriones to take the reins.

335–349: Zeus inspires the Trojans again. They drive the Greeks back, right into their camp. The Greeks are now defeated.

350–484: Hera now persuades Athene to join her in opposing Zeus. They actually set off by chariot for the battle-field. But Zeus sends Iris to stop them, with the threat of a thunderbolt. They return reluctantly to Olympos.

485–565: Night falls. The brief day is over. Hektor speaks to an assembly of the Trojans, who camp out on the plain, ready to continue their attack in the morning.

We heard Leaf's objection, that there is "a rather monotonous interference by Zeus". Kirk's is slightly different, but again suggests monotony. He says that "it is characteristic of this book that most of its actions or initiatives, whether divine or human, are soon abandoned or reversed". And certainly there is quite a lot of abandoned and frustrated activity; so much so that we may wonder if the effect is intended.

Of course the analysts Leaf and Wilamowitz are right that this defeat of the Greeks is closely connected with book 9, the Embassy (I leave 10, the Doloneia, out of account). You cannot have book 9 without a defeat of the Greeks to motivate it. But does anyone now believe that 9 is anything other than an essential and organic part of the poet's plan? Unless you are going to exclude book 9, then book 8 is necessary. And there is another overwhelming reason for that judgement, to which we shall come.

The four days of fighting

If we are not engaged in the old analytical game of deleting parts of the *Iliad* as spurious, or later interpolations, then we should begin from the acceptance of the epic virtually as we have it, and consider what follows from that. (Once again, I remove 10 from the discussion; Danek has said a great

deal that is important about that book.[1]) Taking the *Iliad* as it stands then, we note that it contains precisely four days of fighting, one from book 2 to 7, book 8 on its own, books 11 to 18, and books 20 to 22. These four days are the core of the *Iliad*, and both follow and dictate the structure of its plot.

For the essential story of the epic, however, three days of fighting are all that are minimally required: two defeats of the Greeks, one to motivate the Embassy, the other to bring about the return of Achilleus; and a victory for the Greeks under Achilleus, to complete the drama, and restore the situation to what it was before the drama began. This explains the second, third and fourth days' fighting. The battle which needs explaining is not the κόλος μάχη of book 8, which is absolutely essential for the given plot, but the first day, from 2 to 7, or 3 to 7 if we begin with the duel, or 4 to 7 if we wish to limit ourselves to the actual descriptions of fighting.

This is why some of the analysts saw that first day as otiose, and wished the original story to have moved straight from 1 to 8 (Grote) or 1 to 11 (Leaf), i.e. from Zeus' promise to help the Trojans to the Trojans being victorious. And we cannot deny that there is something that requires explanation in Zeus nodding his head to Thetis in 1, shaking great Olympos, that he will honour her son by helping the Trojans, and then doing nothing whatsoever about it, apart from sending the false dream at the beginning of 2, until line 75 of book 8. That is a delay of nearly a third of the *Iliad*.

We, who are no longer old-style analysts, are committed to accepting the *Iliad* as it is, and trying to understand it. So what is the poet doing? Why does he have the first day of fighting? The answer is twofold. First, he shows us the Greeks as naturally victorious, naturally superior to the Trojans, before he comes to the consequences of Achilleus' withdrawal, "which put pains thousandfold upon the Achaians". He is in no hurry. He is composing this huge epic. He intuitively sees it as artistically desirable to establish Greek superiority before describing their defeat. This is bound to increase the impact of book 8. If we moved straight from 1 to 8, there would simply be gloom. Zeus would manipulate the battle. The Greeks would be seen as ineffective, unable to cope without Achilleus. By showing us the bright figure of Diomedes dominating the battlefield in 5, Homer makes it all more lively and positive, more enjoyable for his hearers, more dramatic.[2]

But the picture of underlying Greek superiority, which is demonstrated by books 5 to 7 particularly, is not the only thing the poet achieves by that first day of action. What about 2 to 4? Just as in the Diomedes *aristeia*, we are assessing the past, the balance of forces before Achilleus got angry, so in 2 to 4 we are receiving impressions that go back in time, even further back, to the beginning of the war, and even its preceding cause, by the inclusion of lists and set descriptions which reflect those earlier days. This is well known,

and (I think) generally accepted.[3] The catalogues in book 2, the *teichoskopia* and the duel between Menelaos and Paris in book 3, and Paris; and Helen going to bed at the end of that book, with the significant reminder of the first time they did so, the renewal of Trojan guilt at the beginning of 4, with Pandaros' treacherous shot at Menelaos, and the *epipolesis*, or Review of the Army, by Agamemnon—all these sequences and episodes widen the time-frame from the central core of three days of action in the tenth year to the whole story of the Trojan war; they make the *Iliad* an *Iliad*. These backward-reflecting incidents precede the *aristeia* of Diomedes, which, as I said, establishes the balance between the two armies before Zeus shows his hand. So 2 to 4 and 5 to 7 are both preliminary. And note that there is a pause at that point, after this very significant action on the first day after book 1, a truce which has the effect of separating that day from what is to come. Homer is perhaps using the passing of empty time at the end of 7 to isolate the central action, as he does with the twelve days' absence of the gods in book 1, and the twelve days' truce in 24.

Thus, after the setting of the background in those early books, with the truce acting as a dividing line, we come to the eighth book, and finally Zeus takes action to fulfil the promise he made in 1. This is the second reason for the absolutely essential nature of 8 that I referred to before, the fulfilment of Zeus' promise to Thetis. It is truly indispensable. We could not have him nodding his head and shaking Olympos, and then apparently letting matters take their own course.

It is worth pointing out in passing, before turning to book 8, that the expansion in the time-scale in those early books, so that we have the feeling of the background, is balanced by the advance echoes and forebodings of the future that pile up in the final books of the epic. There are repeated prophecies of the approaching death of Achilleus, Antilochos emerges as one with a significant role to come, and the fall of Troy is perceived to be inevitable: in the city the death of Hektor has the effect as if Troy has already fallen; and Priam says at the end, after Achilleus has promised twelve free days for the mourning of Hektor, 'then we will fight again, if so we must'; he has no hope of the outcome. So the past is recalled and the future foreshadowed; the *Iliad* is truly an *Iliad*.

The composition of book 8

We turn to the second day of fighting, book 8, absolutely and undeniably required by the plot, (a) to provide the first defeat of the Greeks and thus the conditions for the Embassy of 9, and (b) to show Zeus positively helping the Trojans, in fulfilment of his promise. But we recall that scholars have been

critical of book 8, leading to that extraordinary comment by Kirk, that it was unfinished because of 'Homer's retirement or death'. The weaknesses complained of include (a) that the actions described are inconsequential—people try something, but give it up, both on the human level (Diomedes, Teukros) and on the divine (Hera, Athene); (b) that a greater than usual number of lines in this book are found also elsewhere in the *Iliad*; (c) that there is an unusual number of plus-verses in this book in the pre-Aristarchan papyri. That is about all the criticism, and even the critics are careful to admit that there are fine imaginative passages embedded in the second-rate (as they suggest) material: the death) of Gorgythion, his head falling to the side under the weight of the helmet like a poppy head weighed down by rain; Teukros taking shelter behind his big brother's shield; the simile of the watch-fires of the Trojans at the end, like stars in a clear night sky.

One explanation of a certain muddiness, as it might appear, in book 8 reflects the mind of the poet. Homer has an engaging reluctance to describe Trojans defeating Greeks. In his heroic epic, the heroes are the Greeks; so even when the Trojans have to be shown as winning, because of the plot, it is unwelcome to the poet.[4] Thus the action, and the impressions given, concentrate on Greek successes—the Diomedes attack, the *aristeia* of Teukros. Nevertheless Hektor is on top at the end.

But more important, in relation to the criticisms, is the answer derived from oral poetry theory. We have learned that the essential feature of such poetry is repetition: lines recur, formulaic phrases recur. So to point out that a large number of the lines in this book recur does not imply that the book is late and secondary. Recurrences are not to be discussed under the assumption that one example has been copied from another, so that you can argue which is the original and which the copy. Rather the repeated phrases are separate occurrences of the same phrase. Thus we should not be too concerned by the criticism about lines and formulaic phrases occurring both here and in other books, especially book 5. The situations in 5 and 8 are similar. Diomedes is opposing Hektor; the pro-Greek gods Hera and Athene are trying to interfere. The conditions of oral poetry lead in a similar context to the appearance of similar material. And, as to the plus-verses in pre-Aristarchan papyri, they are less surprising if stock material is being used. Kirk himself quotes Dr Stephanie West, the expert on the early papyri, as playing down the significance of these plus-verses here; she accepts that they probably arise from the same cause as the repeated lines—the use of stock material.[5]

The principle of repetition in oral poetry applies also to incidents—situations and actions, what Lord called 'themes'. Again one should not speculate about originals and copies. Part of that famous simile at the end,

describing the Trojan watch-fires on the plain, comes again in book 16 (at 299f.); and it can even be argued that it is more logically appropriate there, where clouds have been expressly blown away from a mountain-top, so that "bright clear air streams down from the heavens". But that does not mean that the passage in our book 16 was the model for that in 8. Teukros' bowstring breaks in 15 as well as at the end of his *aristeia* in 8; it is merely an event that happens twice; neither is the model for the other. And this applies also to the most striking repetition in 8, from 5, of Athene and Hera setting off in a chariot to help the Greeks. The situations are very similar; but we should not be speaking of an original and a copy.

However, in repeated incidents such as I have been describing, the repetition is often not null, but has a cumulative effect. This has been pointed out in relation to certain demonstrably recurring sequences, such as the four soliloquies in the *Iliad* and the four warnings of Polydamas to Hektor.[6] Repetition has the effect of concentrating the hearer's minds on some particular theme, as for example the throwing of missiles and direction of abuse at the disguised Odysseus in the Odyssey.[7] There is a highly effective example of the cumulative effect of repetition in this very book. Hektor loses his charioteer Eniopeus to Diomedes at 121, and later, in virtually the same sequence, his replacement charioteer Archeptolemos to Teukros at 313; then he asks his own brother Kebriones to take the reins. One can easily see how this concentrates the mind on Kebriones, and prepares the hearers for what will happen to him at the final stage of Patroklos' *aristeia* in 16. The long-term effect of cumulation operates in this case across a gap of eight books.

Book 8 opens with the memorable, even bizarre, scene of Zeus forbidding all the gods and goddesses to interfere in the battle. The reason for this becomes totally clear when we accept the structural fact, that he is now going to take personal action to fulfil his promise, to help the Trojans. The general ban (5–12) is directly preparing the personal intervention (75–77). The rest of the book concentrates on the reluctance, even the opposition, of the pro-Greek goddesses and of certain Greeks, in a repetitive (i.e. cumulative) way. But Zeus is, as he asserts (18–27), stronger than all of them together. His will prevails.

It is heroic in the extreme, one might almost say foolhardy, of Diomedes to oppose the pressure from Zeus; and he does it three times. First he moves forward, in the face of the thunder and the thunderbolt, to rescue Nestor; secondly, having rescued him, he attacks the Trojans and Hektor, until Zeus thunders again and throws a thunderbolt again, at 133. And thirdly, as he then retreats, and Hektor shouts abuse, he thinks three times of turning his chariot and fighting Hektor again; and three times Zeus

thunders from Ida. That sequence, 'three times ... and three times' is typical of the poet of the *Iliad*, as has been shown by Herbert Bannert.[8]

That is the sort of hero Diomedes is, committed to exercising his heroism even against a god (as we saw with his wounding of Aphrodite and Ares in book 5). One is reminded of the extreme statement of Apollo to Aineias at 17.327f., that he has seen men defending their cities, trusting in their strength and bravery, even against a god:

> Αἰνεία, πῶς ἂν καὶ ὑπὲρ θεὸν εἰρύσσαισθε
> Ἴλιον αἰπεινήν; ὡς δὴ ἴδον ἀνέρας ἄλλους ...

The effect of Diomedes' threefold resistance is cumulative. The clash of wills between the supreme god and the supreme hero typifies the stress of the day. Zeus is helping the Trojans to drive the Greeks back; but the Greeks are not weakly conceding. To say with Leaf that "there is a somewhat monotonous interference by Zeus" is to misunderstand the technique of repetition which Homer employs. As I said earlier, Leaf lived before our wide discussion of the techniques of oral composition. (So did Wilamowitz; while Schadewaldt, Reinhardt, and even Bannert try to describe the phenomena without calling oral theory to their aid.)

The threefold resistance of Diomedes is not all. The same tension, the same opposition to the will of Zeus, is seen among the gods also. And there too the resistance is shown three times. First Athene objects when Zeus makes his outright veto against any god interfering (in lines 28–40, which were athetised by Aristarchus); the purpose is to show that the pro-Greek gods are no more willing to concede than the Greek hero on earth. Later, Hera tries to persuade the pro-Greek Poseidon to intervene, though without success; and on a third occasion she does persuade Athene to join her in active opposition. The critic may complain that the attempt to persuade Poseidon is an initiative that 'is soon abandoned'; but so are all three attempts at opposition. It is all to show, by cumulation, the reluctance of the pro-Greek goddesses to accept the arbitrary (as they see it) action of Zeus in positively assisting the Trojans.[9] Opposition on earth is matched by opposition in heaven, just as in 1 the quarrel on earth was matched by the quarrel in heaven. And eventually Zeus threatens the same action against Hera and Athene (a thunderbolt) as he employed against Diomedes and the men on the ground (402–405).

Would the critics have preferred the Greeks and their divine supporters to give way the moment Zeus showed his hand? Would that be heroic in the men, or worthy of belief in the gods?

Homer gets powerful results by very simple means. In this case, the threefold repetition of opposition, both on earth and in heaven, making six times in all, shows the strength of the opposition, but also the in practice irresistible superiority of Zeus, who (as he says at the beginning) is so powerful that he could take on the lot of them in a tug of war, if he wished, and still win easily.

Notes

1. G. Danek, *Studien zur Dolonie* (Vienna 1988).

2. The figure of Diomedes is of course very interesting, as he seems to be a substitute Achilleus, hardly to be conceived as in action when Achilleus was there as well. See Ø. Andersen, *Die Diomedesgestalt in der Ilias* (Oslo 1978).

3. See, among others, J. Latacz, *Homer: Der erste Dichter des Abendlands* (Munich and Zurich 1989) 163–168.

4. See M.H.A.L.H. van der Valk, *Textual criticism of the Odyssey* (Leiden 1949) 87–89; *idem*, "Homer's nationalistic attitude," *AC* 22 (1953) 5–26.

5. S. West, *The Ptolemaic papyri of Homer* (Cologne 1967) 12, 75.

6. These have been much discussed in recent years; see for example M.M. Willcock, "The search for the poet Homer," *G&R* 37 (1990) 1–13.

7. H. Bannert, *Formen des Wiederholens bei Homer* (Vienna 1988).

8. Op. cit. (above, n. 7).

9. There is of course humour here too, as is shown by Alexandra Zervou in her recent book *Ironie et parodie: le comique chez Homère* (Athens 1990) 18–29.

DONALD LATEINER

Probe and Survey: Nonverbal Behaviors in Iliad *24*

Homer undergirds his swift, vivid narrative through body language. The Homeric epics deploy nonverbal behavior to characterize leading figures, to make their reactions instantly intelligible, and to provide a third "language" that supplements their own words and the narrator's description of their martial and political deeds. This is true in the *Iliad* as in the *Odyssey*. Akhilleus and Priam in *Iliad* 24, through their bodies and unplanned motions, become clearer and more intelligible to each other and to the reader. Gestures, postures, and nonverbal sounds in the *Iliad* both supplement and contradict words and acts. In the *Odyssey* also, they provide something that words cannot say, or they undercut and render problematic both instrumental acts and words. Nonverbal behaviors provide Homeric epic, and literature in general, with enriching detail and decisive information. They furnish unobtrusive signals that confirm or deny characters' automatic responses, self-management, and received ideas of human nature. The survey of Iliadic examples that follows will conform to the categories described in chapter 2. It is meant to suggest the importance and ubiquity of nonverbal communication in another, comparable text. It will demonstrate the saturation of epic by nonverbal behavior, while later chapters focus on specific matters limited by category of etiquette, characters, or type of behavior.

From *Sardonic Smile: Nonverbal Behavior in Homeric Epic*. ©1995 by the University of Michigan.

1. Ritualized and Conventional Gestures

Ritual commands a central and pervasive place in ancient, even as in modern, life. Hundreds of communal, religious, and secular events fill nearly every day of the ancient calendar. Patterns of learned behavior, secular rituals, structure daily activities, such as eating, dealing with strangers and acquaintances in friendly or hostile ways (honor and degradation), setting out from home for the day's farmwork, entertaining dependents with one's marginal surplus to cement bonds, upholding one's code of honor, and recreation. Communal, even religious, rites, daily, monthly, and yearly, fill up life. The chief personal rites of passage (birth, puberty, marriage, and death) submerge and swathe the individual in social, ritualized activities. These essential, affective, and honor-calibrating events, and their individual deformations, frequently determine and redirect the plots of the Homeric poems.

Iliad 1, the commencement of the narrative and the wrath, treats many initiatory rituals, including approach ceremonies, propitiations of the god Apollo and the earthly Akhaian king, calling political assembly, displaying and challenging warrior honor, commencing diplomatic negotiations, purification, supplication, gifts, sacrifices, libations, feasts, and so forth. The corresponding end-frame book,[1] *Iliad* 24, offers as many ceremonial acts and exchanges, but here Homer concludes the story of wrath, so defilement, death, and rituals of sorrow,[2] burial, and closure are thematic.[3] *Iliad* 24, a narrative of closures, foregrounds personal and communal rituals of closure with attendant nonverbal behavior.

Human rituals depend for their power, in part, on the participation of the celebrants' whole bodies. Will and words gain expression by symbolic nonverbal behaviors: gestures and postures, nonspeech sounds and tones, clothes and artifacts (body-adaptors), and a disruption of ordinary space and time that powerfully affects interactants. Proper attention to etiquette and altered behaviors in altered situations partly defines the adequate hero in Homer. Inattention to, or abuse of, ritual procedures produces dishonor, even death. *Iliad* 24 richly illustrates these assertions.[4] We cannot survey every ritualized Homeric behavior,[5] but we can suggest the pervasiveness of noteworthy gestures, postures, and paralinguistic indicators of a ritual or conventional nature in *Iliad* 24. The last book reintroduces and reaffirms conventions of community and peace through a range of secular rituals, verbal and nonverbal. The narrative, speeches, and nonverbal behavior remind bloodied and angry participants of the "prizes" for which men fight and die. The contrast to the preceding days of hacking and hewing in battle

somewhat elevates the dehumanizing gore, rage, outrageous revenge, and depressing destruction (Macleod 1982, 45–46).

The nonverbal behaviors of religious devotion are prominent. Apollo and Zeus mention Hektor's regular sacrifices and gifts to the gods. Priam lifts his hands and eyes to Zeus, after purifying his body and pouring wine as a libation to the latter (lines 34, 68–70, 301–7, 284–87). Trojan bodies are instruments of communication.

Sharing food establishes a material symbol of acceptance, a ritual bond of solidarity, especially in Homeric redistributive economies. Com*pan*ionship (in the original sense) employs the body's communicative symbolic resources. Procedures of human alimentation have always been highly ritualized in terms of content, occasion, constraints or "style," and invited participants. Book 24 tells of Peleus' celebrated wedding feast, Thetis' drink and toast of welcome, Priam's fast (a negative feast, another nonverbal behavior), Akhilleus and Priam's ratification of agreement and closure of personal isolation(s) by sharing supper, Niobe's paradigmatic return to human conditions (symbolized by breakfast eating), and finally the funeral feast that honored Hektor.[6] Sharing food is richly symbolic and multivalent. The meanings of mourning are more limited but as highly affective.

Iliad 24 provides a handbook for archaic mourning procedures. Homer articulates the stages and action that perform grief—that honor the dead and give closure to the living. Akhilleus expresses his grief and graces his dead friend Patroklos by obsessively mutilating Hektor's corpse (15–17, 51–52, 416–21). Hektor's extended family weeps profusely. Priam veils himself and spreads dung on his body by rolling in it and smearing it about himself. Priam's kinsmen follow him in prescribed lament when he departs Troy for the Akhaian camp as if to his own certain death.[7] Priam fasts continually and keeps vigil for his dear son (160–65, cf. 510–12; 328; 637–42). Self-defilement (body-adaptor behavior) and self-deprivation (of food and sleep) best perform—that is, externalize for others—his feelings, his verbally inexpressible paternal grief.

Once agreement has been struck by the sorrowful survivors, Hektor's corpse is properly washed, anointed with olive oil, shrouded in a cloak and tunic by Akhilleus' domestic staff, and then brought back to its native public, Troy-town, with further funeral lament (581–82, 587–88, 696–97, 709). The mourning period for the hero Hektor is fixed at an abnormal nine days (in part to compensate for pyre-fuel shortage), with burial and feast on the tenth (cf. the burial of Niobe's children mentioned by Akhilleus, 612). The monument to the dead man will rise on the eleventh.[8]

The kinswomen tear their hair and touch Hektor's head (gendered nonverbal behavior); the multitude, unrelated by blood, crowds around (proxemics), the expressive gesture of concern allotted them. The *oikos* lays out his body, professional male singers lead the dirge, and females wail in unison. His wife Andromakhe ritually leads the kin-lament, while she holds her husband's head in her arms. His wife and mother perform the duty and exercise the right to *sing* (paralinguistics) their own unique laments. His sister-in-law Helen also, in her last appearance, croons and keens for her Trojan protector (710–12, 719–24, 747, 761).[9] These nonverbal and paralinguistic behaviors "speak" as loudly as the words themselves. Hands speak. The movements and sounds physically perform the experience of loss for the community, while they help the survivors emotionally and socially adjust to an emptier world.

For the funeral—both a cremation and an inhumation—a pyre is erected in public, fired, then extinguished finally with wine (cf. 38). The bones are collected and placed in a mortuary casket. The casket is itself enfolded in a purple cloth before being set in the ground and topped with a mound of stones. Lastly, the Trojans gather for a sumptuous feast in accord with traditional procedures (802). Death and the pain of survival thematize the *Iliad*: Thetis mourns for her son alive in books 1 and 18, Akhilleus mourns Patroklos dead from 18 to 24 (at least), and the death of Hektor dissolves the spirit of the great Trojan personages as it spells the doom of Troy (22 passim).

Two forms of ritualized nonverbal behavior prominent in *Iliad* 24, salutation and supplication of an enemy, require greater detail. Nonverbal protocols of heroic greeting[10] and parting provide one barometer of touchy *basileis* civility. *Iliad* 1 and 9 also pivot on nuances of welcome, the observance and rupture of well-understood patterns of reception. Thus, the three books that are arguably most central to the plot and most developed thematically (latest?) locate issues of exchange and reciprocity at their focus. The visitor must be greeted and seated, then offered wine and food, which will be consumed before any inquiries are made as to his name and provenience (394, 397). The good hosts of the *Odyssey*—namely, Telemakhos, Nestor, Menelaos, and Eumaios—provide the pattern, while Polyphemos and Alkinoos show themselves inept, if not dangerous, by violations of these and other rules of hospitality, such as protecting guests and their honor from others' abuse (at dinner and the games). These rules that go without saying are honored and violated repeatedly by knowledgeable interactants in *Iliad* 1, 9, and 24.

Nonverbal, proxemic postures and gestures enable initiation and termination of verbal communication between equals and unequals on earth

as in heaven (see chapter 6). First, Iris comes close to Thetis to parley; then, nymph Thetis sits next to Zeus, because Athena makes (proxemic) room for her. Hera personally offers her a goblet of ambrosia and comforting words (cf. 15.84–89). The two divinities implacably hostile to Trojans cooperate in the process of arranging the return of the chief Trojan's corpse. Immortal Thetis then approaches her mortal son, Akhilleus. She sits immediately next to him to stroke and soothe him in sorrow. Meanwhile, Iris approaches Priam and whispers in his ear (24.87, 100–102, 126–27, 169–70). The disguised Hermes subsequently emerges and takes badly frightened Priam's hand to reassure him of safe conduct. Divine-human traffic is very heavy in the battle's brief hiatus.[11] Finally, after the tragic rapprochement of the leading survivors, the sorrow-stricken Trojan crowd huddles around their returned friend and fallen leader. They salute the corpse and express their loss (361, 478, 515, 707–12).

The crucial encounter between Priam and Akhilleus aborts, in several ways, the usual procedure. It is thus marked by absence of greeting protocols: Priam's sneak-arrival at the feet of Akhilleus. Priam closes in on unsuspecting Akhilleus to supplicate before awareness is mutual. Supplication permeates the lethal encounters of the *Iliad*, on and off the battlefield, but in combat "it is always rejected or cut short," and the suppliant is slain. Akhilleus embodies and realizes that ethic of relentless and merciless war (9.632, 16.33, 21.198). Thus, the "values of humanity and fellow feeling" exhibited in the uniquely successful supplication of 24 heighten its power (Macleod 1982, 15–16). The elaborate description of nonverbal behaviors produces the cinematic effect of slow motion and emphasizes the reversal of business as usual by reasserting humane and generous sentiments. Nonverbal behavior gives visual substance to the momentous *Umkehr*; it provides the counterweight to unremitting killing everywhere before (and after, by clear implication).[12]

Supplication structures the trajectory of Akhilleus' wrath and its eventual extinction. Khryses and Agamemnon originally set the pattern of suppliance and rejection, then Akhilleus develops it with his mother. Menelaos, almost human, yields once to a suppliant (6.51–53), but his brother brings him back to his (pitiless) battlefield senses. Phoinix narrates the story of Kleopatra's failed suppliancy before Meleagros; the semisuppliant Patroklos and the pseudosuppliant Agamemnon vary it. Priam finally succeeds in restoring its important terrestrial potency.[13] Priam's self-degradation, his postural abasement before Akhilleus, is the necessary price for recovery of his son's dead body, the supremely valuable "social artifact." Every formality of gesture, every nuance of acknowledged status-manipulation, is observed.

Priam's divinely contrived and uniquely unnoticed entrance into Akhilleus' presence enacts the varied functions of salutation but without otherwise standard greetings.[14] Supplication atypically *opens* the unequal communication. Priam defines and affirms—by his body's reduced elevation—the imbalance of the interlocutors' status and his own lower rank. Thus, he identifies himself as a suppliant (in this situation). He manipulates the awful garb of humility that he has assumed by kissing the hand of his son's killer, even more than by his subsequently initiating the delayed verbal exchange and the verbal honorifics (486). The approach and abasement establish the situational hierarchy by proxemic, chronemic, and kinesic protocols.

The ritual of supplication here regularizes a constrained communication that would otherwise have been socially unacceptable and even physically dangerous. The absence of any words of greeting or even reassuring gazes and identification before the enemy penetrates the "intimate" distance of "personal space" produces a unique triple anaphora of wordless amazement (482–84). Old Priam has shown a new heroism, as "hard-hearted" young Akhilleus will show a new humanity and gain a unique κῦδος.[15] The audience waits for a sign of reciprocal willingness and generosity from Akhilleus: will he accept this assertive demonstration of abased status from an enemy king; will he respond in kind and with reasonable words, however brusque, rather than with his usual hair-trigger, bloody fury? Priam's vulnerability when he violates Akhilleus' body-envelope rightly arouses our fears. He rejects, however, the competitive ethos of Homeric conduct between equal-status non-*philoi*. He adopts the posture of a submissive inferior. This forestalling of proxemic permit and preemption of low elevation enable him to impose himself aggressively on Akhilleus' heroic code. Zeus, sending orders through Thetis, can be no more compelling. The powerless have their own (social) power, a theme of the *Odyssey*.

Gestures and postures of deference and supplication emotionally enrich, as they ritually satisfy, the narrative of mutual grief and the supreme commercial exchange between heroic enemies. The material quid pro quo (corpse for heaped up items of value and esteem) symbolizes a momentary spiritual, even physical, bridge between two shattered and isolated human souls. Bodies reveal what words cannot say. Words here are truly secondary; they merely ratify the language of bodies and the manipulation of distance and temporal intervals. Rather than a verbal agreement ratified by the formality of a handshake, we experience a nonverbal bonding between powerful presences sealed with verbal confirmations.

Hermes advised Priam to close in immediately and seize the Akhaian by the knees—as if on a battlefield. The Trojan trumps that humble posture

of surrender by the gesture of kissing the hands that have slaughtered his many sons. The lowered body, physical contact, and self-abasing words may logically be viewed as redundant, but communicating simultaneously through all channels conveys both unique urgency and sincerity. His humility is startling in any Greek context (465, 478, 506; cf. 357), but here it conforms precisely to Phoinix' persuasive "anticipatory echo." He had described the personified divinities, the lame, aged, indirectly glancing, but well-connected Supplications.[16]

The pathetic affect is so strong that Akhilleus loses speech (*aphonia*). The intimated image of his own father is too painful. Since Priam has not yet spoken a word, his appearance itself and nonverbal behavior must account for Akhilleus' incapacitating emotion, the pity of the man called "pitiless." Akhilleus shows ambivalence. He takes Priam's hand to reassure him that interchange will be peaceful, but at the same time he pushes him away (508–9; ἀπωθεῖν is formulaic for rejection of suppliants). Sharing a deep sense of human limitation and weakness, the two bereaved men weep together, entrained in paroxysmic pain. Then Akhilleus again touches Priam's arm, grants protection, and exercises dominance by making him stand. Finally finding words, he invites him to be seated. These are social signs of both the ritual of accepting supplicants and that of welcoming honored guests (507–22; cf. Akhilleus and Odysseus at *Il.* 11.765–79 and *Od.* 7.153). He has been touched by and has touched his enemy—vital heroic contact. He has restored him—physically—upright (elevation).

This nonverbal behavior expresses his patent sympathy. This ordinary ritual signaling that suppliancy is granted and a guest received amounts to recognition, honor, and welcome, even without ratifying words. Yet it affronts Priam's heightened sense of ritual obligation to his son's abused corpse. He will not sit in a chair (normality) while Hektor's corpse lies neglected.[17] Priam uniquely supplicates a victor not for consideration of his own body but for return of another's corpse. Two sets of nonverbal behaviors and rituals conflict; Priam's postures of grief do not suit postures of the successful suppliant and guest. But to underline Priam's totally dependent position (both in terms of suppliants' ritual and raw power), Akhilleus, through his beetled brows, threatens the recalcitrant visitor and acknowledged inferior with violence. Even him whom he pities may arouse wrath again, if he will not obey an order to be seated. The frightened King obeys (559–60).[18] As in *Iliad* 9, but more so, supplication is complemented by guest-friendship. These two social institutions exhibit certain parallel ceremonial acts that "permit the acceptance of the outsider within the group." In both rites, exchange of gifts, a form of nonverbal behavior, facilitates accepting the otherwise unacceptable, even the alien person or the

known enemy.[19] It is one of the many recombinative units that structure social life no less than oral epic.

The body is a prime instrument and point of reception for social intercourse. (Here, e.g., the "haptics" [contact behaviors] include Priam's dropping to the floor to seize the knees and kiss the hand of Akhilleus. No less communicative, Akhilleus lays hold of his enemy's arm.) In this climactic scene, the suppliant's reduced elevation, by its severe disturbance of normal position, reveals how low majestic Priam will sink in social honor to recover his son's body. The relation of young, less kingly Akhilleus, still sitting on his throne (472), to elderly, dignified, and otherwise kinglier Priam, curled up on the ground at his feet (510), expresses concretely, and in a single image, the untraditional, nonreciprocal greeting in terms of distance, movement, gesture, elevation, and posture. A minor gesture will "italicize" a message; here, a major gesture, a complex of bodily messages that drastically alters Priam's position, compels attention, reduces uncertainty as to the stranger's identity and intention, and initiates the transaction: an exchange of objects and also an unexpected social reciprocity, the sharing of grief at human loss. The generic commonplaces and the horizon of expectations set up by the multiforms of battlefield savagery have created patterns that neatly augment the astonishing features of this unexpected scene.

For the ancient Hellenes, gestures of limb and bodily position conveyed nonverbal messages more frequently and effectively than the face.[20] Priam therefore performs his nearly unconditional respect by utterly abject posture and orientation to Akhilleus. He nevertheless asserts some residual dignity, his equality as a suffering human being, by aggressive reduction of the separating distance—proxemic penetration of Akhilleus' body-envelope—and by seizing turn-taking precedence in speech (486). His complete array of submissive ritual acts paradoxically compels physically powerful, yet socially punctilious, Akhilleus to accept his request.

The situation enforces his extraordinary claims. By nonverbally abdicating status and power, he requires Akhilleus to grant him the honor that the elder seems to disclaim. This body-persuasion provides one major reason why he succeeds where Agamemnon had failed with "persuasive" gifts.[21] Agamemnon's deference is either false or shoddy or both; Priam's is unarguable. Body language prevails over words or wealth when the two conflict. Akhilleus' own complementary gestures demonstrate two things: first, that he well understands the moves of the game; and second, that he realizes his essential identity with his enemy—or any other man.

Formal and informal public addresses in Homer draw attention to nonverbal elements of both speaker's delivery and audience reception, two aspects of

secular, "political" ritual. Nonverbal behavior, under the later rubric of "delivery" (or *actio*), had a serious impact on the ancient study of persuasion.[22] Homer's attention to *kudos*-winning speech and oratory (*Il.* 1.490, 9.443) is patent in the high frequency and importance of his dialogues, group discussions, and assemblies; in his implicit, and sometimes explicit, attention to different persuasive styles of orators (3.216–24); and in the evaluations of Akhilleus' reckless and Odysseus' prudent speeches.[23]

Akhilleus admires both Priam's heroic appearance and his powers of persuasion, verbal and nonverbal (632). Homer has already characterized him by various speech acts: for example, he scolded his sons (237, 248–49, 251), and he flattered the stranger Hermes (375–77). Now he beseeches his most dangerous interactant, an enemy, effectively (507; 516). He mounts clever appeals and manipulates gaze and eye-lock, proximity, supplicatory postures, touch, and gestures:

> ἄγχι δ᾽ ἄρα στὰς
> χερσὶν Ἀχιλλῆος λάβε γούνατα καὶ κύσε χεῖρας ....
> (477–78)

> ἔτλην ...
> ἀνδρὸς παιδοφόνοιο ποτὶ στόμα χεῖρ᾽ ὀρέγεσθαι.
> (505–6)

> κλαῖ᾽ ἁδινὰ προπάροιθε ποδῶν Ἀχιλλῆος ἐλυσθείς ....
> (510)

The effective orator escapes the ghetto of language and exploits the spectrum of nonverbal behavior:[24] emblems (knee-grasp); illustrators (bent-over body); affect displays (tears); conversation regulators (such as supplicant initiation, lock-on gaze termination, establishing speaker precedence, and turn taking: twice, 483–85, 633–35); adaptors (steady gaze); physical appearance (stature and beauty);[25] touch (hand-kiss); paralinguistics (silence, volume, pitch); proxemics (coming into the "intimate distance," stillness), chronemics (late at night, delay in speaking, keeping speech short); alter-adaptors (gifts for ransom, food and chair [offers and] refusals).

Less dignified behavior better suits comedic than tragic genres. Comic and adventure literature enlist more expressive activity and drastic, not to say spastic, movement than tragic texts, because our jerky bodies often betray or "leak" spiritual pretenses and foolish or criminal plans. Conflict between word and gesture is sometimes read as irony in epic, as when Polyphemos interprets Odysseus' grandiose claims on *xenia* while the hero scuttles into

dark corners or when Iros replaces threatening words with a cowering body when push comes to shove. Such internal conflicts or conflicts between classes sometimes suggest slapstick—for instance, Odysseus' elegant speech while beating Thersites in the *Iliad* or the comic, if fatal, ballistic attacks by the suitors on the beggar.

Homer provides the narrative with such comic variety—with tension between word and performance, or between status and assumed roles. For further instance, we mention Hephaistos' desire to calm the Olympian feasters' threatening eruption into a brawl as he hobbles around the table in *Iliad* 1 and lowly, ugly, and irascible Thersites' jeremiad against the high command and then his punishment in *Iliad* 2. Hera's unholy seduction (employing stimulating olfactory, dermal, thermal, and body-adaptor nonverbal behaviors) overwhelms Zeus. The male spouts a vain verbal catalog of sexual conquest as he lusts for and grabs at his wife in *Iliad* 14. The poet often cues our response by internal laughter, as we note when Zeus laughs at Hera's boxing Artemis' ears in *Iliad* 21 or when the suitors laugh at Iros' nonverbal and verbal insolence and consequent put-downs in *Odyssey* 18. Heroic quarrels over prizes that make even Akhilleus and the Akhaians smile (23.556) repeatedly interrupt Patroklos' funeral games.[26]

The heroic dignity of a king like Agamemnon or Priam, in his own estimation if not the poet's, demands restrained comportment. *Comic* characters, including Antilokhos and the suitors, cannot "carry it off" and leak their affect. In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus' facial demeanor often prefaces or replaces verbal expressions.[27] He smiles the most. He even "manages" a smile when others are rebuking his wife Penelope. His smiles (especially the sardonic one) characterize menacing resources and mark each context as a significant, if ambivalent, moment. His famous sardonic smile and Penelope's puzzling, embarrassed laughter (20.301–2, 18.163) both underline concealment of plans from all others and the heroic control and inwardness of their selves, a Greek ideal (see chapter 11). The tranquillity of a self-assured queen like Arete or the self-controlled smiles of Odysseus, when confident of the assistance of Olympians or steadfast in the face of blows (e.g., *Od.* 17.234–35), contrast to the agitated speech and coltish movements of nervous Paris or angry Antilokhos, the hysteria of the cocky suitors, and the leaping to rise, crying, and sneezing of young Telemakhos.

However, intense kinesic activity can portray unbearable emotion and the rejection of a group's conventional standards of behavior. Traumatized and enraged Akhilleus gnashes his teeth, rolls on the ground, weeps, and otherwise disports his hated body.[28]

2. Affect Displays: Emotional Betrayal

Portraits in oral epic present fairly constant appearance and characters, often in formulaic, even fossilized, phrases. Sometimes the narratives describe dramatic, momentary, emotional disequilibria, characteristically conveyed by mien, posture, demeanor, gaze, and gesture. Idomeneus effectively describes cowards by changes in skin color, frequent postural alterations, fast heartbeat, and teeth chattering, a quasi-paralinguistic leakage (*Il.* 13.278–86). Visible arousal, like these or perspiration and blushing, "leak" affect. The physiognomy and bearing of the praiseworthy hero is, above all, calm and steady. The eyes index the spirit, as the following phrases, all from a short stretch in *Iliad* 1, prove: κακ' ὀσσόμενος, ὄσσε δέ οἱ πυρὶ λαμπετόωντι ἐΐκτην, ὑπόδρα ἰδών, κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων (105, 104, 148, 225). Baleful looks, blazing eyes, glaring glances, and, elsewhere, admiring or loving gazes concretely convey emotional states. Physiognomic consciousness is essential to Homeric characterization of emotional states.[29]

Iliad 24 narrates the disputed disposition and transfer of Hektor's corpse. The gods discuss the problem; mortal Priam is dispatched from Troy to claim the body, and Akhilleus and Priam experience and express parallel sorrow for their dead beloveds. The corpse is washed by the Akhaians, returned to Troy by Priam, and accorded "last rites" by the Trojans. As we have seen, the commercial exchange is devalued compared to the emotional bonding, but both are expressed nonverbally as well as verbally.

Expressions of uncontrollable grief amid the rituals of mourning dominate the book on both sides of the big ditch. Tears are noted for seven subject–object dyads: Akhilleus for Patroklos and Peleus; and for Hektor, Priam's sons and his wife Hekabe, Andromakhe, the Trojan public, and Priam himself (4, 9, 511–12, 162, 794, 209, 745, 714, 786, 509–10). The tears of Niobe express unquenchable, but necessarily endurable, human grief (613, 49). Mortals constitute a community of ephemeral sufferers.[30] Our *pathe* establish our specialness. Priam himself is benumbed, except with (literally) sympathetic Akhilleus. He seems to be beyond the comfort of tears, both when he is self-isolated and when he is surrounded by his grieving palace, family, and subjects (cf. Waern 1985).

While wrenching verbal articulations of sorrow most fully explain to audiences Akhilleus' sentiments and those of Priam, Hekabe, and Andromakhe, the nonverbal affect-displays complement the words. Apostrophes, eulogies, and keening speeches of bereavement gain force from the emotion-laden physical and paralinguistic phenomena that accompany them here. *Iliad* 24 conveys Akhilleus' anguish and anger in a rich variety of nonverbal behaviors: his out-of-awareness scowl at Priam's importuning, his

groaning at the thought of Patroklos' honor diminished, his writhing on the ground in grief, his frustrated search for a bearable posture and place to be still, his compulsive repetitions, and his startled and startling movements (559, 591, 5; cf. Priam: 165, 10–12, 572, 621). The grief of Priam is expressed both formally, through ritualized body-fouling, and informally through affect displays, such as sobbing while huddled at Akhilleus' feet (509–10).

Others too impart their inner states by visible behaviors. Priam, twice approached by gods, suffers uncontrollable shivering (170, 359). His hair stands on end—a unique involuntary reaction in Homer. He is dumbfounded by Hermes' approach and later struck with stilled wonder by Akhilleus' godlike appearance, as is Akhilleus by the astounding sight of the enemy chief (360, 629–32). Helen's presence, because of her beauty and the disasters that it had evoked, disturbed nearly all Trojans. She was ostracized almost by instinct. The shuddering withdrawal (775) that she mentions in describing the involuntary effect she produces in others appears but once elsewhere. There it describes Diomedes' surreal effect in his *aristeia* at the cost of Trojan opponents (11.382–83). Homer notes other nonverbal features of crowd psychology. Book 2 characterized the Akhaian host: shaking, shouting, running, laughing at Thersites, and scattering (2.144–53, 270, 398). The Trojans in book 24 informally and instinctually swarm, like calves or children, toward Priam as he wheels in Hektor's corpse, the body of their defender. Their clustering betrays self-aware helplessness, their need. They gather again, before having been summoned, to prepare formally for Hektor's entombment (709, 790; cf. *Od.* 10.410–15).[31]

A sharp contrast to agitation, various physical movements that replace or transcend words, is sudden cessation of word and motion. Such unmeditated, dramatic, and communicative stillness, denoted by Greek τέθηπα, signifies a nonverbal damming of the stream of reassuring motions, parallel to no longer verbal silence, otherwise known as "speaking degree zero."[32] Only Akhilleus experiences θάμβος, this extreme alteration of consciousness and responsiveness (1.199, 24.483). The epic utilizes this infrequent, but potent, affect-display, to signify the ceasing of human responses. Such a communications vacuum, a hiatus in the usual dependable human emissions, strikes interactants most forcibly.

For the articulate heroes of Homer's *Iliad*, such paralysis usually occurs in military struggles, when men are compared to frightened deer (4.243, 246; 21.29; Lykaon at 21.64 remains relatively rational). Stupefaction more "naturally" comes about from theophany and supernatural interference, the inexplicable and irremediable change that befalls Aias at Zeus' hands, Patroklos at Apollo's, and Priam at Hermes' (11.545, 16.806, 24.360).

The three other of ten Homeric examples, describing neither victims in war nor hapless sufferers of the gods' will, concern Akhilleus, the most emotional, agonistic, and voluble hero.[33] The arrival of the Akhaian embassy at his tent, of an earlier one in Phthia (in Nestor's report), and of otherworldly Patroklos in a dream all bewilder him at first (9.193, 11.776, 23.101). But before each verse is finished, he has roused himself to heroic hospitality or response.

Homer the narrator distinguishes at least three types, degrees perhaps, of astonishment. There is bewildered surprise when Priam first arrives at Akhilleus' lodge (three times in 24.482–84); the awestruck wonder conveyed by θαυμάζω when Akhilleus and Priam mirror gazes with each other after first words (twice in 629–31; cf. Macleod ad loc.); and the thunderstruck paralysis of τεθηπα when Olympian Hermes appears to and stupifies Priam in the dead of night (360).

3. Tokens and Dress: Telltale Objects

Homer sows his poetic field with objects, tokens, and other external signifiers that identify and situate persons for their interactants. As the introduction made clear, associated objects—self-adaptors and other-adaptors—inform interactants who we are and how we feel. The bride's clothes say as much as her blush or smile; so do Priam's ritually filthy clothes in book 24. Communicative objects commence in Greek literature with Khryses' tassled staff and Agamemnon's elaborate and genealogized scepter. Akhilleus' hurling of this scepter to the ground (*Il.* 1.245) clearly communicates by gesture both immediate dissatisfaction and dissociation and also immanent withdrawal. His honor has been transgressed; his humiliation requires symbolic response and retaliation. As such, the failure to honor the king's power-symbol was more significant than its de-elevated landing place. By distancing himself—swiftly, intensely, and violently—from the communal power-object, he abuses it and them, and thus ruptures his bond with the assembly and its convener to preserve his independence, honor, and dignity.[34] Homer's intensely narrow focus in *Iliad* 24 on the grief of a father and a son similarly capitalizes on several significant objects.

Hektor's is the only corpse ever successfully ransomed in Homer. Objects express emotion. Hektor's princely ransom of objects, exchanged here for a "useless" corpse, suggests the incalculable value of the living leader.[35] Since Hektor now is and is not a person, is and is not an object, he therefore can and cannot be "equated" with spoil, gifts, goods, recompense, and ransom. The "objective" style of Homer does not speechify about the value of life—Akhilleus' observations on life and nonlife at 9.400–409 were

enough anyway. The subliminal effect δῶρα ἄποινα, words for lifeless, but symbolically resurrecting, objects—words repeated by gods, victor, vanquished, and narrator—transforms "neutral" into "value" terms. Dispassionate report has become expressive; the cool, objective style more effectively provokes strong emotional response.[36]

Lifeless things in Homer have a "discreet but intelligible language"; sometimes their vicissitudes equal or excel in *pathos* those of human beings.[37] They provide vivid description but also physically communicate emotion and exert force on characters. The blackest veil of mother Thetis states precisely her bereaved emotions. Priam's filthy body and tattered mourning garments proclaim a "darkly" emotional condition and distance him from family, not to mention his fellow citizens (93–94, 163). He still wields his staff of office, but now only in the private realm, shaking it menacingly at his sons (247).

The chair that host Akhilleus gently offers to indicate welcome and fellowship is refused by Priam (522, 553), as the food would have been, had not Akhilleus first nonverbally and verbally supplemented the offer. He restores the corpse of Hektor and relates—inversely paternal as he now is—the parable of Niobe. Only then does Priam end his fast (641–42), a self-destructive, and therefore all the more powerful, nonverbal behavior. Priam's isolated dissociation from the human condition encompasses rejection of conversation, ease (elevation and posture), food, clean and decent clothes and body, and even sleep (635–40). Once he has recovered the corpse, his intense anguish is lessened sufficiently so that he can associate himself with a different set of significant objects, now those relating to the reintegrative niceties of funerals and burial. The tomb and monument (666, 799, 801) are mentioned, not only Hektor's, but those of Patroklos and old Ilos also. Troy has become a cemetery and a burning pyre. Hektor has become bones in a golden *larnax* (795), dead and buried, but at least his corpse has received its due objects of ethnic honor and value, proper ritualized treatment.[38]

One unique form of nonverbal behavior, augury, possesses a separate, divine, but recognized, syntax. This "visible speech" of gods to humans includes all wordless, divine messages to earth below: portents, dreams, "unnatural" thunder, lightning, rain, timely earthquakes, rains of blood, and weird noises (13.59, 11.53–54, 18.217–18; also miracles, such as the petrification of Alkinoos' ship and men at *Od.* 13.163–64).[39] At *Il.* 24.305–21, Priam washes, prays for success and security in a selected, open spot in his courtyard, pours libation, and requests a telegraphic bird on the right, a nonverbal semasiological message. Zeus duly provides his eagle, and Homer measures his wingspread in a simile that describes the strongly barred door of a rich man's treasure chamber. Power as well as size and future safety as

well as expense are conveyed by the mighty auspice and the simile, by the nonverbal bird and portal. Some readers may question the inclusion of object-adaptors among my categories of nonverbal behavior, but they provide literature, a medium of words, with a potent "concrete" dimension by which to communicate feeling, thought, and meaning. They are therefore especially indispensable to a nonmimetic (nontheatrical) medium.

Separate, "lifeless" objects are at times invested with social value (like the scepters of Agamemnon and Priam), emotional power (how clothing is worn and how personal expression varies the face), or divine sanction. Such nonverbal signals (even portents) can support, supplant, or contradict a character's words or actions. Object-adaptors from on-high or down-below are informative, communicative, and interactive. Economy of affect makes ancient epic crisp, rapid, and revelatory. The control of personal appearance powerfully affects Odysseus', Penelope's, and Akhilleus' interactions. These nonverbal messages sometimes decide the narrative.[40]

4. Proxemics: The Human Use of Space

Distance structures human relations. Hall (1966, 113–30) divides social space into four "regions": the intimate, personal, social, and public distances. The lines between paired-off people vary from culture to culture but may vary less between Akhilleus and middle-class Americans than between contemporary Middle Easterners and the same. The stages of Akhilleus' wrath can be schematically represented as violations and restorations of his territory (and significant objects, like Briseis). He draws a series of very clear boundaries between himself and Agamemnon. Agamemnon's ambassadors (as we oddly call them, as if they were representing separate states) gingerly enter the posted grounds of their alienated colleague. Priam manages to penetrate his "turf" and, more emotively, his social and personal being. Akhilleus' body-envelope is very large and is sensitive to the slightest slight.

Intimate distance allows Homer's characters and others to feel and smell other bodies. Skin texture (touch), body heat or cold (with or without touch), and acrid and sweet odors inflect and deflect intercourse. At this distance (and at each of the others), we respond differently to stimuli because we have different sensations (olfactory space) and a different concept of physical self and other. We hear sighs and whispers and see objects in great detail. Humans possess four "situation personalities," depending on how we imagine our personal bubble of inviolable space in every social transaction—in bed or on the subway. At the closest distance, people make love, comfort children and the bereaved, and embrace close friends. We immerse ourselves in each other's sensorium; the sensory input is stepped up. At this distance,

Akhilles and Briseis take their rest (676), Hekabe and Andromakhe bewail their dear Hektor (712, 724), and Thetis soothes Akhilleus as Athene strokes her favorite earthling.

At the *personal distance*, we still touch or grasp one another. The "kinaesthetic sense of closeness" varies from culture to culture, even from nation to nation, and even between ethnic sub-divisions,[41] but this is the distance of one-to-one relations, the friend, the go-between, and the client, relative, or servant. One can still physically dominate the interlocutor. Only trusted acquaintances come this close and transact private business. Conversations at this range expect intermittent eye contact and facing bodies (unless the participants are in motion).

Social distance, four to seven feet, facilitates impersonal business and casual social relations. There is an insulation of the person, a welcome sense of separateness. Sometimes tables and chairs structure this space and affect behavior, as in Akhilleus' lodge. The voice remains at normal volume, and facial expressions can be read clearly. At this distance, the gaze of another can be intensely annoying or can convey the rapt attention of lovers in public venues.

Public distance affects people's choice of words and phrasing as well as their pace and volume. Others are observed without facial detail, and, to be lucid, nonverbal clues must be fairly emphatic: whole arm movements or major changes of posture, as in the Attic theater or the American presidential inauguration. The spatial envelope determining crowded or pushed or claustrophobic feelings varies West to East, North to South.

Every narrative perforce indicates spatial relationships, because proxemics names one of the few basic, unavoidable aspects of human intercourse. (Chronemics, another such aspect, is discussed in the appendix.) This section largely confines itself to examples that most clearly affect mood and events. Homer manipulates to unusual effect the social and psychological meanings of space. Proxemic behaviors cut across all the categories described in chapter 1, so some repetition is unavoidable. That they can be ceremonial, informal, intended, subconscious or unconscious, and voluntary or even enforced comes as no surprise. The quest for *Lebensraum* (elbowroom) and "personal space" currently expresses political and psychological craving for defined comfortable distances. In this section, we examine the four proxemic zones in *Iliad* 24 and then briefly consider proxemic dimensions of perhaps the central ritual, supplication, in the *Iliad*.

Thetis deals with her son, Akhilleus, in the *intimate* zone (126). Hermes is descried by Priam's henchman, Idaios, at the *public* distance, but the god comes closer for *social* interchange and even into bodily contact, the *intimate zone* (352, 360–61; 477). Hekabe has also approached her spouse,

Priam, just as closely (283). Priam defenselessly apposes himself to his son's killer, a startling violation of protocols between enemies on and off the battlefield. Priam supplicates Akhilleus, then they touch each other—first unidirectional knee-grasp, then bidirectional hand-work (478, 508, 515, 671). The usual regulation of *verbal* back-and-forth interaction between the unacquainted (an almost involuntary, out-of-awareness set of rules) shifts—because of Priam's location—to a different pattern, an intimately shared, largely *unverbal* understanding. Interchange of a fixed gaze (face-work) conveys instant sympathy and rejection at the intimate distance. Normal heroic conversational protocols also involve hard looks and smiles at the personal or even social distance. Posture, distance, and body orientation that on other occasions would be rude, ill-mannered, or likely to invite attack express urgency and extreme emotion in Akhilleus' tent (Ekman and Friesen 1969b, 82–84). So does Akhilleus' parentlike setting of Priam on his feet again (515), although this act primarily confirms, in a ritual mode, successful supplication performance.

The close but untouching personal distance measures the herald Iris' approach to Thetis, Thetis' approach to Zeus, Iris' message delivered to Priam, Hekabe's help for Priam, his housekeeper's assistance in ritual, Hermes as Priam's escort, and Akhilleus' unusual permission for his two closest comrades' presence at dinner. Akhilleus acknowledges the enemy's suppliancy but gently distances Priam from himself by force (508, cf. 515). Distance talks; he has expressed proxemic need for "personal space" and reduced for himself the "volume" or intensity of Priam's unanswerable plea. That "claustrophobic" reaction also impels him to insist that Priam be seated—that is, keep his distance. Priam's reluctance to do so reflects his desire to maintain the proxemic pressure. Such elevational alterations create a different distance, different postures and bodily orientations, and thus a different situation and ethos (522, 553).

Social distance positions the leisured Olympians' table-talk that opens *Iliad* 24 (32—Apollo's dinner speech). Priam chases off male relatives from his home at even this unwelcome proximity (247–52). Akhilleus' warriors remain at this distance to mark respect for acknowledged hierarchy and their companion's will (473).

Priam and Akhilleus, the heroic principals, move apart, from *intimate* to *personal* to, finally, *social* space, after Akhilleus returns from loading Hektor's corpse on the wagon (597). He sits on his couch, then he and the imposing father share a meal. They become companions in warm food and in cold grief. Finally, they separate for their nightly rest, Akhilleus inside, and Priam and his herald outside the shelter (673–75). Proxemic procedures articulate phases of their difficult interaction and now signify the completion

of intimate business. The midnight distancing, however rationalized, avoids "morning after" problems, the necessarily "sticky" ceremonial of enemies' restoring intercourse and face-to-face valediction.

This central and crucial encounter of *Iliad* 24, Priam's intimate visit with Akhilleus, is bracketed by the social events on Olympos and the public mourning in Troy, the unquenchable shoulder-to-shoulder feasting above (98–103) and the mournful public-distance gathering and obsequies below. Book 1 began with the public-distance confrontation of a local priest and an alien army but ends with the intimate distance of Zeus and Hera in bed. Book 24 begins with the end of the Akhaian games at public distances, with Hektor lying far away from his parents (211), dishonored on the battlefield. Akhaian burial celebrations begin the book that ends with the end of another public-distance burial ceremony, the departure of Hektor's mortal remains. Homer characterizes variously stressed participants and situations by the use of space.

Supplication, a ritual partly dependent on elevational and proxemic protocols, pervades the *Iliad*. The poem opens with Khryses' failure with Agamemnon and success with Apollo. Agamemnon's "space becomes off-limits." He mercilessly taunts the old man with distance: he must not *come near* again, his daughter will be *far away*, *inside* Agamemnon's house, indeed *intimately sharing* his bed (1.26–31; Holoka 1992, 246). Thetis' suppliant request at the knees and chin of Zeus sets the plot in motion. The embassy to Akhilleus is the most extensive supplication in ancient epic. At the crisis of the Akhaian defense, "big fool" Patroklos, while standing, semisupplicates Akhilleus (16.46–47), and the poem closes with "a full traditional supplication ... in the fullest ritual detail." Physical contact establishes a particularly awesome bond between suppliant and supplicated. Proximity is an essential factor in every case (except Khryses' prayer to Apollo, where the man-God situation allows certain telephonic fantasies). So space as well as posture structures this essential reintegrative ritual where social bonds have never existed or have been ruptured (Thornton 1984, 117, 120–29, 138, 141).

Akhilleus, "squatting" on Priam's Trojan territory, holds by force a delimited beachhead. Control of Trojan land constitutes the plot's immediate incentive. When Priam enters the Akhaian's lodge, he violates the territorial integrity of the violator. The spatial aggression and unexpected proximity communicate his urgency, just as gestures of "full suppliancy" communicate nearly unlimited deference to his son's killer. Akhilleus' claustrophobia and impotence are little diminished by gestures attempting to break Priam's ritual hold. The proxemic coup limits Akhilleus' options. Priam could not express his urgent plea beyond the intimate zone, where no plea can be

barred, if performed correctly. Perhaps this is why he finally succeeds where the priest Khryses initially had failed. Trojan elder Priam exacts from Akhaian Akhilleus by touch (haptics) and proximity his child that distanced Khrysan or Theban elder Khryses (1.366–80) failed to extract from Akhaian Agamemnon.

The way characters "handle" time and space, often automatically and rarely after thinking, tells us what they feel. The text conveys the latent messages of "real" life, brought to awareness by authorial description. In Akhilleus' lodge, gestures and spatial manipulation introduce and embody messages about helplessness and compassion. In many cultures, social controls exist in the situation rather than in the person.[42] The personal element is subordinated to communal norms or is expressed through ritualized or public acts. What seems to us private, inward, secular, and psychological appears as shared, outwardly experienced, and "social" in the Homeric poems. The last generation of scholars, following E.R. Dodds, contrasted these "shame" cultures to "guilt" cultures. Others speak of situational as opposed to psychological analyses. A sympathetic response to the challenges of the *Iliad* recognizes that humans of every culture and era *always* respond (in informal quarrels and flirting as well as at formal weddings and funerals) through socially recognizable and acceptable forms, not directly expressed emotions—if such a thing is even imaginable (and I doubt it). Some acculturated reactions are ceremonial, while others are more actively or passively affect-revealing; often one observes both together. Human negotiations in any case are constructed from each culture's own toolbox. The Homeric example includes tools like scepter hurling and dirt smearing, as well as more "transparent" gambits like smiling, stroking, and (ethologically constant) horripilation.

Akhilleus' social space teems with ceremonies and restrictions whose limitations he perceives. He rigorously adheres to his code and calls to account those who try to elude it. Sometimes he manipulates these rules cleverly, if not courteously, to his own advantage. Some situations stymie him. The flawed stratagems of Agamemnon lead to the more gravely flawed responses of Akhilleus (a pattern repeated for Telemakhos and the suitors, but with our sympathies reversed). In their visit to Akhilleus' lodge in book 9, Odysseus, Phoinix, and Aias describe, with increasing fervor and effect, the institutions and code of heroic behavior. While boasts, taunts, and even logical arguments suggest that Akhilleus will persist in violating the heroic code, his actual behavior carefully conforms to it. He knows his proper "place" and the limits of his social freedom.

Agamemnon publicly threatens to come personally to Akhilleus' lodge to seize his subordinate's prize, Briseis (*Il.* 1.185). The act would doubly

violate the lesser *basileus*' intimate space, by face-to-face challenge and by theft of a gift "freely" given.[43] He does not come in person to Akhilleus then, for prudential as well as ceremonial reasons. More importantly, he again chooses to avoid the personal visit later, when he realizes it is past time to make amends, that is, to offer apology and restitution (*Il.* 9). Nestor, in anticipation perhaps of both the delicate negotiations to come and the commander's clumsiness, proposes delegates. Agamemnon never opposes the convenient idea. Thus, he expects to keep his social "face" intact and his haughty (and safe) "distance." But the ceremonious element is not a frill but is essential to heal the rupture. Agamemnon's change of heart is limited (9.160–61), flawed. Akhilleus rightly calculates that the apology is spoiled. Only an abortive ceremony of restitution of property by proxies occurs. Akhilleus experiences no complete social and public ritual, no adequate face-to-face personal admission of fault here or even later (*Il.* 19.51, 76–77).

In that crucial scene of rapprochement, Agamemnon's late(st) arrival and his remaining seated omits the essential approach of the party in the wrong to the offended party. Making the first move, displacement of self, and direct, face-to-face apology are necessary elements in negating offense; these negotiations of self-presentation restore honor to the dishonored interactant. Agamemnon's repeated failure to apologize, distribute, and supplicate rightly and ritely ("duly;" Latin *rite*) dishonors Akhilleus. The situation forces unromantic and uncomfortable Akhilleus to maintain his honor. Invective and boast, and threat and apartheid, offer effective tools from the heroic toolbox. Within the heroic code, his spatial, ergo social, isolation is the most politic response (and the Olympian preference voiced by Athene) to his humiliation in *Iliad* 1. Akhilleus' return does not hinge on and does not result from Agamemnon's material and paternal generosity with a "catch" (18.111–15; 19.67, 137–50). When he eventually accepts Agamemnon's contorted, defective formalistic apology, the reasons are quite different from those that his peers or many modern readers are able to imagine. In sum, Akhilleus rigorously adheres to the warriors' code; Agamemnon repeatedly violates it (by apportionment, titrated insolence or deference to subordinates, and vaunting). Zeus never faults Akhilleus' behavior in the quarrel with Agamemnon.[44]

Priam performs the sacred institution of supplication to perfection. "The power of this sacred institution [of *hiketeia*] is inescapable."[45] *Iliad* 24 moves finally from the enclosed intimacy of the Olympian clubhouse, Priam's palace courtyard, and Akhilleus' lodgings, outdoors to the cooler, open-sky, public distances of state funeral. The civic reception of the body is followed by family mourning in public (707–20). Other mourners, women from outside the family, are present, and the whole community echoes

Helen's lament (776). Priam, as king, orders the assembled soldiers to pile wood for the obsequies, and the townsmen gather for the cremation and consequent funeral banquet (777, 786, 790, 802). As any funeral and burial separate the bereaved survivors from the deceased, physically as well as emotionally, so Homer separates the hearer/reader from Troy. In cinematic jargon, the final scenes of *Iliad* 24 hold tight focus on facial close-ups at the *intimate* and *personal* distance in Akhilleus' hut, then draw back to the *social* and *public* distances of the living Trojan community in mourning. Finally, it withdraws even farther, beyond a *public* distance, to the noncommunicative dispersal. The community's social dynamic automatically carries life forward after the leader's death, however, at a reintegrative banquet (24.802).

Both Homeric epics "comment" unobtrusively on protagonists' acts by noting their mobility or lack of it, the extent of their body-envelopes, and the degrees of their penetration of others' "turf." They achieve physical proximity as prerequisite to spiritual recognition. The privileges of shared space signal sorrow or joy. While Trojan and Akhaian protagonists voice grief in eloquent words, their bodies—by position and distance—also eloquently articulate inner states and intentions. The *Odyssey*, especially the second half, revels in the intricacies of space manipulation (see chapter 7).

5. In-awareness, Informal Body Language

The nonverbal behavior that we most consciously notice consists of the illustrative and emblematic gestures, postures, and sounds that one subject intends to send to another. When Thetis strokes her sole child (24.127), the act is both intentional and in-awareness; it communicates sympathy and satisfies the affectionate parent's need for closeness and touch (haptics). Priam's beating another person (247) communicates his mood and attitude, his anger and hostility, while it (more instrumentally) inflicts pain. Touch by hand or mouth is a conscious and intense mode of communication, obviously within the intimate distance. Touch generally provokes more response than equally conscious modulations of the voice—meaningful, so-called paralinguistic phenomena.

Homer mentions affective larynx effects. The shrieking pitch and raised volume of Hekabe's voice express frustration and intentional violation of normal female vocal expectations. Iris' whisper transmits an intimate, private, and privileged thought. Kassandra the prophet also shrieks, a paralinguistic sign of demonic inspiration, doom, or both (200; 170, 703). Three women lament Hektor in tearful voices (746, 760, 776). Groans punctuate and articulate the grieving (591, 696).[46]

The eyes are as eloquent as the voice: the locked gazes of Priam and Akhilleus communicate their mutual awe; the "dark" glance threatens an inferior; exchanged glances and maintained silence among Akhilleus' henchmen preclude the need for authorial analysis of heroic psychology; the act betrays their tact. "Telling" laryngeal and ophthalmic behaviors, not lengthy descriptions of emotional states, audibly and visibly convey attitudes of protagonists and "extras" both to internal and external audiences (629–32, 559, 484; cf. Cic. *de Orat*. 3.221 or Nestor's knowing glance at *Il*. 9.179–81). Informal and informative, in-awareness nonverbal behavior is rare in *Iliad* 24, relative to the other types discussed in this chapter. References to Akhilleus' semiritualistic warrior-trophy displays and then mutilations of Hektor's corpse (15–17, 51–52, 417–18) meant more for his mood earlier, in book 22. Here, their continuation symbolizes Akhilleus' pathetic inability to "snap out of it," to accept a displeasing reality and get on with life. He remains frozen in bereavement until Priam holds up a mirror of equal grief and breaks the spell. Similarly, Hekabe's verbally expressed wish to eat Akhilleus' uncooked liver more likely preserves a popular idiom of cannibalistic hostility than a description of real, nonverbal, but communicative, ritual.[47]

Responsibility of affines, legal control, and gendered power and dependence are signaled by arm-grasping hands. The husband ceremonially grasps his bride's wrist during the marriage rite as a sign of control. The female (gendered) correlate is to cling to the arm of a spouse or man-child. This example makes clear that one gesture can have different, even opposite, meanings depending on who does it to whom.[48] An eloquent, informal gesture in *Iliad* 24, persuasive to participants and compactly communicative to the audience, is this hand- or wrist-grasp. Thus, Hermes and Akhilleus both guide Priam, indeed assert their control over Priam's postures and distance, while reassuring him verbally and nonverbally of friendly attitude (361, 515, 671–72, specifying ἐπὶ καρπῷ). Hera grabs Artemis by the same wrists with one hand before boxing the child's ears. Thus, and with a provocative smile, Hera visibly reminds Artemis of her "minor" or inferior status and reproaches her as a naughty child (21.489–92; at 508, father Zeus laughs at her situation).

Astyanax had earlier "screamed and shrunk back" from the extended hands and helmeted face of his fiercely armored father. The child's nonverbal behavior transmits an age-based, infantile feeling: uncomprehending fear (but nonetheless suitably clairvoyant, 6.466–70). Ascribing ostracizing, symbolic intent, Andromakhe earlier predicted that a *Trojan* would someday thrust her orphaned son from the communal table. Now she predicts his death, grabbed by an overpowering Akhaian (22.491–99). This Akhaian who someday seizes Astyanax to hurl him to death performs an instrumental act,

but the death of the young prince, real enough, supplies a synecdoche for the death of the Iliadic community (24.735).

Andromakhe's anticipatory fears for herself and her child arouse pathos. No less passionate is her lament that Hektor had no chance to stretch out his arms to her at home, on his death bed, in his final moment before dying. The unrealized, momentary, nearly instinctual gesture of need serves as another synecdoche for Hektor's indefinitely needy condition and unfulfilled love. The preliminary gesture and the aborted embrace characterize the intimacy of Homeric families and companionate marriage, for Trojans as for Ithakans (743; *Od.* 8.527, 16.214, 17.38, 23.207–8, 23.240, 24.347).

The greatest grief of Akhilleus, Priam, and Penelope appears unrestrained, because their extremes of passion and consequent disregard of social convention in these moments present the central action. Their sounds, gestures, and collapsed postures are vivid and economical communications that reveal psychological states, confirm feelings by act, and advance the narrative toward the next development. Equanimity, emotional stability, and self-sufficiency are themes and ideals of philosophers, not of epic poets who portray the power of passions. Nearly automatically and unself-consciously, these characters express grief, while artful and calculating Aithon/Odysseus explicitly represses and defers his.

6. Conclusions

Nonverbal behaviors provide humans and other sentient creatures with a necessary redundancy: "information received from one system [e.g., the verbal] is backed up by other systems in case of failure.... [T]alk suppl[ies] only part of the message. The rest is filled in by the listener" (Hall 1966, 102). In 1927, Edward Sapir ignored achievements of literature, when he elegantly described nonverbal phenomena as "an elaborate and secret code that is written nowhere, known by none, and understood by all" (Portch 1985, 7). The ancient epic poets find nonverbal behavior a succinct and distinct dimension for their characters and action. They deploy it frequently; it contributes to the varied texture of their mimesis. It is not episodic or extraneous but essential to the drama and to the expression of individual and group personality. It fleshes out narrative and description; it provides counterpoint and emphasis. Such dramatic coloring speeds or slows the narrational pace. When Odysseus alleges that the bard Demodokos must have been present for or must have heard from an eyewitness his account of the sufferings of the Akhaians, the praised vividness and authenticity derives (in part) from his report of nonverbal behaviors (e.g., *Od.* 8.80, 291, 305, 310,

324, 344, 361, 366, 505–6). No mere chronicle or summary, devoid of persuasive speech or insistent gesture, would possess this power or convey such ethos.[49]

All nonverbal behavior reported in literature is, in some sense, conventional, narrowed in its channels to become comprehensible by strangers unfamiliar with an individual and his idiogests. Furthermore, the medium, like any other, must be selective, since verbal accounts, texting, requires "channel reduction." Every teller's narrative strategy selects certain significant facts: only some behaviors, some deeds, and some words "deserve" attention. Even the modern kinesiologists' fixed-focus video camera has a more limited scope and sensorium than a live interactant.[50] Who communicates what to whom and how are questions essential to any reading of the epics. Homeric "facts" are often nothing other than nonverbal behaviors.[51]

Homer operates with patterns of formula, theme, and type-scene for purposes of literary coherence, intelligibility, and drama, as well as for considerations based on the nature of oral epic performance. Gestures also structure his world and ours. He is "persuasive" because he produces a rounded, three-dimensional image that neglects few descriptive and narrative techniques. The lesser authors of the later epic cycle seem to have employed a thin and flat diction, uninspired repetitions, and fantastic elements of romance. They lack the delights of direct speech, tragic characters, and dramatic construction.[52] Few traces of nonverbal behavior can be discerned. Nonverbal behavior, seldom if ever before appreciated by Homeric critics as a ubiquitous element in the epics, contributes importantly to Homer's preeminence. His range of nonverbal behavior is unmatched, and its occurrence, never perfunctory, adds depth to the Homeric stage.

Iliad 24 includes all major categories of nonverbal behavior but is richest in ritual (category A), in part because the final book swaddles us in ceremonious reintegration and closure: the gods and men, the dead and the living, and even the Akhaian besieger and the Trojan besieged. The family unit reasserts itself in the intimacy of human habitats, removed from the blasted, barren fields of battle and brutal Olympian bullying.

Nonverbal behaviors identify emotions and their intensity. They articulate the soul through the body. Many nonverbal behaviors are easily controlled; all normally capable, that is nondyssemic humans employ them daily to supplement or replace words and to ease and effect interchanges with others. In critical situations, often depicted by Homer, posture and gesture have a propriety, truthfulness, and creative expressiveness of their own that transcend words. In particular, the coordination of bodily kinetics with strong feelings (as in family feuds, parting, and mourning procedures) can

have either centrifugal or restorative effects. Repair of persons emerges in *Iliad* 24, where the nonverbal expression of emotion italicizes the inherent pathos, verbal information-sharing, and communal healing. Nonverbal behavior, whether underlining or undermining, transmits essential expression of individual and communal attitudes and feelings. Our bodies and voices suggest or assert that which the speaker fears to declare or cannot find words for.[53] Occurrence of nonverbal behavior in Homer, then, "silently" supplies another, independent and cooperative channel of communication for characters' status, general attitudes, immediate conscious responses, and unconscious feelings. Certain authors, following Homer, summarily reveal by nonverbal behavior significant signs of character and interaction, a "hidden dimension." Oral literature is thus the richer, and the student of ancient personality and social life uncovers enriching contextual information.

Notes

1. Homer's balance and ring-composition are described by Myres 1932, a study of "palindromic structure" (271) in book 24, and Whitman [1958] 1965, 257–60. More recently, see Macleod 1982, 32; Lohmann 1970, 12–30 discusses its use in speeches.

2. In book 24, the Phthian hero's paralyzing grief balances King Priam's hyperkinetic sorrow. Display rules for betraying pain and sorrow vary widely cross-culturally. Odysseus is the most frequent weeper, as Waern 1985, 223, notes: *am meisten weinerlich*.

3. All other human business momentarily becomes peripheral to unarguable death. Nonverbal ceremonies of the happier past are briefly mentioned: Trojan dancers and singers (a negative reference), Akhilleus' sex life, Apollo's lyre playing, and the dancing nymphs of Akheloios. Their joy counterpoints the doom-drenched present (261, 130–31, 63, 616; on dance, see Quint. *Inst. Or.* 11.3.66).

4. Edwards 1987, 152–54, introduces patterns of heroic conduct; J. Foley 1990, 243, explains "plastic compositional units." Book references in this chapter apply to the *Iliad*; references without book numbers apply to *Iliad* 24.

5. For instance, formulae for ritual hand-washing occur five times in the *Iliad*, fourteen times in the *Odyssey*, six times with an identical five-line cluster (e.g., *Od.* 1.136–40) or type-scene. The ritual celebrates (guest) inclusion before the first shared meal. This nonverbal initiation deserves separate analysis, more attention than philological identification of traditional verbal elements. Compare passionate hand-clasping formulae, ἔν τ᾽ ἄρα οἱ φῦ χειρί (6.253 and ten other passages).

6. 62, 102, 641–42, 627–28, 613, 803; cf. Finley 1978, 123–26, on feasting; also Saïd 1979; Motto and Clark 1969; Griffin 1980, 16. Akhilleus earlier (19.200–210) unyieldingly rejected food and ransom. His meal sharing and conversations in book 9 confirm social solidarity and accepted reciprocity with select Akhaian leaders. Lykaon appeals to the bond of former clemency (Akhilleus already owns a debt) and a meal once shared with his killer-to-be (21.76). His later failure in supplication marks Akhilleus' exceptional rejection of hallowed and civilized *xenos*-bonding, formerly and formally certified by nonverbal rituals. From the huge bibliography on shared meals and their rituals, note Visser 1991, esp. chap. 5.

7. Elsewhere the word "to his death" appears only twice, of (other) great warrior heroes: Patroklos and Hektor (328; Macleod ad loc).

8. Thus, Priam responds to Akhilleus' inquiries about death rituals in ancient Troy (664–66). The actual burial rites in 783–803 are slightly different: no cremation had been mentioned, and the periods are one day wrong.

9. Female hair tearing often appears on roughly contemporary Attic Dipylon vases of the Geometric period, part of the luxurious grave goods for the dead. Kakridis 1949, 67–75, and Lowenstam 1981, 32–35, 60–61, consider the Homeric head-holding gesture. For notable millennial continuities of gesture in Hellenic funeral lament, see Alexiou 1974 and Danforth 1982 with photographs. The English language seems less endowed with nuance for grief language as well as for funeral procedures and nonlexemic, formal manifestations of grief. This poverty may mirror North Atlantic reserve in self-revelation and graveside practice, not to mention the antiseptic and lonely deaths we choose to endure in modern hospitals.

10. G. Rose 1969, 387–406, lists Homeric protocols for greeting strangers; Williams 1986 considers Odyssean parodies of the pattern; Levine 1982a, 100–101 examines the greeting of close acquaintances.

11. Macleod ad 463–64, observes that gods "do not customarily even appear to men in their true shape." Exceptional book 24 perhaps questions this rule. Human-divine encounters are sometimes bracketed by the poet with comments on divinity's opacity to men (*Il.* 5.127–28, 845; 10.573–75; 20.131; *Od.* 3.222–23, 4.653–56, 16.161, 17.483–87; cf. Clay 1983, 16–171.

12. Macleod 1982, 20–21, 30, with 16 n. 1 for references; also Pedrick 1982, 132, 139–40; Thornton 1984, 138–41.

13. Other, but not earthling, successful supplications include Thetis' requests of Zeus and of Hephaistos to honor her son. Hera also gets her way with minor gods.

14. Goody 1972 and Firth 1972 survey cross-cultural greeting rituals. Further, see Firth 1969; Gould 1973, 91–95, 100.

15. 24.110, with Macleod's note. Reciprocal wonder (629–31) and mutual esteem indicate their equal heroism.

16. 9.501–14; Gould 1973, 76; Thornton 1984, 116–19; M. Edwards 1991, 19–23, on anticipation.

17. 553, the momentary reality; cf. Odysseus' refusal to eat Kirke's food until his men regain human form (*Od.* 10.383–87).

18. The imbalance of power extends even to their seats: Akhilleus sits on a throne, Priam on a stool (515, 553; 578). The point is lost in many translations; cf. Houston 1975 on Odyssean seating. "Seating in prominence," a prominent detail of even the most conventional feast, here is weighted by a unique context.

19. See Pitt-Rivers 1977, esp. 98, on how honor is gained by being paid to a superior. Gould 1973, 93; 80 n. 39 lists all Homeric examples of supplication. See also, chap. 3, section 4, and chap. 7.

20. Cf. chap. 3, section 2. Modern Westerners, especially those on the North Atlantic rim, deprecate "theatrical" bodily gestures of respect and bodily contact in public in favor of "face-work"; cf. Goffman 1967a, 5–45, an essential study; Driessen in Bremmer and Roodenburg 1991, 245.

21. Gould 1973, 94–95, 100. Motto and Clark 1969 argue well for the Phthian's observance of Akhaian etiquette in every particular. Considering supplication in Attic drama clarifies this point about the power of "compelling gestures." The exigencies, however, of hearing and seeing in the large, open theater of Dionysos entirely invalidate

attempts to draw any conclusions thence about ordinary body-talk. A. Spitzbarth 1946 (*non vidi*) and M. Kaimio 1988 discuss gesture in Attic drama.

22. Quintilian opines (*Inst. Or.* 11.3.65) that in public speaking, *Is* [sc. *gestus*] ... *pleraque etiam citra verba significat*, "gesture means more than the words themselves." The Romans divided its materializing power into *vox* (paralinguistic phenomena), *vultus* (facial expression), *gestus* (= *motus corporis*), and *cultus* (= *habitus corporis*, or posture). *Vox*, *vultus*, *cultus*, and *gestus* must be calculated to suit a serious speaker's subject and intent. Cic. *Or.* 17.55; Quint. *Inst. Or.* 11.3.2, 9; chaps. 65–184 minutely consider gesture and dress. Volkmann 1885, 573–80, summarizes ancient references.

23. M. Edwards 1987, 88–97, notes that two-thirds of the hexameters consist of direct speech; Fingerle 1939 provides statistics book by book.

24. The technical categories, differently divided by semiotic, psychological, and linguistic specialists, are well defined and explained for my purposes in Ekman and Friesen 1969b and some later textbooks, e.g., Burgoon and Saine 1978. Other studies (e.g., Poyatos 1986) divide the phenomena differently, often into more precise, limited categories, such as "kinephonographs" and "ideographs."

25. The narrator characterizes the verbal content and style of Thersites' speech as "unmeasured, disorderly, unorganized, indecent, and amusing to the troops." Nonverbal features are also mentioned: Thersites' ugliness, demeanor, and offensive paralinguistics—"scolding, shouting, abusive, shrill." See 2.212–46; the last line includes Odysseus' sarcastic rebuke of his inferior's putative status claims to obtain the speaker's floor: "Thersites you thoughtless speaker, however clearly and easily you orate."

26. Levine 1982b, neatly demonstrates how the Odyssean suitors and the established beggar Iros comically mirror each other. They share insolence in word, gesture, and deed. Odysseus and Iros contest for a monogamous relationship to the suitors, as the suitors contest for sole possession of the imaginary bride. "Ares and Aphrodite Get Caught" (*Od.* 8.266–366) provides another comic misadventure, this time a divine interlude packed with nonverbal embellishment between Demodokos' two tear-evoking human (Trojan) tableaux.

27. For example, *Od.* 8.165, 17.304–5, 19.389, 23.111–12; see Levine 1984; contrast Eurykleia's incautious moves at 19.476–94, 22.407–12, 23.1–14.

28. *Il.* 24.9–13; *Od.* 10.496–99. Benson 1980, esp. "Gesture and Genre," 41–58, applies contemporary rules of decorum, philosophical, religious, and literary, to hagiography, *The Clerk's Tale*, and medieval romance. Windeatt 1979 describes Chaucer's deployment of nonverbal behavior as suggestive of inner feelings. Nonverbal behaviors in Chaucer do not offer cognitive self-awareness or self-analysis (143) but supply emotional leakage that gauges sincerity of characters' words and deeds (151). In addition, gestures enliven the narrative with "incidental observation" (159). In ancient epic, however, fewer examples of such incidental data emerge, because interest focuses on decisive acts (such as Chaucer's kneeling and fainting), not on characteristic idiogest—idiosyncratic, symbolic body movement (humming, coughing, nail biting, etc.). Roman fictions (e.g., from Seneca Maior, Petronius, and Apuleius) offer more material for that aspect of ancient literature.

29. Evans 1969, 58–67, catalogs facial expression and orientation; see also Holoka 1983.

30. Young Pisistratos opines that mourning is the sole *geras*, honorific prize, of humans at *Od.* 4.195–99, see Redfield [1967] 1973, 153, on mourning as a source of delight and a mastery of sorrow, a constructive source of song and story (19.518–22, 15.398–401). Thus, emotions expressed through the nonverbal, paraverbal, and winged verbal realms generate mythic figures.

31. Levine 1987 (also note his other studies in the bibliography and as discussed in chap. 10) has explored the expressions of the opposite class of emotions, smiles and laughter, as well as tears in the *Odyssey*. The gleeful suitors' and Penelope's maids' laughter reveal their presumption of putative status and blindness to approaching destruction (cf. Herodotus in Lateiner 1987, 94–95). Melantho's affect displays in particular exacerbate her sexual promiscuity and amplify, in another mode, her disloyalty to master, mistress, and house. Homer contrasts her behavior to Penelope's: the mistress frequently weeps out of love for Telemakhos and Odysseus. Odysseus' controlled smiles anticipate the suitors' defeat; they express a justified sense of superiority. The offending suitors, the subversive maids, and even loyal Eurykleia enjoy and exult improperly (22.409–34; 23.58–84). All other females serve as foils to faithful, modest, and cunning Penelope. Wohl 1993 suggests that even Penelope, as a non-kin female, possessing productive and reproductive power, threatens insecure and distrustful Odysseus. *Homophrosyne*, however, Homer's "romantic" notion, neutralizes their apparent conflicts and suppresses our notice of his patriarchal and violent domination.

32. Perhaps the word τέθηπα is related to θάμβος and its verb, which would add eleven examples, but these latter words seem to mark the initial surprise rather than the consequent disorientation. Vergil and Ovid employ the Latin equivalent, *obstipesco*, "to be stunned by an emotion," "to become stupefied, paralyzed, silent and numb." Lateiner 1992a provides further details.

33. Martin 1989, 206–15, 220, quantifies and accounts for Homer's oral "expansion aesthetic," Akhilleus' distinctive verbal characteristic along with moral trumping and efficient killing. When Akhilleus appears in a book (1, 9, 18, 23, 24), he tends to talk more frequently and in larger blocks than anyone else. See Fingerle's 1939 statistics (9–10, 19, 29, 34, 36–37).

34. Other meaningful Homeric projectiles that serve as the social sign can be noted: the stone discus by which Odysseus surpassed the best Phaiakian throw (*Od.* 8.186–98) and the suitors' ballistics, for which see chap. 10.

35. Macleod 1982, 20 (deleting verse 232); Griffin 1980, 19. δῶρα appears thirteen times, ἄποινα eight (e.g., for both, see 118–19, 139, 555, 594). Ransom lexemes emerge once every thirty-eight lines. Not only cash value, so to speak (e.g., the ten gold talents of 232), but Priam's specially won and specially worked tankard (234–37) are packed up—anything to obtain his dead son's body.

36. Herodotos 1.45 and 7.225, Thukydides 7.86, and Semonides' epitaphs well display the power of reticence.

37. Fränkel [1962] 1975, 38; Griffin 1980, 136, on 16.793–805: Akhilleus' helmet, here worn by doomed Patroklos. The African Tuareg enjoy an entire additional language of male veil manipulation; see Hawad-Claudot in Poyatos 1992a, 197–211.

38. Odysseus' repeated "before-and-after" grooming and clean clothes sequence, his first grubby and then magnificent appearance, patterns his series of visits: Ogygia, Skheria, and the palace on Ithaka. Odysseus' tawny hair is set by Athene to appeal to Nausikaa; later, she again ruins it for disguise, and his baldness is mocked by Eurymakhos (6.230–31, 13.399, 431; 18.355). Baldness exemplifies "body badges," nonverbal expressions of identity beyond the subject's control. Penelope also deploys appearance to express emotional state: she refuses to beautify, or even wash, herself. She only presents herself to the suitors veiled and accompanied by loyal servants, two nonverbal expressions of shame, modesty, status(?), and personal reserve that distinguish her from all other women (18.178–84, 207–11). See Levine 1987, 25, and chaps. 7 and 11 in this book for Penelope's proxemics.

39. To exclude these phenomena from *human* nonverbal behavior seems harmfully pedantic. Epic's anthropomorphic gods have access to more means of sending messages than humans do, but the modes are no different (or we would not understand them). If the color of a stoplight, the shape of a highway "yield" sign, or the "forbidden behavior" symbol of a circle with a slanted diameter line are acceptable semiosis, nonverbal communicative symbols of our legislatures, so should be Zeus' clear-sky thunder or Athena's varied birds. I here disavow solutions to the meaning(s) of divine intervention in Homeric epic (e.g., Athene stays Akhilleus' hand at the early assembly and advises Telemakhos to get out of Sparta and to avoid the suitors' assassination squad when approaching Ithaka).

40. In addition to object-adaptors, such as crowns, brandished weapons, low-cut blouses, and chairs, there are self-adaptors, such as (in-awareness) perfuming and other grooming, including hair, and (out-of-awareness) nail biting, lip licking, etc. Furthermore, note alter-adaptors, such as flirting (coy smiles or close approach with or without touch) and visible signs of impatience (foot tapping or clock checking as at *Od.* 13.29–30). Ekman and Friesen 1969b, 85–90 describe further subcategories. One major difference between deployment of nonverbal behavior in ancient and in modern fictions is that current literary convention stresses the idiosyncratic gesture or mannerism, as Portch 1985 shows for Flannery O'Connor, while ancient poetry emphasizes communal acts, visible evidence of status, other social phenomena, and nonlexical, but socially approved, "leakage."

41. Hall 1966, 131–64 gathers remarkable examples of groups misreading other groups' measures of proper distance. Lateiner 1992b more fully discusses heroic proxemics; cf. chap. 7 in this book.

42. Hall 1959, 92; Gould 1973, 94–95; Griffin 1980, 24–26, 53–56; Thornton 1984, chaps. 8–9. In Aristotelian terms, *praxis* has priority over *ethos*.

43. The quotation marks remind the reader that no gift is free, a truism of sociological anthropology, if not Perikles' funeral oration.

44. Motto and Clark 1969, 115, 119; Martin 1989 on the poetics and pragmatics of power. Chap. 6 in this book discusses deference and demeanor in Agamemnon's splendidly inadequate performance of restitution, verbal fobbing off of blame (19.86–90) on innocent gods, nonappearance in his first offer of restitution, and later, nonverbally offensive, seated posture (non-elevation) in public assembly. See Donlan 1971 and 1993; Clay forthcoming.

45. Motto and Clark 1969, 109–10, on rank and arrangement; Thornton 1984, 113–14, 141 for the quote. Modern Americans' apparently casual rules concerning supplication (favor requesting) are no less elaborately deferential and fixed in sequence, but the procedures of a pseudoegalitarian society are designed to seem more informal. The contortions of the failing student before a teacher, the scorned lover, the employee about to be dismissed, or the child who wants more television time may illustrate. Because Euro-Americans want and expect requests to come from the "heart," we reject even the appearance of ritual. This we wrongly regard as "insincere performance," cultural fabrication. The paradoxical result is that Euro-Americans are more inhibited in the expression of emotion—the formal rules of informality are too confusing to risk disclosure.

46. Priam's angry, scolding words, a type of speech accompanied by tonal nonverbal behavior that Helen says Hektor never used in twenty years, are regretfully excluded from this survey by the criterion of explicit textual evidence. Homer does not specify here the expectable paralinguistic attributes 1248–49, 767). Similarly, Hera comforts Thetis by means of a goblet of refreshment, an object–adaptor accompanied, we here can only surmise, by appropriate tones (101–2).

47. 24.212–13; Segal 1971, chaps. 5–7; Combellack 1981.

48. *Od.* 18.258; Sittl 1890, 131–32. For clinging to a husband, see Andromakhe at 6.406. For clinging to a man-child, see 6.253 (Hekabe) = 19.7 (Thetis). For other variants see 18.384 (two women greet each other), 14.232 (Hera greets Sleep). The formula at 18.423 is applied to Hephaistos' greeting Thetis. The gendered act characterizes this exchange as surprisingly urgent and conveys his hierarchical superiority in the divine pecking order. Modern advertisements transmit similar gender asymmetry in companionate couple's power by showing male arms over female shoulders while females cling to males; cf. Goffman 1976, "Function Ranking," "The Ritualization of Subordination," and illustrations 24, 58, 83, etc. In post-Homeric Attic vase painting (as Neumann 1965, 59–60, notes), men continue to lead, by the wrist and hand, the very young, the very old, drunkards, prisoners, and brides. All these creatures are subject to patriarchal authority, in need of guidance, or both. Lowenstam 1992 surveys the uses of ceramic evidence in Homeric studies. The ritualized and conscious gesture has analogues in primate behavior that may lie behind human formality.

49. The historian Herodotos, the Attic orator Lysias, and Plato also realized this power and indeed borrowed it from Homer. For Herodotos, see Lateiner 1987. For the Bible, see Mackie 1899, cols. 162b–163b. He indicates ethnic differences between Near Eastern and Anglo-Saxon usages. Gruber 1980 offers a detailed survey.

50. Tabulated book-by-book statistics on the number and location, internal audience, and length of speeches, the speakers, the type of speech, etc. for both Homeric epics are collected in the valuable 1939 dissertation of Fingerle. It is hard to locate and deserves printing. My graduate school colleague and Homeric companion William Beck, now of the Hamburg *Lexikon der frühgriechischen Epos*, supplied extracts and tables from this valuable study. For book 24, consult Fingerle's pp. 36–37: 804 verses contain 47 speeches composed of 452 verses (Fingerle wrongly typed 252 on pp. 36–37). The average length of a speech is 9.62 verses; the average percentage of a book occupied by *oratio recta* is 56.22 percent. My total number of speech verses is slightly different. Fingerle compares numbers for the entire epics in various useful ways on pp. 68–78; pp. 79–80 summarize results.

51. This self-evident assertion, as Daniel Levine points out to me, contradicts the influential formulation of Auerbach 1953, chap. 1, "Odysseus' Scar." Auerbach claims that Homer puts everything in a perpetual foreground, uniformly illuminated, where "thoughts and feeling [are] completely expressed" (9).

52. Griffin 1977, esp. 48–53. I first developed some of these generalizations in an unpublished comparison of *Iliad* 24, Vergil *Aen.* 2, and Ovid *Met.* 14.

53. The unthinking prejudice of our hyperverbal culture has misstated the topic's unappreciated importance, in part by employing negative and metaphoric terminology like *nonverbal*, *body language*, etc. Cf. Gombrich 1972, esp. 377–82. At this point in the development of the field, it has become difficult to disseminate effectively a less misleading taxonomy.

CHRISTOPHER GILL

Achilles' Swelling Heart

> Everything that you say seems to be acceptable; but my heart swells with anger when I remember the disgraceful way Agamemnon treated me, as though I were some migrant without status.
>
> (*Il.* 9. 645–8)

These famous lines begin Achilles' response to the final appeal made to him in *Iliad* 9, that of Ajax. To make sense of the type of conflict expressed in these lines, we need to place the lines in the context of the psychological language used by the three men appealing to him. This brings up an important methodological point. Snell claimed that the Homeric picture of man is, in effect, that of a field of internal and external forces, with no central, controlling and unifying 'I'.[52] Subsequent scholars have qualified this claim, pointing out that Homeric vocabulary does sometimes present the person (expressed as 'I' or 'he') as having control over the psychological 'forces', such as 'spirit' or 'anger', that affect him.[53] However, what needs more consideration is the question of the criteria that determine whether a Homeric figure is presented as psychologically active or passive. As in the closely related topic of self-identification and distancing, a crucial consideration in Homeric dialogue is that of the ethical attitude adopted by the speaker when he characterizes the psychological state in question. The selection of the psychological mode (active or passive) cannot be explained

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without reference to the type of attitude and behaviour which is presented as normative by the speaker, or without reference to the judgement that he is making about his own, or others' behaviour, by reference to this norm.[54]

To put the point differently, the selection of the psychological mode deployed cannot be explained without reference to what a speaker sees as a 'reasonable' pattern of behaviour. This way of putting the point underlines a second general consideration relevant to these passages in *Iliad* 9. I noted earlier certain parallels between Greek poetic and philosophical psychology which are relevant to the understanding of Greek poetic models of psychological conflict. These include the idea that human beings are, characteristically, psychologically cohesive in so far as their emotions and desires are informed by beliefs and reasoning (3.1 above, text to n. 12). The three men appealing to Achilles, though using differing modes of psychological discourse, all presuppose that his emotions are informed by his beliefs and reasoning, and that the latter can be affected by their presentation of the situation. More precisely, they presuppose that his belief-based emotions can be affected by their judgements about what counts as a reasonable response and about whether Achilles' present stance is reasonable or not. Although there is no single Homeric equivalent for the idea of 'reasonableness',[55] Homeric discourse anticipates the prevalent Greek philosophical assumption that patterns of emotional response can be characterized as acceptable or unacceptable by reference to shared ethical norms for such responses; and this assumption also informs the phraseology of Achilles and his interlocutors. In Greek philosophy, this topic is one on which conflict may arise between conventional and reflectively-based beliefs about what should count as a 'reasonable' response; and this is also, I think, the basis of the conflict expressed in Achilles' famous lines.

In the course of *Iliad* 9, Achilles is subjected to various types of appeal, each of which combines a particular mode of psychological discourse with a particular ethical stance. The first, and most straightforward, type takes the form of urging the addressee to control an emotion (or a psychological 'part' such as *thumos*, which is correlated with the emotion) in response to certain reasons for doing so given by the speaker. This mode of appeal is often combined with an assumption of 'fatherly' superiority by the speaker over the addressee.[56] Thus, Odysseus prefaces his report of Agamemnon's offer of compensatory gifts by impersonating Achilles' father, Peleus, as a way of assuming the authority to give the younger man fatherly advice.[57] He attributes to Peleus these parting words to his son: 'restrain the great-hearted spirit in your breast, for friendliness is better; and put an end to strife, the producer of evils, so that you may win greater honour among the Greeks, both young and old' (255–8). He couples this with advice of a similar type

given in his own person: '... stop, lay down your spirit-grieving bitterness; Agamemnon offers worthwhile gifts if you abandon your anger' (260–1).

The succeeding speech of Phoenix is centred on an appeal of a similar type. Phoenix refers twice to his own quasi-paternal relationship to Achilles (one endorsed by Peleus himself) as providing the basis for urging the younger man in these terms: 'conquer your great spirit; you should not always have a pitiless heart '.[58] His concluding appeal to Achilles, like that of Odysseus, is based on the prospect of enhanced honour (*time*) as well as gifts if Achilles renounces his anger in return.[59] The appeals of this type presuppose that the addressee is, in principle, able to exercise control over his emotions (that he can 'restrain his spirit' or 'abandon his anger') if he is given sufficient reason to do so.[60] The adoption of fatherly authority is naturally coupled with the direct, imperatival form of this appeal. It is also naturally coupled with the implied assumption that the speaker is able to specify what constitutes an appropriate emotional response to the reason given, as a result of his experience of properly conducted social interchange.[61]

However, in his elaborately structured speech, Phoenix employs a different mode of psychological language to describe the responses of Meleager, whom he uses as a cautionary example to deter Achilles from persisting in his wrath. Meleager's responses both in his anger and its cessation, are described in passive terms, as those of one acting on impulse or under pressure rather than responding to reasons. Thus: 'When anger came over Meleager which swells also in the hearts of others, even if their minds are sensible, then he, angered in his heart ...' (553–5). Here, as elsewhere, the use of psychologically passive vocabulary seems to signify an intense or impulsive emotional response,[62] a point underlined by the contrast with the normally 'sensible' minds of those involved. Meleager's eventual return to battle is presented in similar terms: 'His spirit was aroused as he heard of these terrible events ... [and so he returned to battle] giving way to his spirit' (595, 598). The main point of Phoenix's story of Meleager is to show how the latter responded 'unreasonably' in the way that he gave up his anger, and how, as a result, he forfeited the compensatory gifts and honour that he would otherwise have gained (598–605). The vocabulary chosen to describe this response, like that used to describe the onset of his anger, seems designed to underline its impulsive, 'unreasonable' character; and both types of expression are in pointed contrast to the psychologically active, 'reasonable' response that Phoenix urges Achilles himself to give.

Although Phoenix uses a different mode of vocabulary to characterize Meleager's responses, the use of this mode forms an integral part of his overall 'fatherly' appeal. Indeed, the use of an allegedly appropriate parallel

substantiates Phoenix's authority to make such an appeal.[63] The third appeal, that of Ajax, is of a different type, both in the stance adopted and the reasons offered. Although the mode of psychological vocabulary in which he couches his appeal resembles the first type, it takes on a rather different colour in this context. I noted in Chapter 2 that Ajax's speech is the one which seems to engage most closely with Achilles' reasons for rejecting the gifts, as presented in his reply to Odysseus. Ajax cites the willingness of the father or brother of a murdered relative to accept compensation from the killer, and so calls into question, by implication, Achilles' restrictions on the kind of person from whom compensation is acceptable. Also, he focuses his appeal on the claims of friendship and of *aidos* ('shame'), rather than on the advantages to Achilles of gaining gifts and honour, thus taking up Achilles' emphasis on the central importance of properly conducted *philia* ('friendship').[64] To put the point in terms more apposite to the present discussion, he offers arguments which are more likely to lead Achilles to see the positive response as a 'reasonable' one, that is, one which answers to his ethical position and correlated feelings.

Associated with this difference in the basis of his appeal is a difference in stance on Ajax's part. Whereas the previous two speakers made their appeal 'from above', so to speak, from a position of fatherly authority, Ajax makes his as an equal, a fellow-*philos*, though one whose present situation puts him in a position of inferiority. This is a type of approach which, as we can tell from other cases, is more likely to gain a positive response from Achilles, since it invites him to give a generous or 'gratuitous' gesture rather than putting him under pressure to act as the speaker claims is appropriate.[65] Ajax, first of all, describes Achilles' present response in pointedly third-personal form, presenting it as a deliberated one: 'Achilles has made savage the great-hearted spirit in his breast, harsh man that he is, and gives no consideration to the friendship of his comrades ...' (628–30). The third-personal form seems designed to suggest, woundingly, that Achilles is no longer one of their number and is beyond the reach of properly grounded ethical argument, a suggestion to which Achilles is likely to be highly sensitive, given the position taken up in his great speech.[66] However, after giving a further reason why Achilles should respond positively to their appeals (the counter-example of compensation for murder of kin), Ajax addresses Achilles directly in similar terms, saying that: 'the gods have put into your breast a spirit [*thumon*] that is implacable and bad—because of just one girl!' (636–8). The reference to divine influence seems here to be simply a non-significant variant of expression.[67] Here, as in 628–30, Ajax presents Achilles' emotional responses as deliberate, and as reflecting judgements, which need to be met with appropriate reasons on the other side. Accordingly, Ajax ends with a direct appeal to Achilles, of the kind likely to

have most validity for him. He urges Achilles to 'make your spirit mild,' and have respect (i.e. show *aidos*) for the house 'in which are gathered those of the Greeks who wish to be most worthy of your care [literally, 'most closely related to you'] and most *philoi* to you' (639–42). Although Ajax's appeal, like the 'fatherly' ones which preceded it, uses active psychological language to suggest that Achilles' emotional response falls within his agency, this language serves as the vehicle of a different, and more subtle, approach. Whereas his predecessors use such language to suggest that they can prescribe what would be a 'reasonable' response for Achilles to give (one which is in line with normal modes of social interchange, as they present these), Ajax uses it as the vehicle of an appeal that Achilles himself is likely to find both most reasonable (based on good grounds) and most emotionally compelling.

This interpretation of the psycho-ethical significance of Ajax's appeal (viewed in relation to that of the earlier appeals) provides the basis, I think, for making sense of the conflict expressed in Achilles' answering lines:

> Everything that you say seems to me acceptable; but my heart swells with anger [or 'bile'] when I remember the disgraceful way Agamemnon treated me in the presence of the Greeks, as though I were some migrant without status (645–8).

What requires explanation is the nature of the contrast between the points made in the first two lines ('Everything ... but ...'), and the significance of the psychological mode ('my heart swells with anger') chosen in the second line. A familiar type of explanation is the one offered by Jasper Griffin: 'Achilles himself has to admit that the arguments for his return are unanswerable. What prevents him is the intensity of his anger, his passionate nature.'[68] Griffin here, in effect, ascribes to Achilles a type of *akrasia*, or 'weakness of will', in which the person concerned acts, consciously, against his recognition of the better course of action.[69] This line of interpretation would be regarded as untenable by anyone who accepts Snell's view that Homeric figures do not have enough psychological cohesion to be capable of division *within themselves*.[70] However, the preceding discussion of passages from *Iliad* 9 may have helped to cast doubt on the idea that Homeric psychology, as exhibited in Homeric discourse, consistently fails to embody a conception of the person as psychologically cohesive in the way that Snell claims.[71] We may take it that Homeric figures can be presented as experiencing some type of psychological, or psycho-ethical, conflict within themselves. The question, here and elsewhere, is whether they are actually so presented, and, if so, how we should analyse the conflict involved.

Conceivably, the preceding discussion of the appeals to which Achilles is subjected, especially that of Ajax, might be taken as lending support to Griffin's interpretation. Achilles does not, of course, find the arguments of Odysseus, or Phoenix, in so far as they resemble Odysseus', 'unanswerable': he answers them at length in his great speech.[72] But he makes no attempt to answer those of Ajax and seems to concede their validity (643). Although Ajax's brief comments do not begin to confront the complex reflective reasoning contained in Achilles' great speech, they do fasten on some key features of Achilles' position. Thus, the contrast drawn in 645–6 ('Everything ... but ...') *might* be read as expressing Achilles' recognition of the fact that, as Griffin puts it, only 'the intensity of his anger, his passionate nature' prevents him from acting in line with Ajax's words. On this view, Achilles' description of himself in psychologically passive or impulsive terms in 646 ('my heart swells with anger') would be taken as signifying self-distancing from what he sees as an unreasonable response. If, as seems likely, his phraseology echoes the language used by Phoenix to describe Meleager (553–4),[73] this might seem to underline the self-distancing: Achilles presents himself, ruefully, as Meleager-like in his anger, impervious to reasonable persuasion.

But I do not think that this is the most plausible way of interpreting these lines, if one accepts the implications of the discussion so far. I am not convinced that the lines should be taken as an acknowledgement that Achilles is acting against his better judgement; or that they express, as Griffin seems to suggest, a contrast between the reasonable arguments that Achilles cannot answer and the 'passion' which prevents him from acting in line with those arguments.[74] The phrasing of lines 645–6, in particular, indicate an awareness of conflict on Achilles' part. But I think that this is better understood as an awareness of conflict between two ethical claims (and, to some extent, two types of ethical claim) and the belief-based feelings associated with these, than between 'reason' and 'passion'. Achilles' phraseology in 645 (what Ajax has said seems to me *kata thumon*, 'in accordance with my spirit') does not, in view of the strongly emotional connotations of *thumos*, indicate that Achilles sees Ajax as making an appeal that is distinctively *rational* (by contrast with the claims on the other side).[75] As we have seen, Ajax's speech seems designed rather to combine the reasons that Achilles is likely to find most cogent with the emotional appeals (ones correlated with those reasons) that are likely to have most effect on him. Also, it is far from obvious that, in speaking of his heart 'swelling with bile', Achilles is actually disowning his anger (as he might be doing in a vocabulary centred on the reason–passion contrast.)[76] He does, after all, couple the description of his 'swelling heart' with a statement of the reason why it

swells; and the reason, Agamemnon's humiliating treatment of him, constitutes a reiteration of his basic reason, given repeatedly in his great speech, for 'not being persuaded' by the offer of compensatory gifts.[77]

It is worth noting that Aristotle cites part of line 648 to illustrate the kind of grounds that activate anger, and specifically, to illustrate the response of anger to 'insolence' (*hubris*). Aristotle's general analysis of anger is that it is an affective state (a mode of desire), but one that is activated by certain beliefs, particularly beliefs about the conduct of the interpersonal relationships in which one has been involved.[78] Aristotle cites Achilles' words in connection with the response activated by the belief that one has experienced the kind of insolence involved 'in rob[bing] people of the honour due to them' (*Rh.* 1378^{b} 30). In the same context, he notes, as a ground of resentment, the failure to receive the respect merited by one's own good treatment of others, particularly when such failure is shown by one's friends.[79] Aristotle's general discussion, and his citation of line 648, reflect the view that there are some occasions when the fact that one's heart 'swells with bile' is a proper part of a 'reasonable' response to one's situation;[80] and a similar view may well be taken as underlying Achilles' statements in 646–8. After all, the embassy as a whole, as well as Achilles' great speech, are based on the assumption that anger is a legitimate response to breaches in the norm of interpersonal conduct. Therefore, it is far from obvious that Achilles' phraseology in 645–8 means that he is distancing himself from his anger. He is, more probably, affirming it and justifying it, while acknowledging the conflict thus generated with other reasonable feelings which are activated by Ajax's speech.

But, to bring out the full significance of the lines, it is not enough simply to say that they express a conflict between two ethical claims; they also express a conflict between two ethical claims of a rather different type. On the one hand, there is the relatively straightforward claim (powerfully articulated by Ajax) that Achilles should come to the help of his *philoi*, and that his objections to accepting Agamemnon's gifts are insufficient to override this claim. On the other, there is the claim generated by the reflective reasoning displayed in the great speech: namely, the desire to make an exemplary gesture to dramatize the extent to which Agamemnon's behaviour has undermined the basis of co-operative *philia*. Achilles' reiteration of his grievance against Agamemnon may, thus, be taken not simply as a counterclaim to that expressed by Ajax, but as a kind of shorthand reference to the pattern of argument and the exemplary stance taken up in the great speech.[81]

The phrase now added to his earlier statement of grievance, 'as if I were some migrant without status' (648) may be taken as a signal of the

underlying issue raised in that speech, namely the question of what is involved in treating someone as a fellow-member of one's community.[82] The apparent allusion in 646 to Phoenix's (cautionary) characterization of Meleager's response may be relevant here.[83] As part of his exemplary gesture, Achilles now *chooses* to respond as Meleager did: that is, he chooses to have his heart 'swell' with anger or bile at his ill-treatment, and chooses not to enter the battle until the fire reaches his tent.[84] He thus indicates his willingness to risk losing the gifts and honour that are presented as desirable by Phoenix (and Odysseus) as well as—more painfully—to fail to meet his friends' claims on his help, in order to fulfil his continuing desire to show that 'not even so would Agamemnon win over my spirit [*thumon*], at least until he had paid me back all his spirit-grieving insult'.[85]

Before summing up the implications of these Homeric passages, I note two later passages in the *Iliad* (16. 52–5, 60–3, and 18. 107–13) which are related to 9. 645–8 and which can help to place it in an intelligible context. These passages bring out further the capacity of Homeric psychological vocabulary to express relatively complex psycho-ethical attitudes, which include a degree of self-distancing. However, they also lend support to my reading of 9. 645–8 by showing that Achilles, even when distancing himself from his anger and its consequences, never presents it as unjustified and as being a passionate response which is wholly in conflict with soundly based ethical claims.

At the start of *Iliad* 16, Patroclus delivers an appeal to Achilles which is, in attitude and grounds, an intensified version of that of Ajax in *Iliad* 9. Like that of Ajax, it combines persuasive characterization of Achilles' stubbornness with an appeal to his feelings for (and commitment to) his *philoi* in their desperate situation.[86] Achilles' response is interestingly complex. He uses language to describe his anger which is more unambiguously passive than that of 9. 646: 'but this terrible pain comes over my heart and spirit ... it is a terrible pain for me, since I have suffered grievous pains in my spirit' (52–5).[87] However, this passive vocabulary is not used actually to disown his anger; and, to this extent, the vocabulary is not self-distancing. Syntactically, the fact of his continued anger, justified in similar terms to those of *Iliad* 9, is presented as his reason for not re-entering battle, in correction to the one suggested by Patroclus.[88] But Achilles does go on to qualify his previous position:

> But we shall let these things lie in the past; it was not by any means my intention to rage without ceasing. But I did say that I would not put an end to my wrath, until the clamour of battle reached my ships (60–3).

So he lets Patroclus go into battle in his place and in his armour. At this point, Achilles' state of mind and ethical position may seem hopelessly conflicted; and there are certainly more indications of internal conflict here than in 9. 645–8.[89] But the conflict is still one that is best understood as being between competing ethical responses to reasons (together with appropriate feelings) rather than one between an ethical response to reasons and unjustified passion. Indeed, his remarks in 60–3 may help to clarify the point that his previous position (to stay until the fire reached his ships) represented a deliberate decision, and one designed to satisfy his desire for an exemplary gesture to dramatize Agamemnon's wrongdoing, without ruling out completely the possibility of coming to the help of his *philoi*.[90] In effect, he reiterates that decision here, while responding to the additional grounds that Patroclus now offers (the terrible plight of Achilles' *philoi*, 16. 23–7) by acceding to the latter's request to go in his place (38–43). On this reading, Achilles' present sense of psycho-ethical conflict, as expressed in these lines, is intelligible as a development of the conflict between Achilles' reflectively-based stance and his response to the claims of his *philoi* on his pity and generosity.[91]

A similar general point can be made about a related passage (18. 107–13), which falls within the speech in which Achilles accepts Thetis' prophecy of his imminent death:

> Let quarrelling perish from gods and human beings, and bile, which drives even a sensible person to become angry, and which, much sweeter than dripping honey, spreads like smoke in people's breasts; in this way Agamemnon, lord of men, recently made me angry. But, pained as we are, we shall let these things lie in the past, subduing by necessity the spirit in my breast.

Here, more fully than in *Iliad* 9 or 16, Achilles distances himself from his anger, presenting it as something other than himself ('strife', 'bile') but which has had a powerful impact on him.[92] The sense of self-distancing is heightened by the generalizing phraseology of 107–10, and the observation (which implies both past involvement and present detachment) that anger has its own pleasure and the capacity to generate itself.[93] Yet, even here, Achilles does not repudiate his anger, in the sense of saying that it was unreasonable of him to become angry and to maintain his anger in the way that he did. The opposite is implied by the statement, immediately after the general comment about 'strife' and 'bile', that 'in this way, Agamemnon ... made me angry' (111).[94] The 'pain' of his grievance still matters (112); and, although Achilles now undertakes to 'subdue' or 'conquer' his spirit as well

as 'letting these things lie in the past',[95] this is a response to a new and more urgent 'necessity' (*anangke*), that of pressing on with vengeance against Hector, and not to the realization that the earlier anger was unreasonable.[96] Although Achilles does now what he was urged to do in *Iliad* 9 by Odysseus and Phoenix ('conquer' or 'restrain' his spirit), he does so not in response to the type of fatherly appeals made there,[97] but in response to a quite different type of claim, and one which replaces, rather than invalidates the earlier ones.

In my discussion of *Il.* 9. 645–8, and of related passages, my aim has been not simply to offer what seems to me the most plausible reading of the lines, but also to illustrate the pattern of thinking about human psychology expressed there. In particular, I have tried to identify one of the types of psychological (or, better, psycho-ethical) conflict which tend to arise within this pattern of thinking; and to distinguish this from models of psycho-ethical conflict, based on a different pattern of thinking about the person, which some modern critics have used to analyse these passages. Both here, and in the case of *Od.* 20. 18–21, I have been critical of the use of the reason–passion contrast (as deployed by Snell and Griffin) as the basis of an interpretative framework for the conflicts involved. Later, I criticize its deployment by Snell as the basis for his reading of the conflict displayed in Medea's great monologue.[98]

The reason–passion contrast, at least as understood by these critics, seems to be a poor starting-point for interpreting conflicts in a psycho-ethical framework in which it is assumed that people's emotions and desires are, characteristically, informed by beliefs and reasoning.[99] The conflicts to which this type of framework gives rise centre, typically, on the question of which belief-based emotion or desire is to be regarded as 'reasonable' (supported by better reasons) under the present circumstances. Thus, I suggested that, in *Odyssey* 20, Odysseus understandably saw his (belief-based and justifiable) desire to kill the serving-women as less reasonable, under the circumstances, than the desire to do so after he had punished the suitors. In *Iliad* 9, and also in the passages to be discussed in the *Ajax* and *Medea*, we find a more complex type of conflict. Here, there is a conflict between the kind of response that seems 'reasonable' by normal ethical standards and one that the person concerned (the 'problematic hero') sees as justified by her reflective reasoning on the basic principles of co-operative conduct. The intensity of these conflicts derives from the fact that the hero sees the force of the reasons, and the validity of the correlated emotional responses, on either side.

In each of these three cases, as I interpret them, the hero, though seeing the force of the countervailing reasons, reaffirms the stance based on

her reflective reasoning. In terms of the reason-passion contest, she reaffirms the course of action urged by 'passion': Achilles, for instance, acts as his 'swelling heart' urges. Although, as is clear from Snell's writings, the reason-passion contest *can* be used to characterize this kind of choice (the response is presented as a conscious surrender to passion),[100] the analysis offered is not one which, in my view, matches the type of psycho-ethical thinking expressed in the passages. In particular, it fails to explain convincingly why the figure opts for the more 'irrational' line of action. I have offered a contrasting line of interpretation and analysis for Achilles' decision to act as his 'swelling heart' urges: and in the next two sections I do the same for the analogous decisions of Ajax and Medea.

NOTES

52. See esp. Snell (1960), 20: 'man is the open target of a great many forces which impinge on him and penetrate his very core.' See also 1.1 above, text to nn. 10–12.

53. See e.g. Harrison (1960), 74–7; Adkins (1970), 22–3.

54. Similar factors are relevant in the interpretation of psychological language in tragedy: see further Goldhill (1986), ch. 7; Gill (1990a), 78–85; also below 3.4, text to nn. 144–8, 187–8; 3.5, text to nn. 187–8.

55. However, some Homeric phraseology is suggestive in this respect: see e.g. *Il.* 9. 554, 18. 108, and text to nn. 62, 92 below. On Greek philosophical thinking about what is 'reasonable', see 3.1 above, text to nn. 17–22.

56. For other examples of this mode of appeal, see e.g. *Il.* 1. 254–84, esp. 282–3 (Nestor to Agamemnon and Achilles); 19. 216–37, esp. 216–20 (Odysseus to Achilles). On Homeric modes of discourse in general, see Martin (1989), chs. 2–3, esp. 101–9, on Nestor's characteristic modes.

57. As noted in 2.7 above, text to n. 180, Odysseus substitutes this preface for Agamemnon's 'apology' in 9. 115–20, a substitution which helps to undermine the force of Agamemnon's appeal, since it enhances the authoritative stance that Achilles finds objectionable.

58. *Il.* 9. 496–7: see also 438–43 (taken with 254–8) and 485–95.

59. Cf. 9. 600–5 with 299–306. See also 515–17: if Agamemnon were not offering gifts and renouncing his anger, Phoenix would not be urging Achilles 'to cast aside his wrath'.

60. This assumption is not confined to the appeals to control one's anger. See also Thetis' urging to Achilles to 'rage' (*Il.* 1. 422); and, for 'raging' as a deliberate action, see 2. 769, 772, 7. 230, 12. 10.

61. See also the appeals listed in n. 56 above, taken together with Martin (1989), 102–4; Schofield (1986), 28–9.

62. See e.g. *Il.* 1. 188, 9. 436 (Phoenix's description of Achilles), 16. 52–5 and 18. 107–11, discussed in text to nn. 92–6 below.

63. Analogously, Nestor's allusion to figures and situations known only to him helps to substantiate his authority in *Il.* 1. 260–73.

64. See 9. 628–42, and 2.8 above, text to n. 201; also Cairns (1993), 92–4. Contrast the emphasis of Odysseus and Phoenix on gaining gifts and honour (9. 260–306, 515–99); they also appeal to Achilles' sense of *philia* and his pity (247–51, 300–2, and, esp., 434–514), but do so in the context of their overall 'fatherly' stance.

65. See Achilles' relative responsiveness to this type of approach from Patroclus, 16. 22–100, on which see text to nn. 86–91 below; and, more unexpectedly, from Priam, who 'impersonates' Peleus in his supplication of Achilles, 24. 486–506. On the 'gratuitous' gesture, see 2.7 above, text to n. 128.

66. See 2.7 above, text to nn. 153–62; note also Achilles' reply to Phoenix, 9. 612–19, insisting that Phoenix is still very much his *philos*, and, therefore, should not act as *philos* to Agamemnon, whom Achilles regards as having put himself outside the bounds of properly conducted *philia*.

67. See the comparable non-significant variation in 9. 600–1; and see further Lesky (1961), 23–5.

68. Griffin (1980), 74. Griffin's interpretation is coupled with criticism of Redfield's assertion (1975), 106, that 'Achilles is the victim of his own ethic' (on which see 2.3 above, text to nn. 58–9, 62) as distinct from being the victim of his own nature.

69. On weakness of will and *akrasia* see 3.1 above, text to nn. 10, 13 and 3.6 below, text to nn. 219–31. Medea in E. *Med*. 1078–80 is usually taken as the classic example of such conscious or 'clear-eyed' *akrasia* (see 3.5 below).

70. See Snell (1960), 8–22; also (1964), 52–6, discussed in 3.2 above, text to nn. 33–4 and 3.5 below, text to nn. 149–51.

71. There are also serious questions about whether Snell's post-Cartesian and post-Kantian assumptions provide the best available conceptual basis for making sense of Homeric models of mind and ethical motivation (see Ch. 1).

72. On the (partial) similarity of approach between Odysseus and Phoenix, see text to nn. 56–62 above and n. 64 above. Achilles does, however, modify his position in response to each of these appeals, as though granting *some* validity to the claims embodied in each: see 2.7 above, text to nn. 158–62.

73. Cf. 9. 646, 'my heart swells with anger' (or 'bile'), with 553–4, 'anger [bile], which swells in the breasts'; on this linkage, see also refs. in n. 84 below.

74. Although Greek psychological discourse, from Homer onwards, has ways of expressing the conflict between deliberated, long-term objectives and localized impulses (see e.g. *Od*. 20. 18–21 and 3.2 above), the use of the reason–passion contrast as a standard way of analysing ethical dilemmas belongs to a different thought-world, that of Stoicism and its Roman analogues, and of some modern (e.g. Kantian) moral thinking. See also 3.5 below, text to nn. 150–1; also n. 99 below.

75. For *thumos* as emotional (this need not mean imperviousness to good reasons), see 9. 255, 260, 496, 595, 629, 635 (cited in text to nn. 58–67 above); and see further Claus (1981), 39–42. The variant phrase used in the comparable line 1. 286 (Agamemnon to Nestor), *kata moiran*, might seem rather to carry the connotation, 'according to what is proper (in social interchange)'.

76. For cases where a figure disowns her feelings in a psychological vocabulary centred on the reason–passion contrast, see e.g. Seneca, *Phaedra* 177–85 (disowning lust), *Medea* 926–32 (disowning anger); on the latter passage, and on the psychological language involved (by contrast with Euripides'), see Gill (1987).

77. Cf. 9. 647–8 with 334–6, 344–5, 367–8, 375–6, 386–7; see further 2.7, text to nn. 147–8, 157. See also Irwin (1983), 185, dissenting from Griffin (1980), 74.

78. 'Anger may be defined as a desire accompanied by pain for a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no call to slight oneself or one's friends', *Rhetoric* (*Rh*.) 2. 2, 1378a30–2, tr. Barnes (1984). See also *NE* 1149a32–4; see further Fortenbaugh (1970), 80; Charles (1984), 177–9; Sherman (1989), 169–71.

79. This is, of course, a key theme in Achilles' great speech, see esp. *Il*. 9. 316–45, and 2.7 above, text to nn. 140–51.

80. Aristotle does not cite 9. 645 in this connection; but his definition of anger in *DA* 403^{a}29–^{b}3, as, physically, 'the boiling of the blood ... around the heart' (and, logically, 'the desire to return pain for pain') may be based on such Homeric phrases. For anger as an emotion which can form part of the pattern of response of a virtuous person, if felt as 'reason dictates', see *NE* 1125^{b}31–5.

81. See refs. in n. 77 above.

82. The phrase may take on added resonance in the light of Phoenix's report of Peleus' very different way of treating a 'migrant without status', i.e. Phoenix himself (9. 480–4). The phrase is reiterated in 16. 59, in a passage discussed in text to nn. 86–8 below.

83. See n. 73 above.

84. Cf. 9. 650–5 with 587–9; for the idea that Achilles' variations in his course of action (9. 357–60, 428–9, 618–19) represent ways of combining a response to the claim made on him at each point with the desire to make an exemplary gesture, see 2.7 above, text to nn. 158–62. On Achilles as choosing to act as Meleager does, see also Whitman (1958), 191; Claus (1975), 27.

85. See 9. 386–7 and discussion in 2.7 above, text to nn. 163–81. That couplet (9. 386–7) also expresses the idea that there can be grounds, of a special type, that legitimate a response (one of anger) that might otherwise seem to be one of 'unreasonable' impulse.

86. Cf. 16. 33–5 with 9. 629–32 and 16. 23–7 with 9. 639–42. Note also the pointed combination of active and passive phraseology in 16. 30: 'let not this anger hold me', (distancing use of passive vocabulary, as in 9. 533–4), 'which you maintain', (i.e. which you perpetuate deliberately); cf. 9. 629–30, 636–8, discussed in text to nn. 65–6 above.

87. The reiterated language of 'pain' may echo, and answer, Patroclus' opening point, that 'such pain has come on the Greeks' (16. 22).

88. Cf. 16. 53–4 and 56–9 with 9. 647–8, 334–6, 367–8; see also 16. 36–7. 16. 53–4, in particular, 'when a man [Agamemnon] wishes to deprive [of status] one of his equals, and to take away his prize of honour [*geras*]', seems to allude to Achilles' fundamental ethical grounds for his anger (see 2.7 above, text to nn. 148–57).

89. See esp. the strongly passive vocabulary of 52–5 (more unequivocal than in 9. 646), and the adversative phrasing and awkward enjambment of 60–3.

90. Cf. 16. 60-3, esp. 'it was not by any means by intention', with 9. 650–55, discussed in text to n. 84 above.

91. This interpretation of Achilles' position might help to clarify the (admittedly puzzling) lines 72–3 and 83–6: part of Achilles' exemplary objective is that he should gain both gifts and girl *on his terms*, i.e. in a way that involves the counter-humiliation of Agamemnon (9. 386–7). His consent to Patroclus' mission to bring help to their *philoi* is conditional on Patroclus' not jeopardizing this objective. See further Tsagarakis (1971), 263–7.

92. Distancing is expressed in the 'let ... perish' construction of 18. 107–8, the contrast between 'bile' and 'even a sensible person' (108, cf. 9. 553–4), and in the depiction of anger as a quasi–physical or organic force with a life of its own (109–10).

93. These features helped to make the lines favourite ones among Greek philosophers: see e.g. Pl. *Phlb*. 47e, Arist. *Rh*. 1370^{b}10–12, 1378^{b}2–10, Gal. *PHP* 3. 2. 12, p. 178 De Lacy, and 4.1.10, p. 236 De Lacy.

94. See Achilles' related comments in *Il*. 19, responding to Agamemnon's quasiapology: 'Father Zeus, you give men great delusions; otherwise Agamemnon would never have stirred up the spirit in my breast in such a lasting way, nor would he have taken the girl from me so awkwardly against my will and found himself helpless', 270–3. As Taplin (1992), 209, brings out, Achilles, while acknowledging Agamemnon's explanation

for his act (by reference to divinely inspired *ate*, 19. 86–90), restores the customary Homeric 'double motivation', by presenting the act as one in which Agamemnon was also the agent. In addition, Achilles presents it as constituting grounds for a response of anger which is not unjustified in itself, despite its disastrous consequences.

95. Cf. *Il.* 18. 112–13 with 16. 60.

96. *Il.* 18. 98–100.

97. See 9. 496, 255–6, 260, discussed above (text to nn. 57–61).

98. See 3.1 above, text to n. 9; 3.2 above, text to nn. 33–4, 50; text to nn. 68–70, 74–5 above; and 3.5 below, text to nn. 149–51.

99. At least, this is so if 'passion' is taken to be non-rational (not based on beliefs and reasoning) as well as 'unreasonable' (contrary to ethical norms), as it seems to be by Snell and Griffin. The reason–passion contrast seems to have been used in a more psychologically appropriate way by the Stoic Chrysippus in discussing Medea; see 3.6 below, text to nn. 196–213.

100. Snell (1964), 51–6; see 3.5 below, text to nn. 179–84.

AHUVIA KAHANE

Hexameter Progression and the Homeric Hero's Solitary State

Textual and Nontextual Properties

The poetry of Homer as we have it today is a highly *textualized* verbal artifact. In other words, we come into immediate contact with the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as fixed sets of graphic symbols that are independent of any particular performance event, rather than as time-bound sequences of sounds that are unique to their performance context. Many aspects of this *text* are indeed unchanging regardless of whether we speak out, or hear the poems, or read them silently. At the same time, we are increasingly aware of what we might call the *nontextual* aspects of Homer, that is, of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* not as fixed texts, but as reflections of a broad repository of themes, motifs, scenes, word-groups, and so on, as the manifestation of a potential that we sometimes refer to as an *oral tradition*. As a consequence, we are also increasingly aware that a simple dichotomy between "oral" and "literate" is somewhat restrictive.[1]

But perhaps, the most immediately obvious *nontextual* element of Homer's poetry is its meter, or what is better called its rhythm.[2] Paradoxically, writing seems to preserve perfectly the hexameter's *dum-da-da-dum-da-da-dum-da-da-dum-da-da-dum-da-da-dum-dum*. Furthermore, even in writing this rhythm remains an event: it calls for a speaker/reader/hearer; it is not a hexameter unless complete (sequential,

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unbroken) and in the right order; it is a time-bound, linear "beginning–movement–end" sequence, and as such it is a performance.

The Function of Rhythm

Let us now ask, what is the function of rhythm in Homer?[3] Does it facilitate memorization of the poems? Perhaps not. Or at least not directly. Oral traditions normally display a degree of *mouvance*, as Paul Zumthor has called it: each performance is one manifestation of an otherwise flexible tradition.[4] But if the very thing we call "oral poetry" is flexible, that is, if full verbatim repetition (in our literate sense) is not in fact achieved, what is the purpose of rigid metrical/rhythmic form, of formulae, type-scenes, and other "oral" devices? Would such devices not thus be a burden on memory, rather than, as is commonly assumed, an aide-mémoire? Would it not have been more convenient to transmit the contents" or "message" of the tradition, for example, as nonmetrical folktales? Why, then, the use of metrical/rhythmic structure?

One possible answer is that the hexameter rhythm and its technical apparatus, the metrical structure, formulae, and perhaps also type-scenes, are *symbols of fixity and "sameness,"* and hence *symbols of cultural continuity*.[5]

In literate cultures the written *text* ("the Book"; the Bible, the Koran) is the most common symbol of fixity and "sameness."[6] However, a society that knows no writing, or that knows writing only in a very limited sense, will by definition not know this symbol. Oral societies must rely on other means to satisfy their need for fixity and continuity.

To those who know no writing, our literate notion of verbatim, *objective* "sameness" over thousands of lines is meaningless. Indeed, no two performances can ever be fully coextensive. However, if during different performances an identical rhythm is used, and if diction is inseparable from rhythm, then a *semblance of fixity* is achieved.

It is easy to identify the fixed entity we call hexameter. If a particular proper name, for example that of Odysseus or Achilles, is used repeatedly at different times during a performance and/or during different performances but always "under the same metrical conditions" (as Milman Parry would have it), then a "sameness" is easily and immediately affected, even though there may be many real differences between the verbatim contents of one version and another; this is what I mean by "a semblance of fixity." In manifestations of traditional poetry like the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, whose stated purpose is to preserve the *kleos* "fame," "glory," "hearsay" (a manifestation of fixity and continuity) of the past, such fixity is essential. Let me, however, stress again that this version of fixity does not restrict the inherent flexibility of the tradition.

Two other features of hexameter rhythm should be noted here: first, the rhythm's ability to mark epic as "special" discourse, and second, its ability to indicate that the tradition is always broader than any individual performance.

The hexameter progresses regularly for six feet, then pauses at the verse-end,[7] then repeats itself, then pauses, and repeats itself again more or less regularly for many lines. This manner of controlled, cyclic progression contrasts hexameter discourse to ordinary parlance and hence to our "ordinary" everyday verbal experiences. While all discourse has rhythmic features, almost no form of everyday parlance displays such extended, cyclic regularity. The hexameter rhythm is thus a performative act: its very utterance is the making of "special" discourse.[8]

Furthermore, each hexameter verse/unit is by definition not unique; it is but one of many similar units within larger poems. However, the size of these poems themselves is not regarded as a fixed unit.[9] The implication is that each utterance of a hexameter is a manifestation of a body of hexameter discourse of undetermined scope that is, as it were, "out there."

The point is this: Homeric poetry sharply distinguishes between the heroes of the past and the men of today.[10] By speaking of such special characters in "special discourse," their special nature is thus enhanced. By allowing each line to represent a broader body of hexameter discourse, we allow the shorter, performed utterance to function as an elliptic representation of the greater tradition.[11]

The Semantics of Rhythm

Let us try to apply the preceding to a concrete example. Perhaps the most widely recognized manifestations of rhythmicized regularity in Homer are noun-epithet formulae describing the heroes, such as *polumêtis Odusseus*, "many-minded Odysseus," or *podas ôkus Achilleus*, "swift-footed Achilles." As John Foley suggests, such formulae invoke "a context that is enormously larger and more echoic than the text or work itself, that brings the lifeblood of generations of poems and performances to the individual performance or text."[12]

These common formulae are concrete "symbols of fixity." They are easily recognized as words that are "the same" as those uttered in other places, at other times, in other performances, by other poets singing about Achilles and Odysseus in hexameter, hence they are "traditional," hence they are also far more "echoic."

Noun-epithet formulae do not simply refer to a character. Rather, they invoke an epic theme, creating what we might call "an epiphany." As one

scholar has recently put it, "If an epithet is a miniature-scale myth, a theme summoned to the narrative present of the performance, then, like any myth, it needs a proper (one could say, 'ritual') environment for its reenactment."[13]

The ritual summoning of a hero is a very practical matter: in order to reenact "Odysseus" we must, literally, *say the right words*, that is, repeat the *same* words that we know have been used before for the same purpose, for example, *polumêtis Odusseus*, "many-minded Odysseus." But of course this, and most of the other formulae invoking the central characters of epic, are also fixed metrical sequences, for example *da-da-dum-da da-dum-dum* (*po-lu-mê-tis O-dus-seus*). Furthermore, this sequence is not a freestanding semantic-rhythmic unit. *It is meaningful only when embedded and localized in the proper rhythmic/metric context, at the end of a line of hexameter*. Odysseus is thus "recognized" and invoked not just by the words but also by the rhythm—which is a distinctly hexametric, distinctly epic and heroic medium.

Localization, Silence, and Reality

It can hardly be unimportant that common formulae such as *polumêtis Odusseus* and the very idea of the epic hero are localized at the end of the verse,[14] or that others, such as the emotional *nêpios* ("fool," "wretch"), the speech introductory *ton d'apameibomenos* ("to him answered ... "), *hôs phato* ("thus he spoke ..."), and many others are anchored to the beginning of the verse. The beginning and the end of the hexameter are its most distinct points, the points at which the flow/pause opposition and the cyclic nature of the rhythm are most clearly marked. As we have suggested above, this cyclic rhythm can mark epic as "special," "extra-ordinary" discourse. The hexameter, like other contexts of *mimetic* activity such as the stage and amphitheater, like the darkness of a cinema-hall, creates a "distancing" effect; it is an artificial context that indicates to us that what happens "out there," the events described/presented, are an imitation, that they are part of a different reality, and not directly a part of our own here-and-now. No matter how elaborate the tale, the modulations of gesture and voice, or for that matter the animatronics (as they are known in Hollywood), we know that epic heroes, tragic personae, Jurassic dinosaurs, and the like, are not real. No self-respecting Greek ever rushed down from his seat to prevent murder on-stage. No hearer of epic, no matter how enchanted or moved by the song, ever mistook the poet's imitation for the real thing.[15] As we hear, say, a speech by Odysseus, we are never fully allowed to forget that this is an imitation, an artificial reconstruction of "Odysseus" and specifically of "what Odysseus said." The most immediate reason for this, of course, is that no

character in real life, except poets who are by definition the mouthpieces for "other worlds," ever speaks in hexameters.

The conclusion to be drawn from this is as inevitable as it is central to our argument: as we hear the rhythm of epic, it must be that we are both "here" and "there." We are ever conscious of two (paradoxically) overlapping realities or planes: on the one hand, the plane of our own time-present and of the here-and-now performance, and on the other hand the plane of the fiction and of heroic *temps perdu*.[16]

But now briefly consider cinema again: our sense of the reality on-screen depends heavily on a continuous, rapid flow of what are otherwise still images. Stopping the projector means "stopping the show." Slowing down the projector may produce a flickering sequence in which the world of the narrative is still "out there," but now more markedly "punctuated" by split-second interstices of real-life cinema-hall darkness. Such interstices (as in early, particularly silent, cinema) bring "fiction" and "reality" into a sharper contrast. They have the power to affect what we might call the *deictic* balance between the reality of the narrative and the real world.

The case of cinema and the flow of images is a useful (if somewhat contrastive) analogy when considering the flow of words, and in our case, the flow of epic. A pause in the performance of discourse, if it is long enough, affects the balance between our perception of the fiction "out there" and of the here-and-now reality around us.[17] At the same time, as Wallace Chafe says: "The focus of consciousness is restless, moving constantly from one item of information to the next. In language this restlessness is reflected in the fact that, with few exceptions, each intonation unit expresses something different from the intonation unit immediately preceding and following it. Since each focus is a discrete segment of information, the sequencing of foci resembles a series of snapshots more than a movie."[18]

While the hexameter has several conventional points at which a pause in the rhythmic flow can occur (for example, caesurae),[19] the pause at the end of the line, and consequently at the beginning of the next, is the one that is most clearly marked.[20] It coincides with a word-end without fail, and it coincides with sense breaks more often than any other pause in the verse.[21] It is affirmed by special prosodic features, such as the license of the final *anceps* syllable,[22] the lack of hiatus, of correption, of lengthening by position, and it is in the most immediate sense the boundary of the hexameter (the very name "hexameter" defines this boundary). I would suggest, therefore, that the beginnings and ends of the verse, its *onset* and *coda*,[23] are those points where the potential for "interstices of silence," and hence for creating ripples in the flow of epic fiction is greatest. They are the points at which the poet can begin or end his song, hence affecting a full *deictic shift*.[24] More

significantly, they are the most convenient (although not necessarily the only) points where, in the midst of song, a poet may pause for an instant, affecting what we might term as *deictic fluctuations*, situations that contrast more sharply the heroic reality of the past, and the (arguably more humble) here-and-now reality of the performance.

Although I would not hazard a more precise definition of this mechanism without considerable further research, the general function of the hexameter's pause/flow nature is, I believe, sensible to most readers and audiences of Homer. As the poet says the much repeated hexameter line ending with the name of Odysseus *ton d'apameibomenos prospehê polumêtis Odusseus* (answering him, said in reply many-minded Odysseus), he pauses, as surely he must, not only because the hexameter unit has come to an end, but also because a sense unit (the grammatical sentence) has terminated, and because a discourse unit (the narrative section) has ended, and we are about to begin a different type of discourse (direct-speech), which requires the poet notionally to change his person (from "narrator" to "Odysseus," and, of course, no physical change takes place in the here-and-now). An epiphany of Odysseus, the hero of the past, is thus invoked at the end of the speech introductory line, but immediately there follows a pause. This interstice of silence, brief as it may be, does not break the "flow of fiction"; but I would suggest that it momentarily alters the balance between the narrative reality "out there" and the time-present reality of the performance, contrasting the past and the present in a more vivid, concrete, experiential, rather than cerebral manner.[25] And of course, this is more or less what ritual is meant to do: it summons something from "out there" to the reality of the here-and-now, creating, as it were, a complex warp. This effect is also a practical manifestation of *kleos aphthithon*, "undying fame," a process of preserving events outside of their "normal" spatio-temporal boundaries. Furthermore, *kleos aphthithon* is precisely what epic strives to generate. We may thus describe our poems as a type of event that stitches together the past and the present, as an *enactment* of *kleos*, as a special type of *performative* speech-act.[26]

What follows is a specific example of the workings of this mechanism, centering on the verbal presentation of the epic hero's solitary state.

Oios, Mounos, and the Epic Hero

The hero is a basic paradigm of epic, and one of the hero's most important properties is his state of being alone, that is to say, his existence as a heroic one-of-a-kind. Achilles, for example, is unique both in his military prowess and in his greatness of heart. This idea of isolation, of being unique and/or alone, is implicitly embedded in many Homeric scenes. However, it is most

directly expressed by the use of two words, *oios* and *mounos*. These words have different roots, in that *oios* is probably a numeral,[27] and *mounos* an adjective describing a state, but our lexicons do not suggest any difference in the functional semantics,/of the terms,[28] which raises the question of why two words are used.[29]

In *Iliad* 24.453–456 we find the following lines:

> ".. the gate was secured by a single beam
> of pine, and three Achaeans would close (epirrêsseskon)
> and three would open (anaoigeskon) the huge door-bolt; three
> other Achaeans, that is, but Achilles could close (epirresseske) it,
> alone (oios)."

This important description of a mechanism for opening (*anaoigeskon*) and closing (*epirrêsseskon/-ske*) the door of Achilles' hut is very significantly positioned: it opens the closing scene of the *Iliad*. The lines are also a situational definition[30] of Achilles as a hero separate from all others. The three long iterative verb-forms emphasize that this is not a one-time event but instead a matter of long-term significance.

The passage commenting on Achilles and the door is a digression, a form of narratorial comment not strictly required for the flow of narrative time.[31] The climax of this digression, both in "meaning" and in "form" is the verse-terminal word *oios* "alone," "on his own" in 456.[32] *Oios* is emphatically positioned at the end of the line, the end of the long sentence (453–456), the end of the passage, and the end of the whole narrative unit that is the introduction to the concluding section of the *Iliad*. It is thus the verbal focus of the narrator's amazed admiration for his hero's singular, larger-than-life abilities. In addition, as we have suggested, line-ends, especially those that are likely to have longer pauses (interstices of silence) after them, are points of potential *deictic fluctuation*, where the narrative reality can be contrasted with the reality of the performance. This, I suggest, is what actually happens here. Through the use of the localized, verse-terminal word *oios*, Achilles in his capacity as a hero of singular ability has been brought as close as possible to the surface of our own "here and now." Rhythm has generated a situation in which we, through the poet, are most sensible to the contrast between Achilles, the singular hero of the past, and ordinary men.

This reading of the *nontextual* function of *oios* cannot, of course, be based on a single example. In fact it relies on a tightly woven rhythmic-semantic network comprising many other examples of the word, the usage of *mounos*, and ultimately, the usage of other words and types of words, and thousands of individual examples.

Consider three further passages that present us with prominent situational definitions of an Iliadic hero as existentially "alone." In all, *oios* is positioned at the end of the verse (this is linked, of course, to the use of formulae, on which see further below), at the end of the sentence (which is usually long), the end of the passage, and at the end of the narrative unit. In *Iliad* 5.302–304 the poet describes the larger-than-life (as in *mega ergon* "a great deed") abilities of Diomedes:

> "... But Tudeus' son in his hand caught
> up a boulder, a great deed, which no two men could carry
> such as (hoioi) men are now, but he lightly hefted it, alone
> (oios)."

These lines are repeated word for word in *Iliad* 20.285–287, except that the name of Aineias is substituted for that of Diomedes. Terminal *oios* is the focus of the narrator's amazement, or, shall we say, of his emotionally charged awareness of the sharp; opposition between the qualities of the heroic past and the humble present.

Consider further the example of *oios* in *Iliad* 12.445–451:

> "Hektor snatched up a boulder that stood before the gates
> and carried it along; it was broad at the base, but the upper
> end was sharp; two men, the best in all a community,
> could not easily hoist it up from the ground to a wagon,
> such as (hoioi) men are now, but he lightly hefted it alone (oios).
> The son of devious Kronos made it light for him.
> As when a shepherd lifts up with ease the fleece of a wether
> (*oios*)."

These examples allow rhythmic functions to generate yet more complex effects. In 5.302–304, 20.285–287, and 12.445–451, not only is *oios* verse-terminal, but in fact, at the beginning of the verse, just after the preceding interstice of silence, a word highly similar in sound occurs, *hoioi*, which is the plural of *hoios*, "such a ... / what a..." Furthermore, if we recall expressions such as *eu de su oistha*, (...) *hoios ekeinos deinos anêr*, "for you know well, what a mighty man he is ..." (*Iliad* 11.653–654, Patroklos to Nestor about Achilles), we shall realize that the word *hoios* is a key element of Homeric expressions of amazement. Indeed, its function, on many occasions, is *expressive*, not *directive* (in speech-act terms). The common phrase *hoion eeipes*, for example in Zeus' words to Poseidon *o popoi*, *ennosigai' eurusthenes*, *hoion eeipes* (*Iliad* 7.455) is best translated "o my, o mighty lord of the earth, I

am amazed by your words!" (literally "what kind of thing have you said?").[33] Once we accept this, the alliteration of "o-o-o" sounds in 7.455 takes on special significance: it replicates and extends the archetypal exclamatory Greek utterance "o,"[34] whose meaning, or rather whose *function*, is central to the verse as a whole.[35]

I am suggesting that within the specific discourse of Homeric hexameter there are significant pragmatic links between the word *oios* (alone, on his own) and the word *hoios* (such a ... / what a, as an expression of emotion), and that these links are strongly marked by basic rhythmic properties (that is, by prominent localization).[36] This idea need not surprise us. What Milman Parry termed *calembour* (more serious than a "pun") is a recurrent feature of Homeric poetry: *aütmê* // and *aütê* //; *omphê* // and *odmê* //; *dêmos* // (fat) and *dêmos* // (people) are some well known examples, all localized (like the rhyme in later poetry) at the end of the verse.[37] Finally, if any further emphasis on this phonetic and rhythmic marking is needed, we may note the verse-terminal *oios* (of a wether) in our last example (12.451), which echoes yet again the link between *oios* and *hoios*.

Like 24.453–456, these passages are not, strictly speaking, narrative; rather they provide narrator comments. In our very first passage, 24.453–456, the narrator comments on Achilles' abilities without openly acknowledging the reality of the performance. In the stone-lifting passages the normally reticent narrator makes unambiguous verbal reference to the present, to the performance and the audience *hoioi nun* "[the men] such as they are today." Regardless, in all passages, the contrast between past and present is the very essence of the words. And it is precisely this contrast that the extremities of the verse bear out, indeed *enact* so well.

To sum up my point so far: the preceding examples are condensed, highly memorable concrete images, effective situational "definitions" of the epic hero, in which the word *oios* in verse terminal position is a codified element of ritual, an enactment of the epic hero as the possessor of singular abilities unmatched by the men of today, and a marker of the narrator's amazed reaction to these abilities, and his consciousness of the wide breach between past and present.[38] Terminal position, being a point at which the world of fiction and the real world can be effectively contrasted, allows the contents of the definition—the contrast between the epic hero and the men of today—to be enhanced by the cognitive features of performance mechanics. In the three stone-throwing passages we saw how terminal *oios* is further emphasized by the contrastive *calembour*, using verse-initial *hoios*, a word close in phonetic value to *oios* and having an exclamatory force.

It is widely recognized that "unmarked" terms are semantically more general, or even "neutral," compared to their "marked" counterparts.[39]

Terminal *oios* is clearly a "marked" term. Almost two thirds of the nominative masculine singular are localized at the end of the verse;[40] other grammatical case-forms are hardly ever used at the verse-end;[41] usage of the apparent synonym *mounos* at the verse-end would have provided a convenient metrical alternative (and hence formulaic "extension" in the Parryan sense), but in fact it is all but avoided.[42] Unmarked (non-terminal) *oios* does seem to be used in a less focused manner,[43] but virtually all other examples of terminal, nominative usage of *oios* can be read, sung, heard, or in general, *enacted* in accordance with the interpretation suggested here.

Here are a few more examples: first, passages that convey the essential idea of "walking alone" and that employ the terminal, nominative singular *oios*.[44]

In *Iliad* 10.82 the surprised Nestor demands to know the identity of an addressee who is walking about the camp at night (10.82–83):

> "Who are you, who walk through the ships and the army alone (oios)
> and through the darkness of night when other mortals are sleeping?"

In *Iliad* 10.385 Odysseus interrogates Dolon about the latter's nocturnal perambulation (10.385–386):

> "Why is it that you walk to the ships, away from the army, alone (oios)
> through the darkness of night when other mortals are sleeping?"

Comparable use of *oios* may be found also in *Iliad* 24.203 (Hecuba to Priam about his visit to the Greek camp); in *Iliad* 24.519 (Achilles to Priam about the visit); and in *Odyssey* 10.281 (Hermes to Odysseus on Kirke's island). These five passages are another node in the nexus of exclamatory, heroic, verse-terminal *oios*.[45] All imply that the addressee is doing something exceedingly bold, something that we would have called heroic but for the fact that the addressee is, or is assumed by the speaker to be, a nonhero. The speaker construes the actions as reckless and/or abnormal, indicating his awareness of the discrepancy between character and circumstances.[46] In each one of these examples, heroic isolation is enacted in an inappropriate context, with the result being that it is construed as "madness." The speaker's understanding of the situation, and no less our own, relies on a contrast between "heroic" activities and "ordinary" abilities. And this, of course, is

precisely the kind of contrast that can be marked by the interstice of silence at the end of the verse, where *oios* is positioned.

The last example is *Iliad* 1.118: Agamemnon, having heard Kalkhas' explanation of the plague, agrees to send Khruseis home, but adds (118–120):

> "Give out to me forthwith some prize, so that I shall not (mê) be alone (oios)
> among the Argives without a prize, since that is unseemly;
> for as you can all see, my prize goes elsewhere."

This passage of direct discourse is an emotive request. If my interpretation is correct, then here too *oios* is marked as an exclamatory echo and may be enhanced by the effects of a *deictic fluctuation*.

The king's speech is preceded by a long and intensely visual display of anger (a "heroic" emotion ...). Agamemnon is the *far* ruling (102) raging (103) *black* hearted (103) *burning eyed* (104) evil *staring* (105) overlord. Remarkably, over the course of just fifteen lines his rage simmers down to a whimper: "Give out to me forthwith some prize so that I shall not be alone among the Argives without a prize, since that is not seemly. For, *as you can all see*, my prize goes elsewhere." And yet, as the assembled Greek host can *see*, the person speaking is not a feeble priest begging for his child or an ancient king begging for a corpse. Indeed, the speaker is not anyone resembling men as they are "now," but a mighty hero and far-ruling king, a point stressed by the repeated visual vocabulary.

But there is more. We the audience also see the raging Agamemnon in our mind's eye (the reality within the narrative), but we no less see in front of us, with our real eyes (in the reality of the performance) a humble bard (helpless? blind ... like the poet Demodokos in the *Odyssey*? Like "Homer" himself?). To the assembled Greeks the discrepancy between sight and sound to Agamemnon's audience spells out a message: the humbler the plea, the bigger the threat. The contrastive falsity of Agamemnon's words is also, I suggest, directly reflected by the mimesis itself, and no less by verse-terminal *oios* (indeed mê *oios*, "not" *oios*), a word that pretends to speak of a uniquely wretched and dependent state (as are the men of today ...) but that enacts, at the point of *deictic fluctuation*, the violent, larger-than-life hero who does not depend on the consent of their peers but who acts "alone."

Consider now more closely the use of *mounos*. First let us note that although *mounos* itself contains the "*o*" vowel (the word derives from *monwos*) there is in our extant text far less alliterative play on the exclamatory sounds, and, of course, *mounos* cannot echo the exclamatory *hoios* ("such a ..."). In the one example of *mounos* we have seen so far (our first passage, *Iliad*

24.453–456 above) *mounos* was used to describe the beam securing the door of Achilles' hut, but the word was verse-internal.

The beam, we assume, is unique in size among door-bolts, and as such is an important matching accessory for the great hero. It is not, however, a discreet element of the lost, heroic past. Neither ritual song, nor a singer are essential for its reenactment. An ax, a steady arm, and a big tree might easily produce a real object that is "bigger and better" than door-bolts of the past ... By contrast, no amount of woodwork will summon Achilles to the present. My point is that *mounos* in 24.453 is an important word in the context, but it is not rhythmically marked in the manner of *oios* in line 456, and it is not the focus of a verbal reenactment ritual.

It is, nevertheless, easy to find examples of *mounos* that are formally marked and that relate significantly to examples of terminal *oios*, both in terms of their localization and in terms of their discourse functions. By far the most prominent cluster of attestations of *mounos* in Homer appears in *Odyssey* 16.113–125, where Telemakhos is speaking to the disguised stranger, who is his father:

> "So, my friend, I will tell you plainly the whole truth of it.
> It is not that all the people hate me, nor are they angry,
> nor is it that I find brothers wanting, whom a man trusts for
> help in the fighting, whenever a great quarrel arises.
> For so it is that the son of Kronos made ours a line of only sons
> (mounôse). Arkeisios had
> only one (mounon) son, Laertes. And Laertes had
> only one (mounon) son, Odysseus. And Odysseus in turn left
> only one (mounon) son, myself, in the halls, and got no profit of me;
> and my enemies are here in my house, beyond numbering."

The idea of *mounos*, of being alone, here in the sense of "an only son" is repeated four times in as many verses. In three consecutive lines *mounos*, or rather the accusative masculine singular form *mounon*, is verse-initial.[47] As in the case of Achilles and the beam, and also the stone-throwing passages, these lines too are a situational definition. They too describe not one particular moment in time but a permanent attribute of the main characters of the *Odyssey*. Previously, this permanence was effected by iterative verbs; here it is effected by (rhetorical) anaphora and by the idea of a genealogical chain put together by Zeus.[48]

The word *mounos* here is not uttered in amazement and admiration for the abilities of some singularly great character ("what a ...!") as in the case of terminal *oios*. And as just stated before, it carries none of the phonetic echoes

of exclamation. Being *mounos* as Telemakhos clearly explains, is the state of having no brothers *hoisi per anêr // marnamenoisi pepoisthe* "whom a man trusts for help in the fighting" (115–116), that is, it is a state of helplessness. He speaks of Laertes, an old man, of Odysseus, a great hero but presumed dead, and of himself, a boy too young to resist his enemies. Furthermore, this hereditary helplessness has been ordained by the most powerful of the gods, the son (...) of Kronos, whose will is supreme. So *mounos* here does not mark amazement at the larger-than-life heroic abilities of a hero but rather the very opposite, a reaction to isolation as a state of weakness that is beyond mortal control.

Mounos in this passage is an element of exposition. This, says Telemakhos, is how Zeus decided that our family should be: [interstice of silence] "*mounos* my grandfather" [interstice of silence] "*mounos* my father" [interstice of silence] "*mounos* I myself ..." The word *mounos* is physically the first word of each verse. It may be difficult to determine the precise length of the pauses (which in any case are likely to differ from performance to performance), but such precision is not needed. The threefold repetition of *mounos* at the beginning of the hexameter unit stresses the cyclic nature of the utterance. To reject a pause at the beginning of these lines is to reject the very rhythmic essence of epic, which is impossible. Three times we face a member of the family at the point of the *deictic fluctuation*. Each time we meet not an epic hero who is *oios*, not "bigger and better" than ourselves, but a supposedly helpless *mounos*, someone more like "the men of today." Our empathy and pity almost fully overlap Telemakhos' anguish. This, I suggest, is where epic is *enacted*, as the past and the present are placed side by side. And of course *mounos* is localized in a position that is formally the opposite of *oios*: *after* the pause, not *before* it.

Many examples of verse-initial, "emphatic," "weak" *mounos* can be found in Homer. They suggest that *mounos* and *oios* function as complementary/opposing rhythmic-semantic terms. At the same time, several important clues indicate that among the two words, *oios* is the more-specific, marked term, while usage of *mounos* covers a broader, more loose range. We have noted how distinctly *oios* is used at the verse-end, how *mounos* is excluded from the verse end, and how *mounos* does not replicate the exclamatory sound "o." Furthermore, judging by the extant remains of ancient Greek literature, usage of the word *oios*, and especially in the nominative masculine singular, is commonplace only in Homer and ancient commentaries on the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*(!).[49] Usage of *mounos* in authors other than Homer is much wider,[50] and in Homer verse-initial usage varies between nominative *mounos* and accusative *mounon*. All this makes good sense: conceptually *oios* is the more "special" term (describing "special"

heroic abilities), *mounos* the more "ordinary." Inasmuch as these two are a pair, *oios* is the marked term.[51]

In *Odyssey* 2.361–365 Telemakhos' plans to sail in quest of information upset the nursemaid Eurukleia:

> "So he spoke, and the dear nurse Eurukleia cried out,
> and bitterly lamenting she addressed him in winged words:
> 'Why, my beloved child, has this intention come into
> your mind? Why do you wish to wander over much country, you,
> an only (mounos) and loved son?'"

The *deictic fluctuation* at the beginning of the verse has the potential to provide concrete illustration to the contrast between a weak Telemakhos, who is more like the men of the present, and the dangerous reality in which he is situated, that calls rather for the unique abilities of a hero.

In *Odyssey* 16 the poet breaks the narrative in order to comment on Eumaios' greeting of Telemakhos by use of a simile (16.19):

> "And as a father, with heart full of love, welcomes his son
> when he comes back in the tenth year from a distant country,
> his only (mounon) and grown son, for whose sake he has undergone
> many hardships
> so now the noble swineherd clinging fast to godlike
> Telemakhos, kissed him even as if he had escaped dying."

Closely related is the example of *Iliad* 9.481–482, within Phoinix' speech to Achilles:

> "and [Peleus] gave me his love, even as a father loves his
> only (mounon) son who is brought up among many possessions."

The love of fathers for their ("only") sons in the reality of the present and in the world of the narrated heroic past is doubtless identical; here we encounter this emotion, centered on the word *mounos*, precisely at a point that itself allows the poet to enhance our consciousness of *both* realities.

In *Odyssey* 20.30 the narrator describes the thoughts of Odysseus as he wonders how he should take revenge on the suitors (*Odyssey* 20.28–30):

> "So he was twisting and turning back and forth, meditating
> how he could lay his hands on the shameless suitors, though he
> was alone (mounos) against many."

The beginning of book 20 describes Odysseus' deliberations. The passage kicks off with the active, wild and reckless thoughts ("let's jump and kill them all at once!" 11–13) of a barking heart (14–16), through a transitory stage of rational reflection and restraint (17–18), to a simile, in which Odysseus tossing to-and-fro is likened to entrails roasting in the fire—a powerful image, but one of passivity and helplessness, not of singular heroic ability and resolve. The dog imagery and entrails simile are externalized representations of an internal transition: from "that which bites/kills/threatens" to "that which has been killed/is screaming in agony/is about to be bitten." By the end of the transition the polytropic hero is hardly feeling ready to perform astonishing deeds.

Again we have no means of measuring the precise duration of the interstice of silence preceding *mounos*, but its potential as a concrete enhancement of the contents of the situation is clear. Verse-initial *mounos* presents us with the hero at his weakest, at a moment when he is least like the *oios* hero. Interesting comparable usage may be found, in fact, in *Odyssey* 20.40 and in *Iliad* 11.406.

In our next passage the poet describes the death of the unsuspecting Antinoos at the hands of Odysseus (*Odyssey* 22.9–14):

> "He was on the point of lifting up a fine two-handled
> goblet of gold, and had it in his hands, and was moving it
> so as to drink of the wine, and in his heart there was no thought
> of death. For who would think that a man in the company of
>   feasting men,
> alone (mounon) among many, though he were very strong,
> would ever inflict death upon him and dark doom?"

The omniscient narrator is here voicing the thoughts of one who is oblivious to impending doom: Antinoos has no grasp of reality.[52] Indeed, the whole section relies on the tension between heroic characters who *can* stand up to the many (more or less) alone, and helpless characters, marked by the word *mounos*, who *cannot*. This, again, is also the essence of the distinction between the heroic reality and the weaker reality of the performance (the "men of today") which interstices of silence bear out.

Finally, consider the case of *Iliad* 17.469–473. Alkimedon is here wondering that Automedon is about to enter battle alone:

> "Automedon, what god put this unprofitable purpose
> into your heart, and has taken away the better wits,
> so that (hoion) you are trying to fight the Trojans in the first
>   shock of encounter

> alone (mounos), since your companion has been killed, and
> Hektor
> glories in wearing Aiakides' armour on his own shoulders?"

Automedon is charioteer to both Achilles and Patroklos (a man professionally inclined to fighting in pairs, not "alone"), and not thus of equal heroic rank to the great warriors. He has just been deprived of his companion Patroklos, is thus in a passive state of isolation, but has also chosen to fight alone. *Mounos* is used in its familiar verse-initial position, but the very preceding line speaks of insane, valorous action, perhaps reminiscent of the *oios*-type hero.[53] Indeed, line 471 begins with the word *hoion* (in this case adverbial) and thus immediately contrasts, both semantically and thematically, with the following *mounos*. Two lines later, Automedon in his reply to Alkimedon says (17.475–480):

> "Alkimedon, which other of the Achaeans was your match
> (homoios)
> in the management and the strength of immortal horses,
> were it not Patroklos, the equal of the immortals in counsel,
> while he lived? Now death and fate have closed in upon him.
> Therefore take over from me the whip and the glittering guide
> reins
> while I dismount from behind the horses, so I may do battle."

Automedon the charioteer, the man whose fighting role is "incomplete" without a partner, a *mounos* type character, undergoes a transition and becomes more of an *oios* type hero who can and does fight successfully alone (cf. 17.516–542). The passages are rich in echoes and melodies. And yet part of their complexity is set within an ordered rhythmic, hexametric framework. The central poetic opposition of this section—the contrast between helplessness and heroic abilities, between pity and amazement, is firmly linked to usage at the extremities of the verse (*hoion*, *mounos*, *homoios*), which, we have seen elsewhere, mark important examples of *mounos* and *oios*, and which can emphasize the contrast between the larger-than-life past and the present. How far do these echoes extend? This is a difficult, if not impossible, question to answer. But to assume that so many repeated attestations of such significant words at such prominent positions in the verse are due to mere chance or to mere technicalities, is to assume a poet whose indifference to the sounds of his words is almost complete. And of course, soundless words, if they exist at all, exist only on a written page.

The Extent of Rhythmicized Semantics

We have seen some examples of a system of rhythmicized semantics/poetics in Homer that relies on the basic pause/flow nature of the hexameter. Two types of solitary states were noted: isolation as the mark of larger-than-life heroic abilities, which is the "special" attribute of Homer's heroes, and isolation as the mark of "ordinary" mortal helplessness. The two opposing notions were formally marked by use of two otherwise synonymous words, *oios* and *mounos*, employed in notable examples with repeated localization at opposing verse extremities. This formal opposition helped mark the contrastive, but perhaps no less the complementary, nature of the two terms. The relationship between the two terms was made even more significant by the fact that they correspond to a conceptual opposition central to Homeric epic: the contrast between the larger than life reality of epic past, and the more humble reality of the present and the performance. I have tried to argue that the very cognitive functions of the pause/flow rhythm at the points where these two words are prominently localized embody this contrast. Localized usage of *oios* and *mounos* at the extremities of the verse allows an almost literal *enactment* of *kleos*, "fame": a juxtapositioning of past and present.

But have we been using a sledgehammer to crack a nut? After all, *oios* and *mounos* are but two words in the Homeric lexicon, and in order to explain their usage, we have argued for the existence of a mechanism that endows every verse with the potential for emphasizing *deictic fluctuations*. How often, then, is this potential realized?

I have elsewhere argued for statistically significant and hence also semantically significant localization tendencies of lexical/semantic/grammatical items, largely single words, at the ends of the verse, for example theme words of the epic, such as *andra* (man), *mênin* (wrath), and *noston* (return), vocative proper names, nominative proper names.[54] These tendencies apply to thousands of individual examples, and there are other obvious candidates for the further study of rhythmical semantics (for example, *nêpios* "wretch!" at the beginning of the verse[55]). While the localization of many words, grammatical types, and so on, clearly relates to, indeed overlaps, "formulaic" usage, it extends well beyond the use of formulae, as they are presently defined, and it cannot be explained in terms of simple metrical convenience. Now, the mediation between past and present is not simply one among many motifs in the poetry of Homer. It is arguably the most important aspect of the poems, their very raison d'être: the poems are exercises in the preservation of *kleos*. Any device that can emphasize the contrasts and/or similarities between the realities of past and

present could be of use in a very wide range of Homeric contexts and would have the ability to imbue many epic words with specifically hexametric, "performed" significance.[56]

One More Word, at the End

In worlds such as our own, that rely so heavily on texts, and especially in the even more highly textualized world of scholarship, vocality risks being construed as a flourish. Many will admire the voices of an Auden, an Eliot, or an Angelou, and still feel that the performance is in essence a fleeting thing, an ornament to the "real" artifact, an object that "does not change in time," an object that can be held in our hands and possessed.

Auden, Eliot, Angelou, and many other "literate" poets rely heavily on voice, but a full understanding of their poetry always assumes a book. They require a close, leisurely (that is, not monodirectional, time-bound) contemplation of the *text*. But if access to a *text* is limited or even nonexistent (either in the production or in the reception process), if words must flow at a constant pace, how can there be contemplation? Approaching Homer with this problem in mind has led on the one hand to implicitly (or explicitly) *textual* readings, and on the other to various degrees of denial of precise shades of meaning (for example in formulaic discourse). More recently, phonology, discourse analysis, pragmatics, and the study of orality (indeed, the work of many of the contributors to this volume) have shown that epic words *do* allow us to reflect. Epic words relate to and recall, not so much this or that fixed point elsewhere in a *text*, rather they activate a whole "theme," a "myth," a "node" in the tradition.

Thus, essentially, one line of "ritual" of epic verse opens the same kind of window to the epic world as do a hundred lines. "The Movie" of a television series and the shorter network "episodes" are in a deep sense "the same." Likewise, it is "the same" if we are shown the world of epic heroes "out there" either for part of an evening or for three whole days. A thousand-line epic poem about Achilles is in this sense "the same" as a poem fifteen times in size.[57] Paradoxically, writing, the very medium that seeks to preserve "sameness," converts a long and a short version of "the same" song into two "different" *texts*: writing results in two objects that can be placed side by side at a single point in time and hence shown, in a literate sense, to be "not the same." But if two poems are nothing but fleeting streams of words and if each is performed at a different time, how would we ever know that they do belong together, that they are both parts of "the same" world? It is because key elements of this world are repeated, again, and again, and again: *po-lu-mê-tis-O-dus-seus*, *po-das-ô-kus-A-chil-leus*, chanted ever in a fixed position within a short, repetitive pattern we call the hexameter.

At this point vocal, rhythmic properties become the key to sameness, to continuity, to "authority," to "*nontextual* contemplation." We can transcode vocal similarities in two hexameter sequences using graphic signs, but the moment we do so, we have produced two *different* verses, and in a concrete sense two *different* texts! Inasmuch as the poetry of Homer is traditional, and inasmuch as traditional implies "sameness," Homer's poetry is not, nor can it ever be, *textual*. However, this does not mean that it cannot be written down. It can, it has (how, and when, I dare not here say), and furthermore, as I have tried to show, the written voice does "sound" the same.

Notes

Translations are based on R. Lattimore. Some license is taken with English word order so as to reflect a word's original position in the verse.

1. Especially Oesterreicher and Schaefer in this volume.

2. I use the term "meter" to refer to the formal framework of sequencing and segmentation, syllabic in the case of Homer. I use the term "rhythm" to refer to a much broader and less formal range of sequential/segmentational phenomena. See Devine & Stephens 1994:99–101.

3. "Literate" hexameter authors (Apollonius, Quintus, etc.) use a meter almost identical to Homer's (O'Neill 1942; Porter 1951), but they do not link their rhythm and their diction in quite the same way as Homer. Use of formulae is a case in point (see Edwards 1988:42–53; Sale 1993).

4. Zumthor 1990a:51, 203.

5. Perhaps a kind of *sphragis* ("seal"). Compare Nagy 1990a:170.

6. Many poststructuralist approaches (hermeneutics, reader-response criticism, deconstruction, etc.) strongly suggest that even the *text* is a *symbol* of fixity.

7. See Daitz 1991; Wyatt 1992; Daitz 1992. I would suggest that this "pause" can be a cognitive entity, rather than an actual silent duration.

8. Ordinary parlance can display "phonological isochrony" (Hogg and McCully 1987:222–225), but not large-scale repetition of formally identical (e.g., 6 beats) units.

9. Unlike, e.g., the sonnet.

10. See Griffin 1980:81–102.

11. On ellipsis in this sense see Nagy, in this volume.

12. Foley 1991:7.

13. Bakker 1995:109.

14. See Kahane 1994:114–141.

15. Siren songs (*Odyssey*; Göethe, *Lorelei*) are deadly exceptions. For drama and epic see Greenwood 1953:124: Greek drama "did not attempt to produce in the spectators' minds any sort of illusion, any feeling, however temporary, that they were seeing and hearing what, in the distant past, actually took place ... in epic ... illusion was plainly impossible and was in no way attempted [but epic] could nevertheless cause the hearer to imagine vividly the scene and the various persons acting and speaking, so drama could do this."

16. See Chafe 1994:33 (“Conscious Experiences May Be Factual or Fictional”); Bakker, in this volume (“near,” “far”); Schechner 1985:117–150 (“Performers and Spectators Transported and Transformed”); Lada 1993–1994.

17. See Devine and Stephens 1994, ch. 3. Our sense of rhythm depends on patterned temporal sequences, in which stimuli occur regularly: “8 to 0.5 events per second.” “Slower stimuli tend to be perceived as discrete events not joint to each other in a rhythmic pattern.” Estimates vary as to the duration of rhetorically significant pauses (see Deese 1980). Actual duration values do not, however, affect our argument.

18. Chafe 1994:29–30.

19. Caesurae also affect the flow, but verse ends/beginnings are more prominent. For the internal metrics of the hexameter see Ingalls 1970; Kahane 1994:17–42 on relative prominence of pauses.

20. See Daitz 1991; Wyatt 1992; Daitz 1992.

21. See Ingalls 1970.

22. The last full position in the hexameter may be occupied by either a single long or a single short syllable. With a few exceptions in “irrational” hexameters, no other position enjoys such privilege.

23. See e.g. Gimson 1994, ch. 4.

24. Compare codas at the end of narratives, which bring the narrator and listener back to the point at which they entered the narrative (Labov 1972:365).

25. See Toolan 1988:162–163.

26. For speech acts see, e.g., Searle 1968.

27. See Linear-B (PY Ta 641): O-WO-WE, TI-RI-O-WE, QE-TO-RO-WE (*oiwowes*, *triowes*, *qetrowes*, one-eared, three-eared vessels, etc.).

28. *Oios* from Indo-European **oi-*, “one”; *mounos* (<*μόνϝ ος) perhaps associated with *manos*, “rare, sparse,” and *manu* = *mikron*, “small.” See Chantraine 1968–1980; Frisk 1960–1972; Boisacq 1938; *LSJ* with verbal communications from P. G. Glare. Waanders 1992 (on origin and etymology of numerals) is silent on *mounos*.

29. *Oios* and *mounos* are metrically identical, but the former begins with a vowel; the latter with a consonant, i.e. these two apparent synonyms are metrical variants. See following notes.

30. Oral cultures tend to classify items “situationally” (i.e. by linking them to a situation), while literate cultures stress abstract, decontextualized properties (Ong 1982:49–54; Olson 1994:37–44).

31. Narrative is a description of events along a time axis: “John got up (a), brushed his teeth (b), had breakfast (c), and left (d)” = T^0 ... a ... b ... c ... d ... T^n. Although the narrative’s presentation of temporal events is not always linear (flashbacks, visions, etc ...), we can generally separate between “narrative foreground,” elements that directly push the plot forward in time, “John got up,” “he had breakfast,” etc., and “narrative background,” elements that do not: “He [i.e. John] was an ornithologist.” See Fleischman 1990:15–51. For the narrator’s comments in Homer see (S.) Richardson 1990:67, 177; de Jong 1987:19, 44.

32. After which the main, “objective” narrative picks up again *dê r̔a toth’ Hermeias...* “then did Hermes ...” (457ff.).

33. *Hoios* is an indirect interrogative pronoun (Chantraine 1963:238–239), but we cannot paraphrase “Poseidon, what are the contents of what you have said?” (since Zeus has just heard his brother’s words). The rest of Zeus’ speech makes it clear that he is not seeking an answer and that he has not really asked a question: technically (as in Searle 1968) an *expressive* rather than a *directive* speech act.

34. See Frisk 1960–1972 for comments and bibliography.

35. The alliteration is common. Compare *Odyssey* 17.248: *ô popoi, hoion eeipe kuôn olophôia eidôs* "o my, o, what has the dog said, this thinker of destructive thoughts."

36. The formal antithesis of *Iliad* 5.304 is enhanced by the plural/singular antithesis *hoioi/oios*.

37. See Nagler 1974: lff. and his note 1, p. 1; Parry 1971:72. On phonetic/semantic relationships see, e.g., Geiger 1958.

38. Compare *Iliad* 12.379–383, where the stone's size is more modest: *oude ke min rea kheiress' amphoterêis ekhoi anêr*... "a man would not easily lift it up in both arms."

39. Comrie 1976:111; also Nagy 1990a:31–34.

40. 17 out of 26 examples (65%). This is not the result of simple metrical tendencies. Disregarding semantic, lexical, grammatical, and context-specific considerations, the tendency for words with metrical values – ∪ and – – to be localized at the end of the verse is 35.9% and 41.3% respectively (*Iliad*), 34.3% and 41.7% respectively (*Odyssey*) (data: O'Neill 1942:140).

41. There is no metrical reason to prevent terminal usage in any grammatical case. Dat. masc. sing. 4x verse-terminal (*Odyssey* 9.160, 10.524, 11.32, 21.146); acc. masc. sing. 1x terminal (*Iliad* 16.340); gen. and voc. masc. sing. not attested in any position; nom. fem. sing. 1x terminal (*Odyssey* 9.207); dat., acc., and gen. fem. sing. never terminal.

42. Terminal localization of *mounos* is metrically possible and occurs elsewhere in epic (e.g. Apollonius Rhodius, *Argonautica* 1.197, 732; 2.112; Oppian, *Halieutica* 2.571; Eumelus, *Corinthiaca* (in Dio Chrysostom. *Or*. 20.13)), but never in Homer except for a single example *mounê* (feminine) in *Odyssey* 23.227.

43. In *Iliad* 6.403 Hektor is the only hero of Troy (*oios* as the mark of heroic isolation): (*Astuanakt'*.) *oios gar erueto Ilion Hektor*. "(Astuanax—lord of the city;) since Hektor alone (*oios*) saved Ilion." But also in contexts where no heroic element is discernible, as when Tudeus kills everyone except Maion (*Iliad* 4.397) *pantas epephn', hena d'oion hiei oikonde neesthai* "He killed them all, except that he let one man alone (*oion*) get home again."

44. These examples are clearly formulaic. But this "system" is not linked, in formulaic terms, to our earlier *kai oios* examples: localization of *oios* may be related to formulaic composition but is a much broader phenomenon.

45. The examples are not statements, but questions (rhetorical, or otherwise), and hence more specifically expressive elements of direct speech.

46. The shrieking Hecuba *kôkusen* (24.200. Pucci 1993:258: *kôkuein* normally in mourning for a *dead* husband) says to Priam: "Where has your mind gone?" (24.201–202). Achilles, in saying "ah, wretch ..." (24.518) implies that Priam has lost his senses through suffering. Agamemnon says "I fear terribly for the Danaans, my heart is unsettled, I wander, my heart flutters outside my breast, my limbs tremble ..." (10.91–95). Dolon's first words of reply are "Hektor caused me to lose my senses" (10.391). Priam explains that his motivation is divine (compare 24.220–224) and thus possibly a variety of madness. In his reply to Achilles Priam totally ignores everything in his interlocutor's words (553–558).

47. The choice of *mounos* in verse-initial position rather than *oios* or the accusative *oion* is not affected by meter.

48. (Rhetorical) anaphora in Homer is often localized at the line's extremities, and particularly its beginning, as for example in 14–15 in our example, *//oute ... //oute ...*; *Iliad* 2.671–673, *//Nireus ... // Nireus ...*; *Iliad* 10.227–231, *hoi d'ethelon ... //etheletên ... //ethele ... //ethele ... //ethele ...* Compare the rhyme in later poetry.

49. For example, *TLG* (#D) lists total 370 attestations of nominative masculine singular: Eustathius' commentaries on Homer (81); *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (66); scholia to Homer (64); remaining 159 attestations are dispersed among 57 authors/collections.

50. The variant form *monos* is virtually universal. The forms *mounos/mounon* are found mainly in hexametric contexts (incl. scholia), but usage is far less markedly Homeric. For example, TLG lists total 340 attestations of the nominative masculine singular *mounos*: Nonnus (60); Greek Anthology (26); Herodotus (26); Gregory Nazianzenus (19); scholia to Homer (18); Eustathius (15); only 14 in Homer.

51. Comrie 1976:111; also Nagy 1990a:31–34.

52. Even in death Antinoos' rowdy "feasting" continues: he casts away his cup, kicks the table, blood, bread, and meat gush out (17–21). Confusion here is part of the wider matrix of Odyssean disguises and late recognitions. As Antinoos collapses, the suitors rush about in disarray (21ff.), and their thoughts are described in a highly unusual manner (Griffin 1986:45, on *Odyssey* 20.31ff).

53. Some elements of this speech may be comparable to Hecuba's address to Priam (see earlier), where *oios* is used.

54. Kahane 1994.

55. On *nêpios* see also "Bakker, in this volume.

56. The semantic functions of rhythm as described in this article may be more difficult to trace in later, "literate" heroic epic. But this requires separate study.

57. On the magnitude of the Homeric epics, see Ford in this volume.

DEREK COLLINS

Possession, Armor, and the Death of Patroklos

The death of Patroklos is an extraordinary event by most accounts.[1] The most unusual feature of his death is that the god Apollo directly intervenes and stuns Patroklos, enabling Euphorbos and finally Hektor to deal him the fatal blows. Nowhere else in the *Iliad* does a god so directly aid in the killing of a hero.[2] But there is also a more subtle, religious dimension to Patroklos's death. For example, we can detect elements of ritual involved in his encounters with Apollo.[3] On two separate occasions, Patroklos charges the god three times and then is repelled on the fourth. On the first occasion, Apollo is invisible and merely reproaches him with threatening words. These words, however, are not trivial. Apollo tells Patroklos that neither he nor Achilles is fated to overtake Troy. Apollo thus signals the futility of Patroklos's actions, which should dissuade him from continuing. One would think that no matter how enraged a warrior might be, a warning from a god himself would be a cause for concern. Yet on the second occasion, despite the warning and the evident presence of Apollo, Patroklos relentlessly charges the god again as if he had no control over his actions.

Another religious dimension to these events concerns Patroklos's physical and mental state during his encounter with Apollo. Patroklos is clearly not himself during these events. In several places, Patroklos is designated as equal to a *daimôn*, godlike, even equal to Ares. The *daimôn* in

From *Immortal Armor: The Concept of Alkê in Archaic Greek Poetry*. ©1998 by Rowman & Littlefield.

Homeric narrative generally represents an impersonal divine force, and is sometimes equated with Fate. But the expression used of Patroklos, *daimôni isos* 'equal to a *daimôn*', is employed on specific occasions in Homeric poetry,[4] and implies a ritual identification of hero and god. This identification occurs at the peak of Patroklos's *aristeia*, before he is stunned by Apollo and eventually killed by Hektor. We shall be interested in the meaning of the contrast between the height of ritual identification attained by Patroklos with one god, and his subsequent death at the hands of another god.

Patroklos might have been brave elsewhere on the battlefield, but at least during a confrontation with other heroes there is the possibility of success. Confrontation with a divinity who has already indicated the fate of failure demands a different kind of explanation. I do not think the answer is that Patroklos is reckless here, merely full of war mania, or that he has become overconfident as a result of killing Zeus's son, Sarpedon.[5] There is a more immediate explanation to be found in the immortal armor (*ambrota teukhea*) of Achilles that Patroklos is wearing. This armor is special in the first place because it is divine and was fashioned by Hephaistos. More important, however, it communicates to its wearer a kind of power that has specific military and religious qualities.[6] It is to these that we must look for an explanation of Patroklos's physical and mental condition before his demise.

Let us begin with certain events after the death of Patroklos, and then retrace our steps in an effort to understand the position of Patroklos in book 16. After Hektor strips Patroklos's armor from him, the Trojans are in the process of carrying it back to Troy when Hektor withdraws from battle, catches up to them, and takes the armor himself. He has it fitted on him and we are told:

> Ares the terrible war god entered into him,
> and his limbs inside were filled with
> <u>*alkê*</u> and strength
>
> *Iliad* 17.210–12

This passage raises two central issues that we shall have to discuss in some detail. First, the passage describes the possession of Hektor by Ares. Possession, a phenomenon in which a divinity or a divine power temporarily invades a person, is a widely attested cross-cultural phenomenon, which we can document in Greece especially well during the classical period. Once a divinity is inside a person, he is thought to lose his consciousness of self, his self-awareness, and the divinity is believed to work through him.[7] Second, we have to examine the *alkê* that is communicated to Hektor in some detail, and

explore the relationship between *alkê* and Ares. Archaic and classical Greek poetics represent *alkê*, rather than *sthenos* or any other kind of power, and Ares as intricate and predictable counterparts. The kind of strength or power that is distinctively figured in *alkê* is regularly associated with Ares, and the connection between them is expressed in military and religious terms.

The first thing to note with regard to this passage is that it dramatizes the possession of Hektor by Ares. The verb *duô* 'to enter, put on' is used in the sense here only in one other place in the *Iliad*, at 9.239, where *lussa* 'rage' is said to have entered Hektor.[8] There is certainly a thematic parallelism to be found between *lussa* as a kind of rage generated by war, and Ares, the god of war, which can both enter into Hektor. But the parallelism is not strict. The description of Ares entering into Hektor stands alone in the *Iliad* as a graphic example of a mortal becoming possessed by a god.

I use the word "religious" above to convey the seriousness of the event, as well as to highlight an important but underemphasized aspect of this scene. Hektor does not merely feel stronger as a result of putting on the armor; rather, the armor acts as a vehicle for him to become possessed by Ares. This possession has already been hinted at earlier when, after Hektor withdraws to put on the armor, Zeus vows to invest him with *kratos* 'superior strength'. Zeus regards Hektor's actions as 'not in accordance with the order of things' (17.205), and so commits himself personally to delaying, Hektor's inevitable death by strengthening him:

> but I shall now put great *kratos* into your hands
> *Iliad* 17.206

The verb *engualizô* 'to put into the hands of' (compare, for example, *Iliad* 15.491, where Zeus is said by Hektor to put surpassing *kûdos* 'glory of triumph'[9] into a warrior's hands) already signals a degree of personal contact between Zeus and Hektor. Zeus nods his head in fulfillment of his promise to Hektor (17.209), and in this gesture we are also to understand that Ares has become the executor of Zeus's will.[10] The ultimate authority for investing Hektor with power comes from Zeus; but the realization of Zeus's promise is effected through the direct intervention of Ares.

The possession of Hektor by Ares can be compared to the anthropological phenomenon of spirit possession, which has been documented in a wide array of cultures.[11] The "trance state," to use I. M. Lewis's term, can be induced by a variety of stimuli, including drugs, alcohol, music, dancing, self-inflicted or externally imposed privations such as fasting, or by no external source at all.[12] According to Lewis, "possession" embraces a further range of phenomena such as illness and the indwelling of spirits. In

Lewis's framework, possession incorporates and is characterized by trance states, but depends for its definition upon the cultural evaluation of the state of the possessed individual.[13] For the purposes of this work, I will use Lewis's definition of possession:

> Spirit possession thus embraces a wider range of phenomena than trance, and is regularly attributed to people who are far from being mentally disassociated, although they may become so in the treatments which they subsequently undergo. It is a cultural evaluation of a person's condition, and means precisely what it says: an invasion of the individual by a spirit. It is not thus for us to judge who is and who is not *really* "possessed." If someone is, in his own cultural milieu, generally considered to be in a state of spirit possession, then he (or she) is possessed.[14]

It will be useful to compare this definition, which depends upon the cultural interpretation of the phenomenon of possession, to that given by Lewis's predecessor in the study of possession, T. K. Oesterreich. Rather than basing his analysis upon cultural interpretations, Oesterreich attempted to establish a universal psychological basis for possession:

> By the artificial provocation of possession primitive man has, moreover, to a certain degree had it in his power to procure voluntarily at a set time the conscious presence of the metaphysical, and the desire to enjoy that consciousness of the divine presence offers a strong incentive to cultivate states of possession, quite apart from the need to ask advice and guidance from the spirits.[15]

This conclusion of Oesterreich's massive study, which surveys material within as well as outside Christian tradition, emphasizes the circular nature of the motivation for cultivating states of possession. Invoking a metaphysical presence is possible and pleasurable, Oesterreich claims, and the pleasure derived from possession in turn motivates further possession. However, the psychological explanation of possession is not the central concern in the present work. Rather, in accordance with Lewis's observations, I am interested in the cultural evaluation of possession as it is articulated within different societies.

Although possession can occur in many cultures outside a religiously sanctioned context, especially in the case of illness, the Homeric poems vastly complicate the issue of religion. The Panhellenic nature of the *Iliad*

and *Odyssey* prevent them from explicitly reflecting religious phenomena taking place at the level of local cult.[16] Nevertheless the poems systematize religious phenomena, largely stripping them of their local elements, and re-present them in a generic form. Local cults devoted to Ares are rare in classical times,[17] but he was worshipped, among other places, in Sparta[18] and Thrace.[19] Whether possession phenomena took place within the cult worship of Ares in classical times is impossible to know because the historical evidence is silent on this point. Yet Ares' possession of Hektor in the *Iliad* is straightforward. So this raises the question to what extent Homeric epic reflects actual, local cult phenomena, especially in cases where there is no corroborating historical evidence. Moreover, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are generally silent, in contrast to poetry from the classical period, on the issue of divine possession. Even the oracle at Delphi, where possession of the prophetess by the god Apollo is a Panhellenic institution, is only mentioned once in the *Iliad* (9.404–5) and once in the *Odyssey* (8.79–82), and there is no accompanying description of possession itself. But the fact that we do not have historical parallels of possession by Ares to corroborate what is represented in Homeric epic does not detract from the anthropological reality of the phenomenon.

Hektor's possession by Ares at *Iliad* 17.210–12 has been commented on by Eustathius, who interprets this passage in a similar way to what I have been arguing. Some of his remarks on lines 17.210–12 bear careful scrutiny:

> The poet greatly exalts the arms of Achilles: if he fills Hektor with power [*dunamis*], it is so that as such he becomes possessed [*katokhos*] by Ares. This is shown in the expression "and Ares entered into him" [*Iliad* 17.210]; that is, he has become *entheos* after being filled with Ares. Just as Patroklos enters into [*duô*] the armor, so Ares enters into him. We are to notice that such was the case with Patroklos, and before him Achilles, who has this same armor.
>
> Eustathius on *Iliad* 17.210–14

Eustathius tells us that once the god Ares has entered into Hektor, he is technically in a state of being *entheos* 'having a god within'. Although this term does not occur in the Homeric poems,[21] in later Greek it becomes a semitechnical religious term used to describe seers, prophets, bacchants, warriors, and others possessed by a deity.[22] The commentary of Eustathius also highlights another word for possession, *katokhos* from the verb *katekhô*, which in post-Homeric Greek can also mean 'to possess'.[23] The etymology of *katekhô* suggests that a person is 'held down' by a divinity;[24] but Plato

suggests, in the case of the poet, that *katekhô* means that he is 'suspended' (*eksartaô*) from the Muse.[25] The two expressions *entheos* and *katokhos* are often used interchangeably,[26] as they are in the scholion above, and the important point is that both can indicate the same kind of possession.

The state of being *entheos* has been treated by scholars in some detail.[27] Classical sources provide us with a varied picture of what *entheos* means, but there are some important features of the state that remain consistent. Plato suggests, for example, that the *entheoi* suffer at least a partial loss of awareness:

> the *entheoi*[28] say many true things, but they know nothing of what they say.
>
> Plato, *Meno*, 99c

However, in the context of this passage, which argues that politicians pursue just as valid a course under opinion as they do under knowledge, knowledge (*qua* virtue) is represented as something of which one is necessarily unaware. Knowledge is further implied to be the consequences that result from what a politician says (99d), and therefore it, knowledge, cannot be known because they, the consequences, have not happened. In light of this line of thinking, the *entheoi*, who for Plato are divine seers (*theomanteis*) and prophets (*khrêsmôidoi*), are only unaware in the sense that they cannot know the outcome of what they say.[29]

Plato offers the idea that an *entheos* poet or seer first has to have his 'consciousness of self'[30] taken from him, and only then can he become a vehicle for the divinity. In his dialogue *Ion*, Plato has Socrates expound on what makes Ion such a proficient Homeric rhapsode:

> for a poet is a light, winged and sacred thing, and he is not able to compose before he has become *entheos* and put out of his senses, and his consciousness of self [*nous*] is no longer in him.
>
> Plato, *Ion*, 534b

Elaborating on this point, Plato has Socrates state further that the divinity that caused the possession is what speaks through the poet. Poets and seers become, in this interpretation, mere instruments through which divinity communicates directly with mortals. After suggesting that poets cannot have their skills by dint of a learned art because they only specialize in compositional forms (such as the *dithurambos*, *enkômia*, *huporkhêma*, *epê*, and the *iambos*) and are not accomplished in all forms, Socrates asserts that the source of this knowledge must be a divinity:

> On account of this the divinity takes away their consciousness of self [*nous*] and uses them as servants, just as with soothsayers [*khrêsmôidoi*] and divine seers [*manteis theioi*], so that we who hear them may know that they, whose consciousness of self [*nous*] is not present, are not the ones who say such things of great value, but the divinity itself is the one speaking and addresses us through them.
>
> Plato, *Ion*, 534cd

This passage refines Plato's conception of the process of poetry and divination but insists, as in the passage above from the *Meno* (99c), that the state of being *entheos* can only take place with the loss of an individual's consciousness of self (*nous*).

Another striking, but late, testament to the psychological state of the *entheos* comes from the scholia on Euripides' *Hippolytus*, 141. At 141, the chorus describes Phaedra as *entheos*, and asks her who is responsible for her condition. In the scholia to this passage, we read an even more embellished description of the person who is *entheos*, but here again we see the idea that consciousness of self (*nous*) is absent and supplanted by that of the divinity:

> *entheoi* are said to be those who have had their consciousness of self [*nous*] taken away by an apparition, and being possessed [*katekhomenoi*] by the god who made the apparition they do his bidding.
>
> Scholia to Euripides, *Hippolytus* 141 (Dindorf)

Unlike the other examples that we have seen, the chorus of the women of Troezen describe Phaedra as *entheos* because she is fasting (136) and mentally unstable[31] (144). Although the context here is not one of war, poetry, or prophecy, the chorus's references to Pan, Hekate, the Korybantes, and the mountain mother (142–44) as possible sources for the *entheos* of Phaedra, are all appropriate to ritual or ecstatic possession.[32] From their point of view at least, Phaedra's behavior is understandable in terms of being *entheos*. It is not clear from Euripides' text, as it is in the scholion, whether the god who caused the *entheos* of Phaedra actually performs her actions, or whether she acts in accordance with the commands of the possessing god. But what is clear is that, from the point of view of the chorus, Phaedra's behavior suggests a lack of volition and perhaps a loss of *nous*,[33] which are conditions prerequisite to becoming *entheos*.

If we return for a moment to Eustathius's commentary on *Iliad* 17.210–12, we can see that his view of what happens to Hektor as a result of

wearing Achilles' armor fits the pattern of becoming *entheos* and *katokhos*. Eustathius draws attention to the phrase 'and Ares entered into him' (17.210) as evidence for his claim that Hektor has become *entheos* by Ares. Eustathius makes a further comparison that will be of great help to us in bridging this discussion of Hektor to that of Patroklos later. He suggests that if Achilles' armor affects Hektor in this way, then it must also have affected Patroklos and Achilles in a similar way. We shall return to this observation about Patroklos when we examine his death in more detail.

Before we examine the state of *entheos* more carefully, we need to consider the manner in which the *Iliad* highlights Hektor's war mania by comparing him to a maddened Ares. Ares and Hektor are often pictured in the *Iliad* as fighting together.[34] But unlike other warriors who are compared to Ares, Hektor is compared to him particularly with regard to becoming maddened on the battlefield. Already at *Iliad* 5.717, we are introduced to Ares' capacity to become maddened (and thereby his capacity to make others maddened), when Hera advises Athena that they should not easily let him become maddened. At *Iliad* 5.831, Athena dismissively calls Ares 'this maddened one' as she advises Diomedes not to be afraid of him. In the *Shield* of Hesiod, Ares is pictured maddened, raging and shouting next to a grove sacred to Apollo (99–100, where Ares κεκληγὼς περιμαίνεται ἱερὸν ἄλσος | Φοίβου Ἀπόλλωνος). In all of these instances we can detect both secular and sacred dimensions in the usage of the verb *mainomai* 'to rage, become maddened'. In the *Shield* passage especially, it is clearly a deliberate evocation of ritual madness to have Ares raging about (*perimainomai*) a grove sacred to Apollo.

In a more striking context, the image of a maddened Ares appears again in the *Iliad*, where it is used in the context of Hektor's battlefield rage:

> With this in mind [Zeus] drove against the hollow ships
> Hektor son of Priam, even though he himself raged.
> Just as when spear-shaking Ares raged or destructive fire
> rages in the mountains, in the deep thicknesses of the forest.
>
> *Iliad* 15.603–6

The words translated above as 'rage' are all derivatives of the verb *mainomai* 'to become maddened', which is a verb that can be associated in post-Homeric literature with ecstatic religion and possession.[35] Traces of this meaning are difficult to detect but already exist in Homeric poetry. At *Iliad* 6.132, *mainomai* is used of Dionysus, the god of ritual madness and possession *par excellence*, in a context where the translation 'rage', in the military sense of rage on the battlefield, would be inappropriate. Here

something closer to 'ritually maddened' fits the sense better. I suggest that traces of this religious, or more specifically, ritualizing mentality in connection with Ares are evident in the description of Hektor in the passage above. Although I agree in part with Calvo Martinez[36] that Ares is "quizá la divinidad menos ritualizada de todas," nevertheless I think that Ares' connections with ritual, especially as implied by the verb *mainomai* used to describe him, are more embedded in Greek poetry and therefore more difficult to detect.

As an example of the more subtle connection of Ares with ritual, we can see in the passage about Hektor above that Homeric narrative makes a point of noting that he himself raged, or was maddened. The suggestion here is that in other contexts Hektor is enraged or made maddened by a divinity, such as Ares, which is an inference brought out most clearly in the direct comparison to Ares. The point of this passage is not that Hektor can achieve ritual madness or a state of possession on his own, because that would by definition be something different than being *entheos*. It is rather to suggest that the prowess of Hektor is comparable to that attainable under the influence of a divinity. Moreover, the divinity that is most apt to influence Hektor, or the divinity to which Hektor can readily be likened, is Ares. The comparison between Hektor and Ares in this passage actually supplements the passage at *Iliad* 17.210, where Ares possesses Hektor. The description above of Hektor being maddened himself, by way of the comparison of his madness to that of Ares, is meant to highlight Ares' absence here as a possessing divinity. In contrast, at *Iliad* 17.210 Ares' role in ritual possession is dramatized in positive terms.

We are now in a position to reconsider the description of Hektor's possession by Ares at *Iliad* 17.210–12. The description of Ares entering into Hektor captures vividly enough the process by which he becomes possessed, even though he is not described explicitly as being *entheos* or *katekhomenos*. That Hektor has become possessed by Ares can also be confirmed by its effects. Traces of Ares' power working through Hektor are detectable in the ensuing battle in which Hektor confronts Automedon. In order to emphasize Hektor's unique physical and mental state, the *Iliad* presents Automedon as having virtually the same kinds of strength and power. Let us review the description of Hektor after being fitted with Achilles' armor:

> Ares the terrible war god entered into him,
> <u>and his limbs inside were filled with</u>
> <u>*alkê* and strength</u>
>
> *Iliad* 17.210–12

We can compare this passage directly with what is said of Automedon as he prays to Zeus before confronting Hektor:

> and he after praying to father Zeus
> was filled with *alkê* and strength about his black breast
>
> *Iliad* 17.498–99

We recall that, in the case of Hektor, Zeus had decided to invest him with *kratos* and, after nodding to seal his commitment, implicitly designated Ares to perform the transfer of power. Here Automedon makes a direct appeal to Zeus, and the power is transferred without the mediation of Ares and without possession.

Yet the differences between Hektor's possession by Ares and Automedon's investment without possession are revealed in their subsequent confrontation. At 17.525 Hektor casts his spear at Automedon but the latter reacts quickly:

> for he bent forward, and behind him the long spear
> stuck in the ground, and the butt-end of the spear
> shook; there and then strong Ares took away its force [*menos*]
>
> *Iliad* 17.527–29

These words suggest that Hektor's spearcast was not only propelled by his own strength, but also by that of Ares. In light of Hektor's possession by Ares, we have here suggestive evidence that the god himself is acting through him, and in turn through what he touches. As we saw earlier, this is a standard feature of being possessed, where the recipient of divine intervention becomes the instrument through which the divinity works.

Before turning to Patroklos's death, we need to consider another dimension of Ares' powers of possession. This dimension concerns what we might call the poetics of *alkê*, which was one of the kinds of power communicated to Hektor by Ares at *Iliad* 17.210–12. At first glance there is nothing unusual about *alkê* being conveyed to Hektor, since it appears with some frequency as a concept of strength or power in the *Iliad*. But not all *alkê* in this sense is the same. We need to explore whether there is a dimension to *alkê* that is peculiar to Ares. Indeed, a dimension of this kind is attested elsewhere in Greek poetry, in the *Seven Against Thebes* of Aeschylus. There we read about the warrior Hippomedon outside the gate of Onka Athena:

And he gave the war cry; possessed [*entheos*] by Ares
he rages in *alkê* like a bacchant, glancing fear.
Aeschylus, *Seven Against Thebes*, 497–98

Compressed into these brief lines we find a built-in link between Ares, Bacchic or Dionysiac frenzy, and the power of *alkê*. Aeschylus brings together several important threads here that are only implicit in the *Iliad*. The first is that Hippomedon is explicitly characterized as having been made *entheos* by Ares. As in the *Iliad*, Ares himself has already been pictured by Aeschylus elsewhere in the *Seven* as *mainomenos* 'maddened' (343), and we saw earlier how that verb can signal ritual possession. We may recall that in the *Iliad mainomenos* is used of both Ares and Dionysus. Hippomedon's condition engendered by the possession is then implicitly compared with Dionysus, by way of the verb *bakkhaô* 'to rave like a bacchant'. The comparison is next made explicit with the phrase 'like a bacchant' (*thuias hôs*). In this way, while Aeschylus signals the ritual dimension of Ares' powers of possession on the one hand, he also brings Dionysus's province of ecstatic religion into contact with the realm of war on the other.[37]

The powers of possession in war and in ecstatic religion are combined in Hippomedon and what he exudes thereby is *alkê*. The parallelism between Ares' possession and *alkê* in this passage on the one hand, and *Iliad* 17.210–12, where Hektor's limbs fill with *alkê* after being possessed by Ares on the other, confirms that *alkê* is the force that falls under Ares' special preserve. In the passage above, *alkê* most likely represents a kind of strength or power exhibited in war or battle, as Hippomedon is preparing to attack whichever Theban warrior is chosen to meet him at the Onka Athena gate. The expression *pros alkên* (498), which I have inadequately translated as 'in *alkê*', represents a physical, rather than a moral or intellectual, quality, as it comes between terms (*bakkhaô* and *thuias hôs*) that reflect the action of a bacchant. Scholia on line 498 also treat *alkê* in a physical sense, and compare it to *makhê* 'combat' and *polemos* 'war'.[38] Aeschylus shows us that Ares, by possessing Hippomedon, specifically enhances Hippomedon's readiness for combat, and thus a direct link is established between Ares and *alkê*. In the *Iliad*, *alkê* is never explicitly connected with Ares, with the possible, exception of Hektor's possession by Ares at 17:210–12, where his limbs are filled with *alkê*. However, there are indirect links in the *Iliad* between Ares and *alkê*.

Around the shield of Athena, for example, four personified forces are garlanded: *Phobos* 'Terror', *Eris* 'Strife', *Alkê* 'War-Strength' and *Iôkê* 'Onslaught' (5.739–40). As elements of war these forces stand in a general relationship to Ares. But there is one discrete connection. In both the *Iliad*

(13.299) and Hesiod's *Theogony* (934), Phobos is actually a child of Ares.[39] We may also note that the outcome of a fight (*ponos*) between Euphorbos and Menelaos can be represented in the *Iliad* either by *alkê* or *phobos* (17.42), where the sense seems to be that they will either fight fiercely (*alkê*), or withdraw ignominiously (*phobos*). As Hans Trümpy[40] has shown, in Homeric narrative *alkê* and *phobos* regularly function together as opposites. Ares is once portrayed in the *Iliad* as war or fighting personified, by means of his epithet Enualios (18.309), and this in turn further connects him with the *alkê* and *phobos* of combat. *Eris* and *Iôkê* are nowhere mentioned as genealogically or otherwise directly related to Ares, although their forms of influence are appropriate to him.

Within the *Iliad*, there is an important dimension to *alkê* in its relationship to Ares that we have not yet explored. This dimension concerns the indomitable or uncontrollable nature of *alkê*. There are two instances of *alkê* in this sense in the *Iliad*, and their implications are critical for the understanding of the word's usage in general. The first example comes from book 21, where Agenor is sent into battle with Achilles by Apollo. Agenor, however, is outmatched. But for the grace of Apollo, who shrouds Agenor in mist and removes him from the battlefield, Achilles would have killed him. Agenor's condition is compared to that of a leopard before an overpowering hunter:

> even if a man anticipating her should lunge or throw [a spear],
> although pierced with the spear she <u>does not desist from</u>
> <u>her *alkê*, before either closing with him or being overthrown</u>
> *Iliad* 21.576–78

The underscored portion could be taken to mean that the leopard's will to fight is so great that it, and its physical expression as *alkê*, drive it on to kill or be killed. But it is more plausible, as I shall clarify further with "a second example, that *alkê* here is an autonomous force that directs the leopard. What is most important here, however, is that until now we have not seen described any of the consequences of exhibiting *alkê*. A warrior is said to have *alkê*, or to exhibit it, but this is the first time that its actual effect is mentioned. Its effect, as in the passage above, is that it relentlessly drives one to overcome an adversary or to be overcome by hire. In this sense, *alkê* is insurmountable and blind once it has taken hold. A warrior such as Agenor, about whom the leopard simile is used, will fight his opponent Achilles until one or the other of them is killed. And it is just this virtue, or perhaps weakness, of *alkê* that motivates Apollo at the last moment to withdraw Agenor from conflict (21.597–98).

The second example of *alkê* in its aspect as an uncontrollable combative force finally returns us to Patroklos, whose death we have been laying the groundwork to explain. It will be useful first to summarize some of the arguments made up to this point. Since Patroklos confronts Apollo in book 16 dressed in Achilles' immortal armor, we began by examining the ways in which that armor affects its bearers. We saw a graphic description of what happened to Hektor (*Iliad* 17.210–12) when he had the armor fitted to him. Ares entered into him and his limbs were filled with *alkê* and *sthenos*. Hektor's physical and mental condition after this possession was described by Eustathius as *entheos*, which is not a Homeric term, but is one that classical Greek literature especially employs with a near technical regularity to describe the same phenomenon. Hektor's condition of being *entheos*, then, from the point of view of the classical material at least, can be characterized as lacking *nous* 'consciousness of self', and as allowing the god, in this case Ares, to work through him.

Upon further examination of *alkê*, we noticed that this word stands in a peculiarly apt relationship to Ares. In a passage from Aeschylus's *Seven Against Thebes* (497–98), we saw how the warrior Hippomedon was described in virtually the same terms as Hektor in the *Iliad* (17.210–12), where Ares had possessed them both and given them *alkê*. Subtle and indirect connections between Ares and *alkê* in the *Iliad* were examined, but as we saw there was no direct linkage between the two in epic poetry. Finally we examined how, in one of two important instances of *alkê* in the *Iliad* (21.578), *alkê* can represent a fighting force that cannot be controlled. It is with this aspect of *alkê* in mind that we are now best prepared to consider the death of Patroklos.

The *Iliad* already marks Patroklos for death in book 11, in terms that will now be very familiar. Achilles is on the stern of his ship observing the fighting (*ponos*) and onslaught (*iôkê*)[41] between the Achaeans and Trojans (11.601). He sees Nestor carrying the Achaean Makhaon, whom he does not recognize, off the battlefield, and at that moment he calls Patroklos out of his shelter:

> and he, hearing him from the hut,
> came out <u>equal to Ares</u>, and this at once was the beginning of his evil.
> The *alkimos* son of Menoitios addressed him first.
>
> *Iliad* 11.603–4

While neither the expression *isos Arêi* 'equal to Ares', nor the adjective *alkimos*, are restricted in the *Iliad* to Patroklos, these words mark him in a

manner that will become more resonant as the narrative proceeds. Patroklos has several other epithets in the *Iliad*, such as *diogenes* (5 times), *hippeus* (4 times), and *hippokeleuthos* (3 times), but this is the first time he is called *alkimos*. He will be called *alkimos* five more times in book 16 alone,[42] which is clearly meant to emphasize that book 16 is his *aristeia*. Book 16 is, after all, called the *Patrokleia*. But from our point of view, the intensified usage of *alkimos* in book 16 is meant to heighten Patroklos's religious identification with Ares. In the passage above from book 11, Patroklos has not yet been given Achilles' armor, so it foreshadows events to come that here he is already called *isos Arêi*. After he puts on the armor in book 16, we should expect that the identification with Ares will become intensified.

When Achilles gives his immortal armor to Patroklos, agreeing to let him take his place in battle before the Trojans, he warns him to come back after he has driven them from the ships lest an Olympian attack him (16.91–4). Of course, Patroklos will not heed this warning. But the reason for this, I suggest, lies in what happens to Patroklos after he puts on the armor. The description of Patroklos fitting himself with the armor (16.130–38) does not mention that Ares, as in the case of Hektor later, enters into him. However, as Eustathius observed in the passage quoted earlier, there is a symmetry between Patroklos and Hektor wearing Achilles' armor, (Eustathius on *Iliad* 210–14). Since the armor is the same, if Ares enters into Hektor and fills his limbs with *alkê* and *sthenos*, then we may infer that the same thing happens to Patroklos. Patroklos does not take Achilles' ash spear, as it is too unwieldy for anyone but Achilles (16.140). But Patroklos does pick up two other spears to complete his outfit, and as if to intensify the references to Ares, they are both described as *alkimos* (16.139).[43]

After Patroklos returns to the field of battle, he kills twenty-seven Trojans, an exceptional number,[44] which I infer to result from his possessed state in Achilles' armor. Patroklos seems unstoppable. As we have seen, this is exactly to be expected from the *alkê*, communicated to him through the armor by Ares, that now, drives him. So uncontrollable is Patroklos's onslaught that he kills, with the begrudging acquiescence of Zeus, Zeus's son Sarpedon. Glaukos, Sarpedon's companion, then marshalls the Lykians, and in words that are more revealing than even Glaukos knows, he says that *Ares* has struck Sarpedon down by means of Patroklos's spear (16.543).

Patroklos next encounters Apollo in what will be the first of two parallel confrontations. On the first of such, three times Patroklos tried to mount the Trojan wall and three times Apollo battered him back (16.702–3). Then Apollo speaks to Patroklos and tells him that it is neither his, nor Achilles', destiny (*aisa*) to take Troy (16.707–9). One would expect that in the context of a warning from Apollo, Patroklos would back down. He does back

down momentarily, but then Apollo stirs on the Trojans, which in turn motivates Patroklos to reengage. The narrator comments on how misguided Patroklos is here, saying that the mind (*noos*) of Zeus is always stronger, and that he can terrify (*phobeô*), even the man who is *alkimos* (16.689). In his state of being *entheos* by Ares, Patroklos has lost his *nous* 'consciousness of self', and has been given over to the will of Ares working through him. That will, reflected in Patroklos by the use of the term *alkimos*, is what drives Patroklos to his death.

Patroklos throws a stone and hits Hektor's charioteer, Kebriones, knocking him from his chariot and killing him. At this point, the *Iliad* describes Patroklos in terms of *alkê* by way of a simile reminiscent of the one about Agenor quoted earlier. This is the second, and most explicit, description of *alkê* as an autonomous driving force, which I alluded to earlier. For our purposes, it is tragically significant that it used of Patroklos, and it further supports my claim that it is the *alkê* of Ares that prevents Patroklos from heeding the warning of Apollo. After killing Kebriones, Patroklos rushes in to strip his armor:

> having the spring of a lion, who while ravaging stables
> has been hit in the chest, <u>and his *alkê* destroys him</u>
> *Iliad* 16.752–53

Unlike the previous example of Agenor (*Iliad* 21.576–78), where the consequences of *alkê* were described as driving a leopard to overcome or to be overcome, here *alkê* represents the cause of death itself. Even though the lion is wounded, which can be interpreted as an allusion to Patroklos's condition, its *alkê* prevents it from disengaging from battle and tending to its own needs. Like the warrior Hippomedon in Aeschylus's *Seven Against Thebes*, the *alkê* that drives Patroklos here, if the simile above allows us to draw such an inference, is the outward expression of being possessed by Ares. Patroklos's own person has been eclipsed by that of Ares and, like the wounded lion, he is no longer aware of his own needs at this point (he lacks *nous* 'consciousness of self'). The simile also makes it clear that both the lion and Patroklos are *being driven*—not that they are driving themselves—to their deaths. Apparently the only limit on *alkê* while in this state of possession is the death of the being in which it is active.

But the death of Patroklos is not accomplished without the aid of Apollo, and this raises several interesting parallelisms. Neoanalytic scholars have noted that the death of Patroklos at the hands of Hektor and Apollo, in addition to Euphorbos, parallels the death of Achilles at the hands of Paris and Apollo.[45] According to the *Aithiopis*, the Ethiopian hero Memnon slays

Antilokhos, and in turn is slain by Achilles at the Skaian Gate. Then after Eos, Memnon's mother, bestows immortality upon him, Apollo and Paris collude to kill Achilles at the Skaian Gate. Patroklos is hit from behind by Apollo and Euphorbos, and then killed by Hektor, also at the Skaian Gate. Hektor, too, is slain at the Skaian Gate at the hands of Achilles and Apollo. Now what is interesting here is that Patroklos, Memnon, Hektor, and Achilles all wear immortal armor forged by Hephaistos.[46] If we can take the description of Ares possessing Hektor at *Iliad* 17.210–12, when he puts on Achilles' armor, to be the model, then we have to ask whether there is any deeper connection between wearing full immortal armor, becoming possessed by Ares, and dying.

We can further refine the question by separating Achilles and Memnon from the group, because they alone seem to be capable of killing leading warriors with or without the aid of Apollo. In the *Aithiopis*, Memnon kills Antilokhos on his own, and then Achilles kills him. Achilles then kills Penthesileia.[47] In the *Iliad*, Apollo merely forsakes Hektor (22.213), thus passively enabling Achilles to kill him. The parallelisms between Memnon and Achilles extend further. Although Memnon dies at the hands of Achilles, he is semidivine and so his mother Eos, by permission of Zeus, can make him immortal. Achilles is also semidivine, and the *Aithiopis* tells us that his fate, like Memnon's, is to have his mother Thetis transport him to the White Island. We can infer from this that Achilles is made immortal as well.

Patroklos and Hektor by contrast are not semidivine, and thus their situations call for a different explanation. Apollo does not actively contrive to kill Hektor, as he does Patroklos, but he does not actively help him either (again 22.213). This is an important distinction because Apollo's active aid to Hektor, which leads to Patroklos's death, foregrounds this entire encounter as highly unusual. Why should a divinity aid in the killing of a mortal? Nowhere else in the *Iliad* does Apollo intervene to strike a warrior,[48] nor does any other god for that matter. In my view Apollo's intervention is necessary to counterweigh the threat of Patroklos's possession by Ares.[49] Before Apollo's intervention, Patroklos indeed kills Sarpedon, a son of Zeus, which indicates that he has achieved a state at least as powerful as that of a semidivine hero. After Sarpedon's death, Zeus "ponders many things with regard to the murder of Patroklos" (*Iliad* 16.647), then sends Apollo to retrieve Sarpedon's body, and this indirectly leads Apollo to stop Patroklos's onslaught.

Since both Hektor and Patroklos wear Achilles' armor, we expect that some of their actions should take on a similar character. At one point, in fact, after Athena disguised as Deïphobos has encouraged Hektor, he says something reminiscent of the animal similes used of Patroklos:

> now my *thumos* has driven me in turn
> to stand against you. I must take you or I must be taken
> *Iliad* 22.252–53

The passive language in the first sentence, and the "kill or be killed" mentality in the second, can be compared to what *alkê* was said to do to Patroklos by way of the lion (16.752–53) and leopard (16.567–78) similes used of him. Neither Hektor nor Patroklos has control over their actions and this state of affairs is to be expected if we understand them to be *entheoi* by Ares. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that neither Patroklos nor Hektor received Achilles' ash spear to complete their panoply, which might have prevented them from fully actualizing the capacity of the armor. And although we know from the *Aithiopis* that divinely armored Memnon and Achilles will also die, within the *Iliad* only Patroklos and Hektor die so armored. I conclude from this that the *Iliad* is emphasizing their mortality, and is underscoring their inadequacy to maintain themselves for long in a divine capacity.

There is one further distinction to make between the deaths of Patroklos and Hektor. Patroklos's death is more ritualized in general than that of Hektor. I use the term *ritualized* here to denote a formalized pattern of interaction between a hero and a divinity, rather than to suggest that Homeric narrative is presenting a series of religious rites that can be correlated with a given historical practice in cult. At the same time, I recognize that the formulaic nature of Homeric poetry itself may also be the source for repeated dictional patterns, rather than actual religious ritual. But even formulaic diction and thematic repetition suggest a kind of ritualizing mentality,[50] and the singular nature of Homeric poetry makes it difficult to judge finally what may, or may not, represent historical ritual.

In *Iliad* 16 Patroklos charges Apollo three times, only to be repelled on the fourth, on two separate occasions (16.702–5, and 784–7). The "thrice ... but the fourth time" pattern occurs elsewhere in the *Iliad* (e.g. 13.20, 22.165 and 208), and occurs on two other occasions between a warrior and Apollo at 5.436–39 (Diomedes), and at 20.445–48 (Achilles).[51] But unlike the single "thrice ... but the fourth time" encounters between Diomedes/Achilles and Apollo, Patroklos undergoes this experience, an unprecedented two times. This does not merely distinguish Patroklos from Diomedes and Achilles; rather, in my view it casts his encounter with Apollo in more overtly ritualizing terms. In the fourth attempt on both occasions Patroklos is marked by the expression *daimoni isos* 'equal to a *daimôn*' (16.705 and 786). But it is on the second and fatal charge that Patroklos is also called 'equal to swift Ares' (16.784). By occurring at this final moment before Patroklos's

death, the *Iliad* seals the identification of hero and god. At this moment Patroklos has become Ares.

However, the *Iliad* does not represent this state of affairs as tenable. Indeed, if there is a consistent theme behind the deaths of Patroklos and Hektor, both of whom die suited in Achilles' immortal armor, it is that achieving a state of *entheos* by Ares is an inherently unstable condition. Unlike the examples of *entheoi* individuals discussed earlier, where we saw how seers, prophets, and poets could undergo temporary periods of possession, the warrior presents a different case. The possession of seers, prophets, and poets results in well-defined outcomes: the seer has a vision, the prophet prophesizes, and the poet sings poetry. However, Homeric epic represents the possessed warrior as killing, and continuing to kill, until he is stopped by being killed. This ideology is prefigured or reflected in the concept of *alkê*, which engenders a "kill or be killed" mentality, and is said to drive an animal (warrior) relentlessly to its death. Taking the case of Hektor (*Iliad* 17.210–12) as a model, *alkê* is conveyed to a warrior by Ares when he dons immortal armor.

Outside the *Iliad*, the deaths of Memnon and Achilles in immortal armor indicate that even semidivine warriors who achieve a state of possession by Ares will eventually die. Within the *Iliad*, however, only Patroklos and Hektor die in immortal armor, which suggests that mortals are incapable of handling the divine forces conveyed to them through possession. On the other hand, when Patroklos reaches the peak of his *aristeia* in his struggle against Apollo, his condition is likened to that of Ares (16.784). He has achieved a state of divinity. Unlike Achilles, who, except for Apollo withdrawing his help, is alone capable of killing Hektor, it takes Apollo, Euphorbos, and Hektor to kill Patroklos. The fact that Patroklos charges Apollo on two separate occasions, and in the meantime kills the semidivine Sarpedon, reinforces the notion that Patroklos is as unstoppable as a divinity, and thus Apollo, and at a further remove Zeus, must intervene to aid in his destruction. This final battle between what are virtually two gods stands alone in the *Iliad*. Even Diomedes, who can wound Aphrodite (5.335–37), almost kill the semidivine Aineias but for Apollo's intervention (5.445), and who later with Athena's help can wound Ares himself (5.856–67), nevertheless backs down at Apollo's command (5.443). However, through possession by Ares Patroklos is able to encounter divinity as divinity himself, and thus his final military exploit, which the *Iliad* seems to cast in ritual terms, represents an attainment of religious grace—a mortal has momentarily transcended his mortality—before the sudden reversal by Apollo can lead to his death.

The ritual dimension of Patroklos's death can be carried further. As mentioned earlier, in the course of his *aristeia* Patroklos kills Sarpedon, a son

of Zeus who in several respects resembles Memnon.[52] Patroklos is thereby cast in a role similar to that of Achilles, who in the *Aithiopis* slays Memnon, and then is slain. Just as Memnon's mother Eos immortalizes him, Achilles' mother Thetis bears him off his funeral pyre to the White Island. But this kind of immortalization is impossible for Patroklos, because he is neither semidivine, nor has a divine sponsor.[53] Yet, on the level of cult as opposed to that of myth, the *Iliad* insists on the similarity between Patroklos and Achilles by having Patroklos's ghost ask to have his bones buried with Achilles' (23.83–4). When Achilles orders that a grave mound be built and that Patroklos's bones be set in a golden jar to await burial, until "Achilles himself covers him in Hades" (23.243–44), there is a suggestion that these two heroes may share a cult at Troy. Achilles tells the Achaeans not to build a large mound for him and Patroklos, but only a modest one, and to return to it at a time when they can make it broad and high (23.246–47). Although this is not direct evidence for cult, Achilles' words presuppose that the Achaeans will continue to tend his and Patroklos's funeral mound after the war is over. It is also significant in this regard that the funeral games for Patroklos take place next to the funeral mound. In Homeric narrative, athletic games function as part funerary rites[54] and certainly prefigure later patterns of cult worship, even if they do not yet assume the seasonal character of, for example, the games in honor of Demophoön in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (265–67).[55] I suggest that the immortalization of Patroklos to be achieved in cult, as represented indirectly by the *Iliad* in the funeral games, thus presents compensation for Patroklos's inability to be immortalized like Achilles in myth.

In the early fifth century B.C.E., the ritual dimensions of Patroklos's death, in the sense of sacrifice, were further elaborated upon by classical audiences. At least one stamnos vase painting, attributed to the Triptolemos Painter, represents a sacrificed ram as Patroklos.[56] The ram is lying with its throat cut between the feet of two warriors, only one of whom (on the right) is named, and the name given is Hektor. Behind these two warriors stand two older men, named Phoinix and Priam respectively. The events appear similar to the events described in *Iliad* 17, where Ajax and Hektor battle over the body of Patroklos. Thus the unnamed warrior could be Ajax. The other side of the vase, however, represents the Embassy scene in *Iliad* 9, and Diomedes, Odysseus, and Phoinix (all named), flank a seated and recalcitrant Achilles. For the sake of plot consistency, it is possible that the unnamed warrior standing over the ram Patroklos on the other side could be Achilles himself, although this is uncertain. Whatever the solution to this problem, the interpretation of Patroklos as a sacrifice in place of Achilles is fraught with even more difficulties.[57] Nevertheless this vase painting shows that

Patroklos's death, beginning with its representation in the *Iliad*, might have conveyed more ritual dimensions to a classical audience than we are able to recover.

Notes

1. Whitman 1958.198–202. Cf. Janko 1992.408.
2. Whitman 1958.201–202.
3. Lowenstam 1975, Sinos 1980.55, and Nagy 1979.33.
4. For example *daimôni isos* is used of Diomedes at *Iliad* 5.438, 459, and 884 to characterize the height of his *aristeia*, during which he attacks Apollo, wounds Aphrodite, and charges against Ares. Achilles is described as *daimôni isos* in his confrontation with Hektor (20.447), who is closely protected and momentarily saved by Apollo. Achilles' general slaughter of the Trojans motivates the designation *daimôni isos* (20.493), and he is also described thus when he chases Trojans into the divine river Xanthos (21.18), and when the divine river Skamandros pleads with him to fight the Trojans on the plain, away from his corpse-filled stream (21.227). On the ritual antagonism between god and hero implied by the use of *daimôni isos*, see Nagy 1979.143–44.
5. *pace* Janko 1992.311.
6. In a different connection, Thieme 1952.23 argues that the adjective *ambrotos* as used of the armor of Achilles (e.g. at *Iliad* 17.194 and 202) does not mean 'divine', but rather 'Lebenskraft spendend', which is certainly a kind of power. Indeed it is tempting to see with Thieme, ibid., this meaning at work in the narrator's comment that "[Peleus] in turn, grown old, gave [the armor] to his son; but his son did not grow old in the father's armor" (*Iliad* 17.196–97), as well as in the fact that Patroklos will be stripped of Achilles' armor by Apollo (16.787–804) before he is killed. Without denying the plausibility of Thieme's argument, my discussion will focus more specifically on another kind of power (*alkê*) that will be seen to motivate Patroklos in battle.
7. See Lewis 1989 (1st ed. 1971) and Oesterreich 1974 (1st ed. 1921).
8. Cf. Edwards 1991 on 17.210–12.
9. For this translation of *kudos*, see Benveniste 1969 II.68.
10. At *Iliad* 1.524–27 Zeus tells Thetis that nodding his head is the *megiston tekmôr* 'greatest sign' that he can give as proof that he will accomplish what he says. Since Zeus never descends upon the battlefield in person in the *Iliad*, we should expect that another god would be designated to fulfill his promise.
11. Again Lewis 1989 and Oesterreich 1974.
12. Lewis 1989.34.
13. Lewis 1989.40.
14. Lewis 1989.40.
15. Oesterreich 1974.377, and cf. ibid. 377n2: "In many cases it is probable that, exactly as in modern spiritualism, the imperious desire for direct communication with departed ancestors and other relatives also plays a part, particularly if we remember the extraordinary extent to which memory of the dead is cultivated in ancestor-worship amongst many peoples with whom the deceased are not excluded by death from the general communion of the living."
16. Nagy 1979.6 and 115–16.
17. Nilsson 1955.517.

18. In Sparta, puppies were sacrificed to Ares Enualios (Pausanias 3.14.9 and Plutarch, *Roman Questions* 290d). In the *Iliad*, *enualios* is Ares' epithet (17.211), and is personified to represent war (18.309). Ares also had a temple at Athens (Pausanias 1.8.4), and was worshipped exclusively by the women at Tegea (Pausanias 8.48.4–5).

19. Cf. Herodotus 5.7. For more on Ares cults in Thrace generally, see Burkert 1985.169–70, Farnell 1909 V.400, and Harrison 1908.374–79.

20. Van der Valk 1987 IV.41 (on his lines 8–10) thinks that Eustathius erred by naming Patroklos here instead of Hektor. The following sentence, however, makes clear that Eustathius has in mind the parallel of Patroklos and Hektor becoming possessed by Ares when they wear Achilles' armor.

21. Homeric poetry employs other expressions, like *isotheos* 'equal to a god', and *daimôni isos* 'equal to a *daimôn*' to represent states of possession.

22. In poetry we find possession, for example, in Aeschylus, *Seven Against Thebes*, 497, where the warrior Hippomedon is said to be possessed (*entheos*) by Ares; at *Agamemnon*, 1209, the chorus asks Kassandra whether she was 'seized by *entheoi* arts'; at *Eumenides*, 17, Zeus is said to have made Apollo's breast *entheos*. In Sophocles, *Antigone*, 964, Dionysiac bacchants are called *entheoi* women. In Euripides, *Hippolytus*, 141, the chorus describes Phaedra's raving state as *entheos*. In prose, Plato, *Phaedrus*, 244b, the Sibyl is said to speak by 'mantic *entheos*'; in the *Meno*, 99c, and the *Apology* 22c, *khrêsmôidoi* 'soothsayers', and *theomanteis* 'diviners' are described as *enthousiôntes* (from *entheos*); in *Ion*, 533e, the Muse is said to make men *entheoi*, and epic poets are called both *entheoi* and *katekhomenoi*.

23. Cf. the term *katokhos* 'possessed', from *katekhô*, as at Euripides, *Hecuba*, 1090. Note that there the entire Thracian people is referred to as *katokhos* by Ares.

24. Cf. the idea of being 'taken' (verb *lambanô*) by a god, as it is used for example of Dionysus at Herodotus 4.79.

25. In the *Ion*, Plato has Socrates argue that a rhapsode's proficiency is not due to art (*tekhnê*), but to divine power (*theia dunamis*), which can be compared to the power that a magnet exerts on iron rings (533d). Later in the dialogue, Socrates elaborates on this idea, explaining that the Muses, poets, rhapsodes or actors, and audiences, are all rings (*daktulios*) suspended (*eksartaô*) from one another in a descending order of influence (536a). Possession is then related by Socrates to being suspended: 'one of the poets is suspended from one Muse, another from another. We use the word "possessed" (*katekhô*) for it, but it is nearly the same thing, for he is held' (536ab).

26. For example, Plato, *Ion*, 533e.

27. Rohde 1903 11.18–22, Tambornino 1909.55–57, Pfister 1939.178–91, 1940.102 and *passim*, Dodds 1951.87n41, Nilsson 1955.577–78, Calvo Martinez 1973.160, Burkert 1985.109–11. For a view of possession that interprets *entheos* as metaphorical, see Smith 1965.410–13, esp. 410n23, in conjunction with Burkert 1985.391n1. Rohde (1903 II.19–20) seemed to have thought that *entheos* meant 'being in god' (he says that in possession the soul "ist nun bei und in dem Gotte," and that the *entheoi* "leben und sind in dem Gotte"), but the meaning 'having a god within' is the accepted interpretation (Pfister 1939.183 and 1940.102, Dodds 1951.87n41, Nilsson 1955.579n4, Calvo Martinez 1973.160, Burkert 1985.109). The latter meaning is used in the present work.

28. In this case., the term *entheoi* refers to *khrêsmôidoi* 'soothsayers', and *theomanteis* 'diviners' (*Meno*, 99c).

29. Cf. Oesterreich 1974.342.

30. I translate *nous* as 'consciousness of self' rather than 'mind' or 'consciousness' generally, following Rohde 1903 11.20n1. When Plato or others speak in the case of seers (*theomanteis*) or prophets (*khrêsmôidoi*) of a loss of *nous*, they do not mean a total loss of

consciousness, as that would imply that the person is unconscious or comatose. It is more accurate to say that 'consciousness of self' is lost in possession, and that a measure of consciousness remains through which the divine source communicates.

31. I derive the translation 'mentally unstable' from the metaphorical usage of the verb *phoitaô* at 144. The chorus reports at 131–32 that Phaedra is "distressed on a bed of sickness and keeps indoors," which suggests that the usage of *phoitaô* at 144 cannot mean literally 'to roam about'. I take *phoitaô* to refer to Phaedra's mental condition.

32. See the summary by Calvo Martinez 1973.166–71.

33. Rohde 1903 11.20n1, commenting on this scholion, says that the *entheos*, who is in the power of the possessing divinity, and through whom the divinity speaks and acts, lacks self-consciousness (*Selbstbewusstsein*). This is the main point of the chorus's remarks about Phaedra.

34. For example, at *Iliad* 5.703–4.

35. For example, see Sophocles, *Antigone*, 1151; Euripides, *Bacchae*, 130; Plato, *Phaedrus*, 244b, *Ion*, 536d; Herodotus 4.79.3; Heraclitus B 15 and 92 DK; Aelian, *Varia Historia*, 3.42; Theocritus 26.13, etc.

36. Calvo Martinez 1973.164.

37. The connection between Ares and Dionysus is made explicit by Euripides in the *Bacchae* (302–4): "[Dionysus] shares in a portion of Ares. For terror (*phobos*) has struck a host, arrayed in armor and order of battle, before a spear is touched." Compare Pindar, *Dithyramb* 2.16–17, where during a celebration of Bromios (Dionysus) in the palace of the daughters of Ouranos, "the spear of Enualios is brandished." The actual identification of Ares with Dionysus (Bacchus), as for example in Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, 1.19.1, by means of the name 'Ενυάλιος, may be significant but the evidence is too late to be of help here. See Dodds 1960 on *Bacchae* lines 302–4. For more on the association between Ares and Dionysus in tragedy, see Zeitlin 1993.177–78 and especially Lonnoy 1985.

38. See the glosses in Smith 1982.228 (498f and 498g). Cf. Hesychius (ed. Latte), s.v. ἀλκή, where μάχη is listed as one of the synonyms.

39. Aeschylus, in the *Seven Against Thebes*, in lines immediately following those describing Hippomedon above, depicts Phobos vaunting before the Onkan gate (500). Certainly the genealogical relationship (as attested for example in the *Theogony*) of Ares and Phobos is meant to be evoked here.

40. Trümpy 1950.220.

41. Note that this is the same term that we saw earlier, personified and garlanded around the shield of Athena (5.740). The language, too, is similar and homophonic: at 5.740, we read *kruoessa Iôkê* 'chilling Onslaught', while at 11.601, it is *iôka dakruoessan* 'tearful onslaught'.

42. The general distribution pattern of *alkimos* as applied to Patroklos also reflects the military importance for him of book 16: it occurs in book 11 (3 times), book 12 (1 time), book 16 (5 times), book 18 (2 times), and book 19 (1 time).

43. Shannon 1975.84 emphasizes the symbolism of mortality and destruction of Achilles' ash spear (e.g. at *Iliad* 16.143), and its thematic importance for the relationship between Achilles and Patroklos. I draw attention to the fact that although Patroklos does not take Achilles' *Pêliada meliên* 'Pelian ash spear' at 16.140, the spears (*doru*) that he does take are marked with the adjective *alkimos*, which connotes the possibility of destruction by way of its association with the power of *alkê*.

44. Janko 1992.411.

45. Scheliha 1943.264, and Kullmann 1960.315–16, with further bibliography. See also the summary in Janko 1992.312–14.

46. In the Proclus summary of the *Aithiopis*, Memnon is said to wear *hêphaistoteukton panoplian* 'Hephaistos-made armor'. Patroklos, Hektor, and Achilles wear the same armor; Hephaistos makes a second set for Achilles. Cf. Pestalozzi 1945.43.

47. Note, however, that in Proclus' summary of the *Aithiopis*, after Achilles kills Penthesileia, who is called the 'daughter of Ares', and then Thersites, who had reproached Achilles for loving her, Achilles sails to Lesbos and sacrifices to Apollo, Artemis, and Leto to become purified from bloodshed by Odysseus.

48. Whitman 1958.201–2.

49. I am suggesting that Patroklos's possession by Ares may represent, within the religious economy of the *Iliad*, a direct threat to the sovereignty of Olympian divinity as represented by Zeus and Apollo. Hence they aid in his death. Cf. Lewis's 1989.26–28 and 107–8 discussion of the politics of what he calls 'peripheral possession' *vis-à-vis* a given centralized religious organization.

50. Cf. the remarks of Whitman 1958.250: "Thematic motifs, such as descriptions of sacrifices, ship-launchings, feasts, funerals, arming, and combat, are on the whole fixities of the poems, as indeed they were of the world from which the poems arose, and the recitation of such passages is as ritualistic, in a way, as were the performances of the acts which they describe."

51. Cf. Whitman 1958.200; Janko 1992.400, on lines 16.702–6, merely calls these patterns "traditional," and does not comment on their ritual value.

52. Kullmann 1960.318, Pestalozzi 1945.13–15 and 44–45, Janko 1992.313, with further bibliography.

53. A different tradition, attested in Pausanias (3.19.13), does represent Patroklos on the White Island with Achilles.

54. Cf. the games in honor of Amarynkeus (*Iliad* 23.630–31) and of Achilles (*Odyssey* 24.85–6).

55. Rohde 1903 I.19 suggests that many aspects of the funerary rites and games for Patroklos recur in later times in customs reserved for hero cult. Yet because funerary rites and games are not repeated on a regular basis in Homeric poetry, Rohde rules out the existence of hero cult *per se* in Homer. I concur with Nagy 1979.116–17, that in Homeric poetry we are dealing with intimations of cult practices, which, because of the Panhellenic nature of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, are deliberately made generic and "universal." Rohde's argument *ex silentio* cannot be taken to exclude the possibility that the funeral games for Patroklos, and the common burial ground for him and Achilles, reflect hero cult ideology. For more on hero cult in Homer, see Hack 1929 and Price 1973.

56. Discussion in Schmidt 1969 and Griffiths 1985.

57. Schmidt 1969.149–50 cautions against applying modern concepts of sacrifice to this painting. There is no evidence either in the *Iliad*, or in the surviving fragments from the Achilles trilogy of Aeschylus, to whom Schmidt attributes the idea for the painting, for Patroklos to have been sacrificed. Griffiths 1985.49–50, compares the ram to the common folk motif of spiriting a person away and substituting an animal in their place, as Artemis does for Iphigeneia.

DEAN HAMMER

Toward a Political Ethic

> Now I have tasted food again and have let the gleaming wine go down
> my throat. Before, I had tasted nothing.
> 24.641–42

I began this book by looking at the philosophic rejection, beginning with Plato, of the epistemological status of epic poetry. The problem with the Homeric epic for Plato is that it imitates phenomenal appearance (*phainomena*) since it depicts the shadowy world of human action. Unlike Homer, whose art can tell us nothing about how to live because it merely imitates what we already do, the philosophic craft, as it draws its inspiration from the contemplation of truth, is capable of producing political judgments of what conduct makes individuals better or worse (*Rep*. 599d). Overlaying this Platonic argument in modern times is a Kantian distinction between "pure moral philosophy" and other precepts that "may be only empirical and thus belong to anthropology."[1] Moral philosophy is seen as derived from abstract and universal principles that impose a categorical duty on humans. Empirical precepts, such as norms of behavior or even ethics,[2] are seen as culturally grounded and so not critically reflective.

Applied to the Homeric world, this distinction between moral philosophy and empirical concepts underlies a view of Homeric individuals as conforming to external cultural norms rather than acting and reflecting

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upon internal motivations of what is morally right and wrong. In Snell's influential formulation, Homeric man lacks consciousness of himself as making moral choices and an ability to reflect on those choices.[3] For Fränkel, no encounter occurs between an outside world and an "inner selfhood."[4] Homeric individuals possess only an "elemental vitality" in which they live in the joys and sorrows of the moment and act according to the "forms" of society.[5] Dodds would employ a now famous anthropological distinction between "shame" and "guilt" cultures to describe the operation of the Homeric value system in which an individual's sense of right and wrong is governed by what the community will think of him or her, rather than by an internal sense of moral guilt.[6] And Redfield, in his anthropological reading, suggests that Homeric man "has no innerness" and is "incapable of development" because he "responds fully and uncritically to each situation."[7] From these perspectives, neither personal decision nor judgment is possible because no image exists of oneself apart from the norms of society.[8] Homeric man functions unreflectively as an expression of the external standards of society.

Yet, these formulations make it impossible to understand who or what is doing the conforming, and how the conforming even takes place. Even Redfield, who rejects any innerness to Homeric individuals, notes that in the shame culture of Homeric society, the "expressed ideal norm of the society" is "experienced with the self, as a man internalizes the anticipated judgments of others on himself."[9] Honor is not just the value of a person "in the eyes of his society" but, as Pitt-Rivers notes, it "is the value of a person in his own eyes." Honor, and its sanction of shame, provides "a nexus between the ideals of a society and their reproduction in the individual through his aspiration to personify them."[10] The recognition of how one's actions might damage or enhance one's status, suggests Cairns, requires "a subjective idea of one's own worth, an ideal self-image which is placed under threat, and an awareness of the standards under which one is liable to be criticized" or praised.[11] The claim by an individual that he or she was inappropriately dishonored, for example, rests upon a particular image and valuation of oneself as deserving honor. I follow Cairns in his characterization of this valuation of oneself as "self-esteem."[12] Esteem, in the sense used here, does not denote some authentic inner self but is an *image of oneself in relationship to others* that necessarily involves questions of how this self relates to "the demands, needs, claims, desires, and, generally, the lives of other people."[13]

Like politics, ethics is both cultural as it is tied to the expectations of society, and critical as it is shaped and reshaped in its performance. The ethical self is an enacted self that must interpret and apply the standards of a community, as well as encounter occasions in which community expectations

are ambiguous, contradictory, or unsatisfactory. At the core of these enactments is the notion of esteem. I identified in chapter 2 the cultural basis of esteem, in that the warrior's sense of worth is tied to the receipt of honor and glory for the performance of great words and deeds in battle and assembly. I argued in chapter 4 that Achilles interprets the loss of Briseis as a violation of his esteem and responds by rejecting a notion of worth that is tied to recognition by others. In this chapter, I explore the critical aspect of the notion of esteem by examining how Achilles comes to revise his sense of worth through recognizing how his choices affect him, as his choices affect others.

The focus on esteem will serve as a complement in some ways, a corrective in others, to recent discussions of the ethical transformation of Achilles. For Crotty, Achilles has initially only "the most rudimentary sense of self" that is simply reactive to challenges to his superiority. Achilles' grief over the death of Patroklos, though, allows him later to "sense vividly" the suffering of Priam. In generalizing from his experience to Priam's, Achilles "reforms or restructures his sense of himself" to appreciate "the similarity of another's experience to his own." Crotty writes, "In appreciating his resemblance to another, Achilles no longer confines his reactions to the immediate stimulus but can see in another's distress the kind of danger to which he is *in general*, or *as a kind of being*, exposed." What becomes difficult to reconcile is the two people that Crotty portrays as Achilles. Up through Book 23, Achilles appears as Fränkel's "Homeric man" who, because he lacks innerness, can react only to "external stimuli." In Book 24, Achilles appears as a "more complex self" in which he is able to reflect on the experiences of others and establish new bonds outside the conventions of warrior society.[14] Rather than positing a reactive and reflective Achilles, we can better trace in Achilles a clarified sense of his own esteem in response to different experiences of suffering: the suffering of battle, the loss of Patroklos, and the pain excited by the sight of Priam.

Zanker, too, sees a "change of heart" in which the "affective drives" of pity, respect, and affection are emphasized in Achilles' actions, toward Priam. This heroic magnanimity, as Zanker describes it, is made possible by Achilles' "unique experience and knowledge of death." Through his "deepened sense of mortality" and his "personal realization of the reality of death," Achilles acquires a "totality" of "vision" that is alone among other mortals and "outstrips even that of the gods." With this vision, Achilles is able to "attain to the companionship in suffering that he shares with Priam and the sublime generosity that he shows toward him."[15]

Zanker is not alone in emphasizing the importance of death in affecting the transformation or reintegration of Achilles.[16] These formulations are

ambiguous, though, for it remains unclear what, precisely, it means to "accept" or "face" or have a "deeper" sense of one's death and how this is related to a changed comprehension of human relationships. Tying Achilles' development to his distinctive knowledge of death is particularly tricky because Achilles already has knowledge of his death that surpasses in certainty and clarity the knowledge of every other warrior. Yet, with this depth of knowledge, Achilles chooses variously not to fight, to fight savagely, and then to postpone fighting. In understanding Achilles' development, we may wish to avoid a language of comparatives (greater, lesser, deeper, fuller) in talking about death. This language creates ambiguities precisely because it implies a scale of measure that does not exist. We can better speak of how Achilles comes to understand death differently, and how that difference is related to a changing notion of esteem (as an image of himself in relationship to others).

Whatever his faults, the Achilles of Books 1 and 9 is neither reactive nor unwilling to face his death. As we saw in chapter 4, Achilles' response to the loss of his war-prize arises from a sense of esteem that he shares with the rest of the Achaians: worth is tied to the receipt of honor and glory by the community. When the community fails to show gratitude for his fighting, the struggle of battle appears not as a heroic pursuit of glory, but as a rather humiliating submission to suffering. More than that, though, this violation of esteem recasts Achilles' understanding of fate and death, since his willingness to risk his life for others no longer enhances his worth but appears downright foolish. Angered by Agamemnon's slight, Achilles seeks to restore his worth by humiliating those who brought him pain. The death of Patroklos, though, recasts Achilles' experience of pain since he becomes implicated in the suffering of another. The awareness of how he is implicated in the suffering of another provides the foundation for a more generalized expression of pity toward Priam. This awareness has political significance since it answers to the fundamental political problem that is raised in the *Iliad*: how can communities, as political fields, endure since they are formed by human relations and consequently endangered by human collisions that can be neither foreseen nor controlled?

ESTEEM FOR ONESELF AND VULNERABILITY TO ANOTHER

The ethical problem in the *Iliad* is created, as Gregory Nagy notes, when Achilles refuses to fight.[17] We saw in this refusal a claim to self-sufficiency, in which Achilles will not be bound by others. He needs neither the honor nor the glory that others can provide. Nor does he feel a sense of obligation

or pity to others born of any corporate bond. He derives his sense of worth, instead, from an ability to impose suffering without suffering himself.

In contrast to Achilles, Patroklos is moved by the suffering that has befallen the Achaians (16.22). Patroklos exclaims that Achilles is pitiless in his unwillingness to help (16.33) and dons Achilles' armor to fight in his absence.[18] Patroklos's death has the narrative importance of bringing Achilles back into battle.[19] As Nagy argues, for the "uninvolved audience of epic," the death of Patroklos and the pain Achilles feels is the "subject for *kléos*," or immortal glory. By avenging Patroklos's death, Achilles will achieve glory in "the epic tradition itself" since his story will be worthy of being told.[20] But, as Nagy notes, pain and glory operate at two levels in the epic. The glory of Achilles is heard and celebrated by the audience of the epic, but the pain is experienced as unforgettable by the characters involved.[21]

Pain points to the inextricable, and often immediate, connection between an image of oneself and one's relationship with others. In Achilles' earlier experience of pain, he saw himself as *suffering-from* the dishonor brought about by Agamemnon. Achilles' response is one of anger in which he seeks to restore his esteem by reversing this suffering, inflicting pain upon others while staying removed from the infliction of pain by others. With the death of Patroklos, though, Achilles experiences a *suffering-with*, in which his own pain is connected, to the suffering of another.[22] Achilles does not feel the other person's pain. Nor does his sense of suffering from the afflictions of war end, as suggested by his anger toward Hektor (see 15.68). What is different is that Achilles is unable to dissociate himself, and his own sense of esteem, from the loss of another. This sense of suffering-with has cognitive significance since it alters Achilles' image of himself in relationship with others. As his suffering-with reveals his fundamental connectedness to Patroklos, Achilles begins to see himself as the occasion for (if not the cause of) Patroklos's death. Achilles begins to articulate a sense of being responsible for the death of Patroklos.[23] This responsibility is not so much the attribution of himself as a cause as a statement of Achilles' own failure to stand by (or be responsible for) Patroklos. What follows is an elaboration of how Patroklos's death revises Achilles' notion of esteem by making his sense of worth *vulnerable* to another who is *distinctive*.

Esteem for Oneself and Vulnerability to Another

Upon hearing of Patroklos's death, Achilles pours dust on his head and face as he "fouled [*êischune*] his handsome countenance" (18.24) and "defiled" (*êischune*) his hair (18.27). Removed from the disgrace others can bring to him, Achilles now debases himself. The verb *aischunô* is used most frequently

in the *Iliad* to describe the shame brought about to another through the mutilation and defilement of a corpse (see 18.180, 22.75, 24.418).[24] As Vernant notes in describing the relationship between the "heroic ideal and the mutilation of the corpse," the "hero's beautiful death, which grants him eternal glory," has as its corollary "the disfigurement and debasement of the dead opponent's body, so as to deny him access to the memory of men to come."[25] In this case, though, Achilles defiles himself and, in fact, remains covered in filth after he kills Hektor and even after the Achaians implore him to wash himself (23.40–42).[26]

In characterizing this mourning for Patroklos, Crotty suggests that it bears a similarity to the expression of pity (*eleos*), an expression that Crotty will suggest is later extended to Priam. For Crotty, "the appeal of pity is seen at its clearest in the context of intimate relations" where "the plight of one" becomes another's "own plight."[27] Though Achilles weeps, defiles himself, suffers, and wishes he were never born, he is never described after the death of Patroklos as pitying either Patroklos or himself.[28] The reason the language of pity is not used lies in Achilles' closeness to Patroklos. There are three occasions in which intimates are associated with pity: Andromache's appeal to Hektor (6.407, 431);[29] Achilles' response to Patroklos's crying (16.50); and Priam's appeal to Hektor (22.59, 82). Not only do these appeals fail, suggesting that pity is not most powerfully felt among intimates, but they are a vast minority of usages in the *Iliad*. More often, some distance exists between the pitier and the pitied, such as the pity of a god or the pity for one's comrades. To see an intimate (*oikeiotata*) suffer, as Aristotle suggests, is not to feel pity, but to feel oneself suffer as the other person.[30]

It is just this suffering, as a loss of a part of himself, that Achilles feels with the death of Patroklos. This loss is significant in altering Achilles' claim to happiness.[31] When Thetis reminds Achilles that everything he has asked for has been "brought to accomplishment [*tetelestai*] / through Zeus" (18.74–75), she recalls Achilles' own words to the embassy that he does not need the honor of others because he is already honored by Zeus (9.607–608). Yet, even with Zeus's honor, Achilles declares, "But what pleasure [*êdos*] is this to me, since my dear [*philos*] companion has perished" (18.80). Where Achilles' sense of suffering led him previously to assert his esteem through a claim of self-sufficiency, he now places his life in a relational context, suggesting that he loved Patroklos "equal to [*ison*] my own life" (18.82, trans. modified). This equality makes it impossible for Achilles to see his life as simply his own because he now shares it with another.

Achilles articulates now a close connection between his own sense of worth and his failure to take care of another. His failure to act stands out in his mind because of his strength, "as no other of the bronze-armoured

Achaians / in battle" (18.105–106). In describing himself as a "useless weight on the good land" (*etôsion achthos arourês*, 18.104), an image that certainly strikes at the heart of self-esteem, he connects this esteem to a failure to take care of another. In Achilles' words, "I was not to stand by my companion / when he was killed" (18.98–99). Patroklos perished, laments Achilles, because he "lacked my fighting strength to defend him" (18.99–100). Not only was Achilles "no light of safety to Patroklos," but he was no help to "my other / companions, who in their numbers went down before glorious Hektor" (18.103–104). Achilles portrays himself as an individual who failed to care for his comrades.[32]

Achilles' response to the death of Patroklos seems to point toward a recognition of a more complex operation of fate than he had suggested earlier, a recognition that underlies this changing notion of esteem. In Book 9, Achilles declares that there is an equality (*isê*) of fate in which death comes to both the brave and the coward (9.318). Equality appears as the finality of death that all mortals face alike (*homôs*) (9.320). As I suggested in chapter 4, this equality is one in which individuals are alike, but not necessarily connected. After the death of Patroklos, though, Achilles comes to express a different relationship between equality and fate. Achilles points to an equality in which fates, such as the relationship between Patroklos and Achilles, become shared through an inextricable connectedness of one life to another. Fate is no longer an individual possession but a collision that occurs through the intertwining of choices and actions. When Achilles says that he will avenge Patroklos's death by killing Hektor, Thetis reminds him that his fated death (*potmos*) will follow (18.96). In Achilles' answer, he seems to recognize the necessary consequences of his choice: "Then I shall die [*autika tethnaiên*], since [*epei*] I was not to stand by my companion / when he was killed" (18.98–99, trans. modified).

This notion of fatefulness, in which destinies are fulfilled through their intersection and collision with each other, is integral to the narrative construction of Achilles' situation. In the opening verse of the *Iliad*, Homer portends this collision, since men are "set ... together" (*xuneêke*) (1.8). The audience, like the gods, witness these collisions throughout the *Iliad*, while Achilles sees himself not as a part of, but as willing, these collisions. The death of Patroklos changes that, since it demonstrates the impossibility of a withdrawal from a world of collision. The knowledge of destiny that Achilles possesses is not wrong as much as incomplete because it does not, and cannot, account for the connectedness of humans to each other. As Achilles observes in his lament of Patroklos, "It was an empty word [*halion epos*] I cast forth on that day / when in his halls I tried to comfort the hero Menoitios. / I told him I would bring back his son in glory to Opous / with Ilion sacked,

and bringing his share of war spoils allotted. / But Zeus does not bring to accomplishment [*teleutai*] all thoughts in men's minds [*andressi noêmata panta*]. / Thus it is destiny for us both to stain the same soil here in Troy" (*amphô gar peprôtai homoiên gaian ereusai autou eni Troiêi*, 18.324–28). Hera confirms the incompleteness of Achilles' knowledge when she responds to Zeus that "Even one who is mortal will try to accomplish his purpose / for another, though he be a man and knows [*oide*] not such wisdom [*mêdea*] as we do" (18.362–63). What Achilles cannot know is how to confine the consequences of his actions to punishing Agamemnon. Instead, Achilles' decisions affect, in unintended and unanticipated ways, both Patroklos and himself. We see the beginning of an enlarged sense of Achilles' connectedness to others, not simply as a cause of troubles for others, but as vulnerable to their suffering.[33]

Esteem and the Distinctiveness of Another

Through the death of Patroklos, Achilles experiences not only a vulnerability to the suffering of another, but also a longing that, ironically, he had promised the Achaians would feel for him (1.240–44). Something has changed in the nature of this longing, though. Whereas the longing of the Achaians would be based on Achilles' value to them in war, the longing that Achilles now experiences is for the loss of someone irreplaceable. Even after Achilles has avenged Patroklos's death and honored him through a funeral, Achilles' "longing [*potheôn*] for Patroklos" continues, as he misses "his manhood and his great strength / and all the actions he had seen to the end with him, and the hardships / he had suffered" (24.6–8).

Suggestive here is Aristotle's discussion of the motivations for friendship as those based on pleasure, utility, or a love of another's character.[34] We do not have to read Aristotle's categories back into the *Iliad* to see how Achilles' regard for his comrades is expressed earlier almost solely in terms of how they can serve the ends of his desire for vengeance. Even when Patroklos comes weeping to Achilles because of the pain (*achos*) that has befallen the Achaians (16.22), Achilles' response is carefully cloaked in an instrumental language. Achilles allows Patroklos (at Patroklos's urging) to defend the ships so that the Trojans will not "take away our desired homecoming" (16.82). Moreover, he tells Patroklos to "obey to the end this word I put upon your attention / so that [*hôs*] you can win, for me, great honour and glory / in the sight of all the Danaans, so they will bring back to me / the lovely girl, and give me shining gifts in addition" (16.83–86). Achilles, to be sure, does not want Patroklos to die. But Achilles defines Patroklos's reentrance into battle almost solely in

terms of how Patroklos (without dying) can serve Achilles' desire for vengeance.

Achilles never strays very far from an esteem for Patroklos. With his death, though, Achilles recognizes and articulates more fully his relationship to Patroklos as the esteem of another who is distinctive.[35] In the midst of desecrating Hektor's corpse, Achilles presents himself to the memory of Patroklos, saying: "I will not forget him [*ouk epilêsomai*], never so long as / I remain among the living and my knees, have their spring beneath me. / And though the dead forget [*katalêthont'*] the dead in the house of Hades, / even there I shall still remember [*memnêsomai*] my beloved [*philou*] companion" (22.387–90). The poignancy of this statement is suggestive of the depth of the friendship. Nothing is to be gained, even potentially, from Achilles' promise of a continued enactment of his relationship to his slain friend. But this invocation is still more suggestive. Whereas relationships based on pleasure or usefulness are necessarily temporary, dissolving once the motives disappear, true friendships endure because they are based on an attitude of esteem.[36] As Aristotle notes, "When friends live together, they enjoy each other's presence, and provide each other's good. When, however, they are asleep or separated geographically, they do not actively engage in their friendship, but they are still characterized by an attitude which could express itself in active friendship. For it is not friendship in the unqualified sense but only its activity that is interrupted by distance.[37] In this case, Achilles' esteem for Patroklos will endure the distance of death and memory.

Achilles comes to express, as well, that which is distinctive in his comrades. Most notably, he rewards an extra fifth prize to Nestor in the funeral games, even though Nestor does not compete. As Achilles explains, "I give you this prize / for the giving [*autôs*]; since never again will you fight with your fists nor wrestle, / nor enter again the field for the spear-throwing, nor race / on your feet; since now the hardship of old age is upon you" (23.620–23). Achilles' esteem for Nestor is decoupled explicitly from any further military contribution the old man can make. And Nestor, in fact, seems to recognize this as he expresses gratitude "that you have remembered [*memnêsai*] me and my kindness [*enêeos*], that I am not forgotten [*lêtho*]" (23.648).

I have suggested, thus far, that Achilles' feelings of loss and pain with the death of Patroklos have cognitive significance. In particular, these feelings alter Achilles' earlier understanding of himself as suffering-from the inflictions of others. With the death of Patroklos, Achilles suffers-with Patroklos, unable to separate his own suffering from the loss of another. This experience exposes the untenability of Achilles' earlier stance of self-sufficiency. His sense of esteem, as an image of his worth in relation to

others, is modified in two ways. First, as his sense of esteem is now made vulnerable to the loss of another, he comes to define his own worth as premised on a sense of responsibility or care for his intimate friends and comrades.[38] Second, and related, this care rests upon an esteem for others as distinctive, rather than as instruments of his revenge. What begins to emerge in the context of intimacy and friendship is an esteem for himself as connected to, and bearing some responsibility for, the care and suffering of distinctive others. This altered sense of his esteem for himself and esteem for another will provide the basis for Achilles' response to Priam in Book 24.

ESTEEM AND THE EXPRESSION OF PITY

The pain of Patroklos's death does not immediately unite Achilles with others. The incommunicability of the pain leads him to stand apart from the other Achaians. The boundlessness of the pain causes him to slaughter endlessly. And the inconsolability of the pain drives Achilles not just to kill Hektor, but to attempt to desecrate the corpse beyond recognition. This suffering, as we have seen, underlies Achilles' sense of being responsible for the loss of Patroklos. But it also leads to an inconsolability that threatens to consign Achilles to a reactive cycle of anger and vengeance that can know no end.

Against this backdrop of suffering, the poet creates a space in which Achilles and Priam meet. There is both a literal and figurative aspect to this space. Homer describes the contours of this bounded space as a "towering / shelter" (*klisiên*) that is surrounded by a "courtyard" with "hedgepoles / set close together" (*pukinoisi*) (24.448–49, 452–53). As Lynn-George notes, the association of *pukinos* with architecture describes structures that are "closely constructed" or "well fitted together."[39] It is an image, as it appears in Book 24, that suggests a return to "closure and order" (a return that, as Lynn-George suggests, is also resisted).[40] This architectural image is important for conveying in physical terms the existence of a bounded space in which Priam and Achilles meet. Within this space, Priam and Achilles encounter each other's pain.[41] Achilles' and Priam's pains cannot be compensated and their grievances with each other cannot be resolved. But the pain that separates them initially—the grief that Priam and Achilles have brought to each other—is now brought into a common outline. The space of meeting, established in conflict, now brings into the open "the intimacy with which opponents belong to each other."[42] They appear to each other with the physical marks of their suffering-with another. Achilles, in his longing for Patroklos, and Priam, as he mourns the loss of Hektor, have both defiled themselves (18.22–27, 22.414, 24.162–65),

suffered sleepless nights (24.3–13, 24.637–39), and gone without food (19.209–14, 19.303–308, 24.641–42).[43]

Whereas the funeral games appear as a ritual enacted by the community to redress the schism between Achilles and Agamemnon over the issue of authority, the meeting between Priam and Achilles addresses what Lord describes as the "feud" that erupts between Achilles and Hektor with the death of Patroklos.[44] Crotty and Seaford both have shown how this scene draws upon rituals of supplication: to invoke recognizable patterns of interaction "between individuals from different social units," to bring an end to Achilles' lamentation, and to establish some solidarity between Priam and Achilles.[45] I would suggest, as well, that this gathering is made possible by an ethical stance that, in its most fundamental sense, allows another to appear. This ethic is premised on the sense of esteem for oneself and another that is now generalized by Achilles from the intimacy of friendship to a pity for an enemy. Far from taking "place on the level of nature, outside the human world,"[46] as Redfield suggests, the meeting of Priam and Achilles has political significance since it points to the possibility of lending durability to this world.

Priam begins his appeal to Achilles by invoking him, to "remember your father, one who / is of years like mine, and on the door-sill of sorrowful age" (24.486–87). As Crotty suggests, Priam summons a "memory of grief" in which Achilles is asked to "generalize from his own experience" of the death of Patroklos and the absence of Peleus "to another's similar experience of loss."[47] Priam attempts to establish a resemblance with Peleus, by evoking those "who dwell nearby encompass him [Peleus] and afflict him, / nor is there any to defend him against the wrath, the destruction" (24.488–89). But Priam as carefully distinguishes between his plight and Peleus's. Priam emphasizes in his next line that this harm has not yet befallen Peleus: "Yet surely he [Peleus], when he hears of you and that you are still living, / is gladdened within his heart and all his days he is hopeful / that he will see his beloved son come home from the Troad" (24.490–92). Peleus's hopes are, of course, in vain. But this qualification by Priam, which is seldom discussed, makes sense in the context of an appeal for pity.[48] Priam establishes a resemblance to Achilles' father, but does not establish an identity. In this way, Priam attempts to arouse in Achilles the impulse of pity that comes not from the sight of pain befalling an intimate, but the sight of pain that one fears may, *in the future*, come upon oneself or one who is close. A distance is maintained between the pitier and pitied that befits the relationship between the supplicated and suppliant.[49] Priam does not say, "Remember the suffering of your father and, from there, you can understand my suffering." He says, "Remember your father who may soon suffer as I do now."

Achilles' initial response to Priam's supplication is not pity, but mourning. Priam's words, as they recall images of suffering, "stirred" (*ôrse*) in Achilles "a passion of grieving [*gooio*] / for his own father" (24.507–508). Achilles pushes away Priam's hand gently, transforming their relationship into one of mourning (*stonachê*) (24.512). The "two remembered, as Priam sat huddled / at the feet of Achilleus and wept close for manslaughtering Hektor / and Achilleus wept now for his own father, now again / for Patroklos" (24.509–12). Depicted here is the expression of loss by both Priam and Hektor.

Only after Achilles "had taken full satisfaction in sorrow [*gooio*] / and the passion [*himeros*] for it had gone from his mind and body" (24.513–14) does he look to Priam "in pity" (*oikteirôn*) (24.516). But how can we explain this transformation from mourning to pity? And why would Priam's appeal for pity work now, and not for the embassy in Book 9? The answer lies in Achilles' ability to imagine himself in the position of another, an imagination that grows out of his experience of suffering-with another. Achilles first experiences this vulnerability when the death of Patroklos precipitates a corresponding loss of himself. The appearance of Priam now calls to mind Achilles' own vulnerability to the suffering of Peleus, as well. Whereas the vulnerability experienced through the death of Patroklos is immediate, the vulnerability to Peleus's suffering is both immediate, as Achilles experiences Peleus's absence, and more distant, as Achilles imagines the experience of Peleus. As Priam pleads for the return of his slaughtered son, Achilles sees himself through the eyes of Peleus as "a single all-untimely child" who gives his father "no care as he grows old" (24.540–41). The pain of Achilles' wandering is experienced as a loss of esteem, not as he is denied the recognition of others, but as he fails to care for his father (like he failed, to care for Patroklos). In this projection, Achilles is able to imagine himself similarly through the eyes of Priam. Achilles appears to Priam as he does to Peleus: as the occasion for their suffering. After describing the suffering he has brought to his father, Achilles laments, "I sit here in Troy, and bring nothing but sorrow to you and your children" (24.542). Achilles is able to sense not just the suffering, but his own responsibility for the suffering that he now brings to Priam and has brought to Peleus.

Suffering, which once appeared as the fulfillment by Zeus of Achilles' wishes, now appears as a necessary consequence of the intertwining and colliding of fates. Whereas the "gods themselves have no sorrows" (*akêdees*) (24.526), states Achilles, mortals encounter both good fortune and evil. For those who receive from the "urn of evils," Zeus "makes a failure / of man, and the evil hunger drives [*elaunei*] him over the shining / earth, and he wanders [*phoitai*] respected neither of gods nor mortals" (24.531–33, trans.

modified).[50] Achilles no longer sees himself as removed from mortal suffering, but as inextricably linked to the movement of fate in the mortal realm. Zeus's fulfillment of Achilles' oath, as he comes to see, brings about the death of Patroklos. Peleus, too, is stricken by Zeus: his father once "outshone all men beside for his riches / and pride of possession, and was lord over the Myrmidons" but now suffers from the evils of Zeus as his son sits "far from the land of [his] fathers" (24.535–36, 541–42). A similarly undeserved plight has befallen Priam. As Achilles states to Priam, "And you, old sir, we are told you prospered once" and "you were lord once in your wealth and your children" (24.543, 546). But the "Uranian gods," continues Achilles, brought the Achaians, who are "an affliction [*pêma*] upon you" (24.547). Priam has been transformed from a lord to a suppliant, covered in dung, and soon to lose his city. What unites the suffering of Achilles, Priam, and Peleus is the collision of their fates: Priam is about to lose his home, Achilles will not return home, and Peleus will die alone.

The undeserved nature of Priam's suffering is heightened by Achilles' developing esteem for the king.[51] Achilles recognizes immediately a certain nobility in Priam's heart. Achilles asks, "How could you dare to come alone to the ships of the Achaians / and before my eyes, when I am one who have killed in such numbers / such brave sons of yours? The heart in you is iron" (24.519–21). This esteem will be expressed later, as well, when Achilles is described as seeing Priam's "brave looks" and listening "to him talking" (24.632). In this awareness is a comprehension of a "who" as a distinctive life story. Created in this encounter is a space, born of esteem for another, in which human life appears, not as an instrument of Achilles' revenge, but through its unique story.

TOWARD A POLITICAL ETHIC

With the death of Patroklos, Achilles enters a grief that is beyond endurance (*atlêton*) (19.367). When Achilles meets Priam, he tells the Trojan king to "bear up" (*anscheo*) (24:549).[52] They risk becoming frozen in grief, like Niobe who, "stone still, ... broods on the sorrows that the gods gave her" (24.617), unable to reconcile themselves to a past for which they must suffer but could neither foresee nor control. But what can make such endurance possible, particularly given Achilles' description of a world of coming and going in which fortunes shift and lords become wanderers?

In addressing this question, scholars have often found recourse in the aesthetic of the meeting between Priam and Achilles. For Griffin, "From suffering comes song, and song gives pleasure." The hero endures, "not so much for his own glory, not even so much for his friends, as for the glory of

song."[53] Redfield suggests, as mentioned earlier, that this reconciliation takes place at the level of nature, outside community. Whitman identifies an aesthetic awareness in their meeting: "Priam and Achilles see life whole, and with the freedom of men on the last verge of time, they forget the present circumstances, and admire each other's beauty."[54] For Rabel, pleasure is found "by a mortal hero's enjoyment in the reflection of his own ironhearted endurance in suffering."[55] And for Crotty, Achilles comes to recognize the "poetics" of the epic as he enters into a new kind of fellowship with Priam. This fellowship does not provide any "common project" or "cooperative effort" but serves only to enable Priam and Achilles to "better understand what each has experienced."[56] Out of this experience comes a vision of an "elemental human solidarity" in which Priam and Achilles are bound to each other through their common experience of suffering.[57]

What is striking in these formulations, but for a few exceptions,[58] is how this vision of human solidarity is elevated above or placed outside of politics and political community. This runs contrary to a continual linkage in the *Iliad* between private acts and public consequences, whether the lust of Paris, the greed of Agamemnon, the wrath of Achilles, or the pride of Hektor. The epic continually places these individual volitions in a public context, showing how communities suffer and, in fact, are endangered through the collisions of human action and reaction. The meeting of Priam and Achilles arises from these collisions and speaks to the fundamental political problem that is raised in the *Iliad*: how does one give endurance to communities made fragile by the very nature of human connectedness?

The *Iliad* answers that question by showing how pity provides the foundation for a political ethic that makes possible community life in the context of community suffering. Pity rests upon an awareness of the frailty of human affairs in which our connectedness to each other makes our deeds, in Arendt's words, both "irretrievable" and "unpredictable."[59] And pity is guided by a sense of care for others that makes possible the restoration of the bonds of community. No longer able to count on the gods, who "have no sorrows" (*akêdees*) (24.526) and who bestow good and bad fortune upon mortals, and no longer able to control the path to his future because of the interconnectedness of himself to others, Achilles now acts toward Priam in such a way as to make it possible to project themselves into a future.[60] Two actions, in particular, allow for this restoration: releasing and promising.[61]

The first of these actions, releasing, allows for the possibility of projecting the world into the future by answering to the irretrievability of action. The meeting between Priam and Achilles in Book 24 is premised, most obviously, on the release of Hektor's corpse. Thetis tells Achilles that the gods are concerned that he has not released (*apelusas*) Hektor's body

(24.136; see also 24.113–16). The corpse, though, is the material manifestation of a deeper predicament. Achilles and Priam are "confined" to the consequences of their actions, which, by the nature of acting among others, they cannot now retrieve.[62] Releasing, thus, is not just a return of a body, but a freeing from an inner confinement to the past.

This confinement to the past is suggested both by the desire for vengeance and by the feelings of sorrow that cannot end. Vengeance, as a reaction to Hektor's deed, can neither end, because it is always a re-action, nor satisfy, because it cannot reverse the original deed. Thus, Achilles seeks his vengeance not only by killing Hektor and sacrificing twelve innocent Trojan children, but also by attempting tirelessly, and without satisfaction, to desecrate Hektor's corpse. The unfortunate truth is that Patroklos will not come back, no matter what form of vengeance is taken. Without release, Achilles is caught in a reactive cycle that knows no future. After dragging Hektor's body around the city, he then drags Hektor's body three times around the tomb of Patroklos (24.16), ending where he began.

The inability to release himself from the sorrow of loss is suggested by Achilles' unwillingness to eat and drink. While mourning, Achilles recalls how Patroklos used to prepare fine meals for them (19.315–18). But now, sighs Achilles, "my heart goes starved / for meat and drink, though they are here beside me, by reason / of longing [*pothêi*] for you" (19.319–21). Thetis asks Achilles, "My child, how long will you go on eating your heart out in sorrow / and lamentation, and remember neither your food nor going / to bed" (24.128–30)? Food and drink will not pass Achilles' "dear (*philon*) throat" now that Patroklos has fallen (19.210, trans. modified). As Benveniste notes, *philos*, in modifying "throat," suggests the intimacy of association between Achilles and Patroklos. Food and drink will not pass his *philon* throat because "the sorrow of Achilles is that of a *philos*, and the feeling of having lost his *hetaîros* [companion] makes him put aside all desire for food."[63] Food and drink are not just necessary for human survival, but are aspects of associations of *philotês*, whether the friendship of intimacy, community, or toward guests. The loss of a *philos* who is so dear renders Achilles unwilling to participate in these activities of community. The image of digestion appears, as well, in the use of *pessô* to describe the confinement to one's sorrows. *Pessô*, which is associated with swallowing or digesting, also means "brood," suggesting a sorrow that does not go away but remains within the person (as though indigestible). Niobe is unable to eat or drink, but instead forever "broods" (*pessei*) about her sorrows (24.617). And Priam neither tastes food nor sleeps because he "broods" (*pessei*) over his suffering (24.639).

The meeting between Priam and Achilles allows for a release from the suffering each has brought. In telling Priam that he is "minded / to give

[*lusai*] Hektor back" (24.560–61), Achilles experiences a release of the grief that had bound his heart in this reactive cycle of vengeance and sorrow. Before, Achilles' love of Patroklos had excluded any pity or care for the return of Hektor's corpse. Achilles dismissed Hektor's entreaty to ransom the corpse back to his family (22.338–43). Patroklos will be buried properly, proclaimed Achilles, but Hektor shall lie on the plain to be "foully" ripped by dogs and vultures (22.335–36).

In the expression of pity toward Priam, though, Achilles calls for the servants to wash, anoint, and clothe Hektor's corpse and then "Achilleus himself lifted him and laid him / on a litter" (24.581–90). The cleaning of Hektor, which parallels Achilles' treatment of Patroklos's corpse, does not signal a love of Achilles for Hektor. It does, however, correspond to the extension of the language of *philos* by Achilles. He is able to imagine his love for Patroklos as having a parallel in Priam's love for Hektor. This so clearly challenges the exclusive love that he had for Patroklos that Achilles even calls to his "beloved [*philon*] companion" not to be angry since he has given back Priam's "beloved [*philon*] son" to his, "loved [*philôi*] father" (24.591, 619, 594).

This more inclusive language of *philos* is played out symbolically, since both Achilles and Priam can "remember" their dinner (24.601) and sleep.[64] While they were confined to the sorrow for one who is beloved (*philotês*), neither food nor drink could pass their dear (*philous*) throats. Like Achilles, Priam only broods (*pessei*) over his sorrow. Now, with the release of Hektor, both can taste food and drink again. As Priam exclaims to Achilles, "Now I have tasted [*pasamên*] food again and have let the gleaming / wine go down my throat. Before, I had tasted [*pepasmên*] nothing" (24.641–42). Through this release, the eternal brooding of Niobe, frozen in time by the impossibility of release, is replaced by images of eating, drinking, and sleeping.

While releasing answers to the irretrievability of the past, the second action, promising, answers to the unpredictability of the future. This unpredictability arises, as Arendt suggests, from "the impossibility of remaining unique masters" of what we do, "of knowing its consequences and relying upon the future."[65] The promise does not guarantee the future any more than it provides mastery over the present. What promising does is give some durability to human community by projecting it into the future. That is, the promise suggests a stance of responsibility for the future in which individuals, recognizing their connectedness, bind themselves to one another.

Promises, more than any other act, establish relationships that constitute Homeric political fields. Oaths, guest friendships, ties of reciprocity, and the distribution of material rewards all rest on promises that

are essential to the maintenance of a community space. In fact, the Achaian community is jeopardized by its broken promise to Achilles when it retrieves the gifts that had been given. This broken promise prompts Achilles not only to refuse to fight, but to withdraw to a realm in which he will not be bound to others through promises or obligations. Achilles will be bound only by his promise to himself that he will bring unendurable suffering and loss to the Achaian community.

Even in his reentrance into battle, Achilles promises only to Patroklos. He ignores Agamemnon's offer of his oath that he did not sleep with Briseis. And he rejects Hektor's offer of an agreement (*harmoniê*) that whoever wins should return the corpse to the community. Achilles' answer is telling, as he responds that he cannot make agreements (*sunêmasunê*) with someone whose deeds he will not forget (22.261). Caught in a reactive cycle of vengeance, Achilles is unable to make any such promise. "As there are no trustworthy oaths [*horkia pista*] between men and lions, / nor wolves and lambs have spirit that can be brought to agreement [*homophrona*] / but forever these hold feelings of hate for each other, / so there can be no love between you and me, nor shall there be / oaths [*horkia*] between us" (22.262–66). There is something distinctively human about this ability to promise, as it rests upon a like-mindedness (*homophrôn*) that only humans share.

Now, though, Achilles binds himself to Priam. When Achilles addresses Priam as "good friend" (*phile*) (24.650), he fulfills Priam's wish "for love [*philon*] and pity [*eleeinon*]" (24.309). This language not only signals the end of the feud, but is restorative by establishing a relationship in which they have become bound together through a promise.[66] Achilles asks Priam to tell him how many days will be needed for the burial of Hektor so "I myself shall stay still and hold back the people" (24.658). Priam responds, saying this "is what you could do and give / me pleasure" (*kecharismena*) (24.661). As Richardson notes, in other situations *charizesthai* means "to oblige someone."[67] Achilles seems to recognize his assumption of an obligation when he answers that this "shall be done as you ask it. / I will hold off our attack for as much time as you bid me" (24.669–70). Coming from Achilles, who has "destroyed pity" (24.44), such a promise that he will be this self in the future and honor the agreement would be met rightly with some hesitancy. And Achilles seems to recognize this as he grasps Priam's wrist "so that his heart might have no fear" (24.672). This act, following on his words, allows Priam and Achilles to move from eternal mourning to an anticipation of a future. Though Achilles will die in battle, he cares for himself now for the first time. Whereas before he remembered "neither ... food nor going / to bed" (24.129–30), indifferent to his own future, Achilles now eats with Priam (24.601) and sleeps with Briseis (24.676). In contrast to Foucault's

claim that "the care of the self is ethically prior" to a "care for others,"[68] Achilles discovers that the care of the self, as a matter of self-esteem, is inextricably bound up with others.

Achilles' promise is unlike earlier promises in the *Iliad* because it does not rest on even the possibility of getting something in return.[69] Achilles knows he will die, and Priam knows his city will fall. Yet, this promise is significant because it allows the *Iliad* to close on the poignant image of a Trojan community space. In contrast to the scene in Achilles' shield in which the city's people await an ambush, now, in Priam's words, "Achilleus / promised [*epetelle*] me, as he sent me on my way from the black ships, / that none should do us injury until the twelfth dawn comes" (24.780–81). In promising to another, Achilles binds the Achaians to the Trojans. The promise is restorative of the public life of human community, as the Trojan people (*laos*) "all were gathered to one place and assembled together" (*êgerthen homêgerees t' egenonto*) to mourn and remember Hektor, to build a grave with stones "laid close together" (*puknoisin*), and then gather for a feast in Priam's house (24.789–90, 798, 802). The space itself is indeterminate since the fall of Troy is near. But the activity of human dwelling is preserved, as the *Iliad* ends with a moment of care that is set against the frailty of a world of coming and going.

POIESIS AND THE CALLING FORTH OF THE HUMAN WORLD

Throughout this book I have been asking, "What is it that the poet makes?" For it is around this question, though often unstated in scholarship, that so much of our understanding of the *Iliad* is built. For Plato, the craft of the poet is to imitate appearance and, so, the poet has little to say about how one should act. For Parry, a focus on the mechanical demands of oral composition overshadows any discussion of the meaning of the poem. Combining Plato's philosophic concerns with Parry and Lord's insights into the structural demands of oral composition, Eric Havelock contends that an oral consciousness places conceptual limits on the Homeric epic. The conscious task of the pre-Socratic, suggests Havelock, was to critique not just the content of Homer and Hesiod, but the error of thought that arises out of orality.[70] The claim of the pre-Socratic, argues Havelock, was that "the resources of poetry as commonly exploited in performances are unsuitable for the expression of philosophy" because of "the idiom of common speech and thought, which narrativizes our experiences, recounting it as a series of events, of becoming and perishing."[71] This error of thought extends to the

"moral dimension" of the epic since morality appears simply as a "pragmatic response" to particular situations.[72]

There is a fundamental similarity in the activity of both an oral and philosophic language, though, that belies the distinction that Havelock draws. The activity of language, as Arendt notes, is "the human way of *appropriating* and, as it were, disalienating the world into which, after all, each of us is born as a newcomer and a stranger." Language is a way of making sense of and giving meaning to the world. Language does this in two ways: through the "naming of things," and through metaphors by which we relate things that are otherwise unrelated. Philosophy shares in this activity through the only way it can appear: namely, as it is manifested in language. The philosopher names the world, giving linguistic substance to the phenomena of "truth," "mind," "reason," and "soul." And philosophers relate the world through metaphor, creating analogies to bridge "the abyss between inward and invisible mental activities and the world of appearance."[73]

Plato certainly understood the importance of metaphor since he sought to appropriate the poetic task of "making" for philosophy. His philosophic language is replete with images from this world: of metals that constitute our capabilities, of the journey of the soul, of the philosopher as navigator, and of philosophic truth as the light of the sun. The objective system of thought that Havelock sees as characteristic of logos does not stand apart from the phenomena of appearance but appears more as "frozen analogies": metaphors used to describe relations of permanence. The pre-Socratics may have sought to create a conceptual vocabulary, but they did so, as Arendt suggests at one point, by going "to Homer's school in order to emulate his example."[74]

The point is not to downplay the importance of philosophic thinking. Rather, it is to suggest the close connection between poetry, philosophy, and thinking as an activity of language. Language appears not as a ready-made tool that the poet uses to make a poem, nor does language appear unconceptual since it is grounded in the particulars of experience. Rather, through language the poet calls forth a world. The poem becomes a world that is made familiar as the things of the poem are named and brought into relationship with each other. But it is a world that is neither purely fictive nor representative, since both terms suggest an unacceptable instrumentality and transparency to language. The poet, to be sure, uses the language, but the language, through the cumulating of tradition that describes the world, also uses the poet. In constructing a poem, the poet calls forth a world that the poet and audience know through language.

What is it that the poet makes? Even Havelock recognizes that the product of the poet, the poem, cannot be reduced to a purely instrumental expression of "how to." Such a reduction is impossible because the language that builds the poem is, itself, not reducible to a tool of the poet. Language resides in the world, and through language we reside in the world. It is a similar residing that the poet creates through the poem. The poem "gathers around itself" the relations of beings that make up the world: "birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline" that "acquire the shape of destiny for human being." In calling for, and allowing to appear, the particulars of the experience of the world, the poem "brings man onto the earth."[75] That is, the poem does not transcend the human condition but presents us with, perhaps even reminds us of, our condition as dwellers in the world: "To say that mortals *are* is to say that *in dwelling* they persist through spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locations."[76]

We are not talking here about the particular intentions of a poet, whoever that poet may be, but about the attitude that the poem evinces toward the world. The poet constructs a vision of the world, rendering visible through metaphor the invisibility of human yearning, desire, and pain, and bringing into relationship with one another the successive experiences that make up the passing of life. Around this notion of fate, as the passing of time, we see the philosophic contribution of poetic making. For the poet does not fix time in the concept—to discern essences that stand outside time—but understands how time conditions our being in the world.

Plato is correct in seeing in the *Iliad* aspects of suffering, vulnerability, remorse, and pity rather than investigations of that which is immutable. He is incorrect in concluding that such attention to the particulars of human experience serve only to glut our emotions and tell us little about how to live. The importance of the epic is that it invites reflection on the exigencies of human enactment. The epic moves us to a comprehension of a political and ethical relationship to others, a relationship that is grounded not in the philosophic world of autonomy, universality, invulnerability, and transcendence but in the Homeric world of contingency, particularity, vulnerability, and immanence. The story Homer tells us, like the story Achilles tells Priam, is one in which we are moved toward a recognition of a shared world, a recognition that arises not from outside but from within a world constituted by experience.

Notes

1. Kant 1959, 5.

2. Gagarin, for example, defines morality as a "disinterested concern for others" and ethics as a general cultural orientation in which norms of behavior are grounded in "prudential self-interest" (1987, 287–88).

3. Snell 1930. See also Snell 1982 and Erbse 1986, 1990.

4. Fränkel 1962, 89 (1975, 80). See also Böhme 1929, 76.

5. Live in the moment: Fränkel 1962, 93 (1975, 84) see also Schadewaldt 1959, 266–67, and 1955, 137–38. Act according to forms of society: Fränkel 1962, 89 (1975, 80); see also Auerbach 1953; Bakhtin 1981; and Finley 1979, 25, 113, 115.

6. Dodds 1957.

7. Redfield 1994, 21.

8. Critiques and modifications of these arguments have been offered by Wolff 1929, Whitman 1958, Long 1970, Lloyd Jones 1971, Sharples 1983, Gaskin 1990, Schmitt 1990, Williams 1993, Cairns 1993, Yamagata 1994, Zanker 1994, and Gill 1996.

9. Redfield 1994, 116.

10. Pitt-Rivers 1974, 21–22.

11. Cairns 1993, 142.

12. Cairns 1993, 16. No Greek term corresponds to the term "self-esteem." Cairns has made a strong argument for showing how *aidôs*, and terms used in conjunction with *aidôs*, involves issues of esteem. Though I begin with this notion of esteem, I seek to justify its usage in my argument.

13. Williams 1985, 12. See also Ricoeur 1992, 172.

14. Crotty 1994, 75, 78–79, 79 n. 6, 6, 8.

15. Zanker 1996, 73, 97, 125.

16. See Burkert 1955; Segal 1971; Atchity 1978, 164; MacLeod 1982; Schein 1984; King 1987; Lynn-George 1988; Griffin 1980; Beye 1993; Crotty 1994; and Muellner 1996. Griffin writes that with the death of Patroklos, Achilles now "accepts his own death" (1980, 96). In fact, what is distinctive about Achilles is that "he is able to contemplate and accept his own death more fully and more passionately than any other hero" (95). Segal also suggests that "Achilles shows an awareness of death as part of a more comprehensive order" (1971, 73).

17. Nagy 1979, 83.

18. Sinos sees Patroklos's entrance into battle as a ritual substitute for Achilles' unwillingness to recognize his obligations to the *philoi*. "Patroklos recognizes the social obligation of Achilles to the φίλοι; it is he who dies for the φίλοι, but as Achilles. His act is a ritual act uniting the φίλοι with. Achilles, in the person of the substitute, Patroklos" (1980, 42).

19. Lord suggests that the death of Patroklos marks a change in the pattern of the story from a "pattern of the wrath" of Achilles, which leads to his withdrawal, to one of a "feud" with Hektor, which leads to his return (1960, 150).

20. Nagy 1979, 113, 97.

21. See Nagy 1979, 97–102. Muellner (1996) does not sustain this distinction in his discussion of Achilles. Rather, he describes Achilles' actions and reactions only at the level of epic convention. This is why Muellner does not see Achilles as an ethical actor, but rather as being "propel[led]" by the "poem's overall teleology and conventions" (1996, 161).

22. "To suffer-with another" appears in classical Greek as *sullu-peisthai*, and is associated with a feeling for one who is intimate. The term does not appear in the *Iliad*, but I think this sense is conveyed in Achilles' reaction to the death of Patroklos.

23. Heidegger 1979, 327.

24. See Cairns 1993, 57–58.

25. Vernant 1991, 67. See also Segal 1971.

26. This scene is often interpreted as a prefiguring of Achilles' own death. On the relationship between Patroklos's and Achilles' death, see Schadewaldt 1959, 155–202; Schein 1984, 129–33; and Muellner 1996, 155–69.

27. Crotty 1994, 46, 48. There is considerable ambiguity in Crotty's argument at this point. He does not want to suggest that pity and mourning are the same things. Pity becomes something like a second order mourning: pity arises from the memory of mourning (1994, 75). This distinction between pity and mourning is blurred, though, when Crotty uses Achilles' mourning for Patroklos as an example of the visceral character of pity in his chapter "*Eleos* and the Warrior Society" (1994, 49–50).

28. Crotty 1994, 49.

29. Konstan (1999) suggests that Andromache, in fact, attempts to create this distance by projecting a future in which Hektor is dead.

30. Arist. *Rhet*. 2.8.12.

31. Muellner describes this alienation of Achilles from himself (1996, 136–43), but does not ascribe any cognitive status to this alienation.

32. I disagree with Sinos on this point when he claims that "Achilles' only recognition of his social obligation to the φίλοι is, as we might expect, linked with the name Patroklos" (1980, 43). The death of Patroklos certainly precipitates the remorse, but it is a remorse (and a sense of responsibility) that is specifically extended to his treatment of his other companions.

33. "Because the actor always moves among and in relation to other acting beings," suggests Arendt, "he is never merely a 'doer' but always and at the same time a sufferer" (1958, 190).

34. See Arist. *NE* 1156a–1157a.

35. See also Ricoeur, who describes this esteem as a love of "the other as *being the man he is*" (1992, 183).

36. Arist. *NE* 1156a, 1157b.

37. Arist. *NE* 1157b.

38. Both intimates and comrades are referred to as *philos*. See Benveniste for a discussion of the "complex network of associations" referred to by *philos* (1973, 288).

39. Lynn-George 1988, 232, quoting Cunliffe 1963.

40. Lynn-George 1988, 232.

41. Heidegger 1971b, 204.

42. Heidegger 1971c, 63. Crotty suggests that the performance of the ceremony of supplication gives rise to a "transient, but profound, 'community'" between Achilles and Priam (1994, 21).

43. See Richardson 1985, 344.

44. Lord 1960, 190.

45. See Seaford 1994, 10, 174, and Crotty 1994, 83.

46. Redfield 1994, 219.

47. Crotty 1994, 75.

48. Rabel characterizes Priam's appeal as "rhetorically inept" and reflective of the "narrator's habitual irony" (1997, 201–202).

49. There is practical reason, as well, why Priam does not establish an identity of himself with Peleus, and that is that Achilles would then be cast as Hektor. That, of course, would be unacceptable to Achilles. And Priam notes the difference. Peleus may still have hope, "But for me, my destiny was evil [*panapotmos*]. I have had the noblest / of sons in Troy, but I say not one of them is left to me" (24.493–94). The one who was left and "who guarded my city and people, that one / you killed a few days since as he fought in defence

of his country" (24.499–500). Priam has now lost everything, having "gone through what no other mortal on earth has gone through" (24.505). He ends with an expression of supplication: "I put my lips to the hands of the man who has killed my children" (24.506).

50. This interpretation runs contrary to the suggestion that the urns are an "artistic" motif used by the poet to "satisfy his audience's desire to find an order and rationality in human experience" (M. Edwards 1987, 136).

51. See Arist. *Rhet*. 2.8.7, 2.8.16.

52. See Richardson 1985, 329, on the appearance of the theme of endurance in later literature.

53. Griffin 1980, 102.

54. Whitman 1958, 219. See also Crotty, who suggests that the "understanding of grief" results in "delight" (1994, 103).

55. Rabel 1997, 205.

56. Crotty 1994, 99, 84.

57. Schein 1984, 159. See also Burkert 1955, 107; MacLeod 1982, 16; and Zanker 1996, 125.

58. Notably, see Burkert 1955, 126–34; Seaford 1994; and Zanker 1996, 135–36. Burkert shows how pity relates to, and is brought into tension with, an aristocratic ethic. Seaford argues that Priam's supplication stops the excessive mourning of Achilles. This allows the *Iliad* to end by emphasizing a "public death ritual" suggestive of a polis society, as opposed to the lavish private rituals of early Dark Age society (Seaford 1994, 182). I would disagree with Seaford that this implies a sixth-century dating of the *Iliad* (1994, 144–54). As we saw in chapter 1, there was in the eighth century an increasing public organization of community life and interaction between communities that points toward a progressive enlargement of aspects of recognition, cooperation, and obligation toward other groups. Along these lines, Zanker suggests that the establishment of a "morality beyond reciprocity" would be important in Dark Age society for binding "the distinct community of *aristoi* in crossing 'tribal' boundaries" (1996, 135).

59. Arendt 1958, 188–92.

60. See Heidegger 1979 for his discussion of "understanding" as a "projecting towards a potentiality-for-Being" (385–89). Though the term is from Heidegger, my discussion more closely follows Arendt. My notion of projection points to a disagreement with Schadewaldt. Schadewaldt suggests that Achilles' decision is one of "pure presence" (*reine Gegenwart*) that arises from his "*ganzen Sein in einem Zustand der Erhebung*" [whole being in a state of exaltation] (1959, 267). There is an interesting parallel to Heidegger's notion of "*ecstases*." For Schadewaldt the moment of "Exaltation" (*Erhebung*) does not "know" a "Before" (*Vorher*) or After" (*Nachher*) but exists at the moment of "what has been and what is to come" (*des Gewesenen und des Kommenden*). So for Heidegger the "*ecstases*" of temporality is the experience of a "pure sequence of 'nows'" that bring together the "phenomena of the future (*Zukunft*), the character of having been (*Gewesenheit*), and the Present (*Gegenwart*)" (1962, 377 [1979, 329]). For Schadewaldt, Achilles' decision is not directed by any burden of the past or anticipation of the future, but exists as a pure moment in time. Heidegger, on the other hand, suggests that the coming together of the past, present, and future makes possible the projecting forward of the individual into the future. I am arguing that Achilles engages in just such a projecting-forth as he binds himself and his community, through a promise, to Priam.

61. I am drawing on Arendt 1958, 236–47.

62. Arendt 1958, 237. Arendt writes, "Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to

one single deed from which we would never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever" (1958, 237).

63. Benveniste 1973, 286.
64. See Arendt 1958, 241.
65. Arendt 1958, 244.
66. See Benveniste 1973, 278–81.
67. Richardson 1985, 346.
68. Foucault 1997, 287.
69. See Zanker 1996, 117–18.
70. See Havelock 1983, 15–20.
71. Havelock 1983, 19, 20.
72. Havelock 1978, 8–9.
73. Arendt 1978, 1.100, 102, 105.
74. Arendt 1978, 1.104, 108.
75. Heidegger 1971c, 42, 35; 1971d, 218.
76. Heidegger 1971a, 157.

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The Iliadic War

The *Iliad*, composed approximately in the middle of the eight century B.C., constitutes the leading and oldest known example of heroic epic. With its own Iliadic war,[1] lasting only a matter of days, it telescopes and dramatizes the ten-year-long Trojan war. To the extent that almost all the Greeks take part in this war with the Trojans of Asia Minor and their neighboring allies, we are justified in viewing the *Iliad* and the Iliadic war, albeit with some exaggeration and with hindsight, as a model for the antithesis "Greeks-Barbarians," and by extension for the anthropo-geographical division "Europe-Asia"—though these distinctions are given name and form some two centuries later.[2]

If every war produces its own dividing or divisive ideology, it is only natural that we should expect some pro-Greek trace of this in the *Iliad*.[3] Nevertheless, both the epic and its poet appear to withstand this temptation.

For the Homeric *Iliad* does not legitimize any form of evaluative distinction between Achaeans and Trojans—or, as we might put it, between Greeks and Barbarians; since, apart from anything else, it is unfamiliar with the two words in question. In the vocabulary of the *Iliad*, we find only once the terms βαρβαρόψωνοι and πανέλληνες. The first is used to linguistically characterize the familiar Karians; the second to describe the population of a wider region in southern Thessaly.[4]

From *Homeric Megathemes: War–Homilia–Homecoming*, translated by David Connolly. ©2004 by Lexington Books.

Given this, the only distinction occasionally maintained in the *Iliad* concerning the two opposing parties is purely linguistic[5] and, more specifically, refers to the Trojans' allies. As for the Trojans themselves, no such issue is raised anywhere in the epic.

On the contrary, despite their long and bitter conflict, both Achaeans and Trojans are presented in the *Iliad* as being linguistically, politically, and culturally homogeneous. They communicate easily with each other; they are bound by the same family, social and political institutions; they concur in their view of gods and men; they share the same principles of warfare, at the center of which is the Homeric κλέος.[6] As for war itself,[7] both Zeus and the poet and the *Iliad* appear to abhor it,[8] or to regard it in some way as a necessary evil, which inflames the passions of gods and heroes.[9] However, behind the murderous conflict of the two opposing forces, the poet of the *Iliad* appears to want to find a common view of man that might support an albeit belated reconciliation.

This is evident from the reconciliatory program with which the Iliadic war ends: In view of the two illustrious dead heroes, Patroclus and Hector, Achilles and Priam converse, converge and consent to an eleven-day truce in order to allow Troy's unburied dead hero to be returned and his honorable burial to take place. Although in terms of the Trojan war as a whole this truce may be regarded as no more than an interval, we should not overlook the fact that it is with this break in the war that both the Iliadic war and the epic of the *Iliad* come to an end.

I am not suggesting, of course, that the *Iliad* should be viewed as an antiheroic and antiwar epic,[10] in the sense that these terms have acquired in, for example, both Greek and foreign interwar fiction. Yet next to the κλεόςυ of valor in war, the *Iliad* stresses the tragedy of war—its futility, sometimes even its absurdity. This conclusion stems from a careful reading of the first battle which, in my opinion, is also a model[11] for the epic, as I will explain below.

It is worth remembering first of all that the Iliadic war is unnaturally delayed:[12] it is preceded by the οὐλομένη μῆνις of Achilles, which keeps the bravest and most illustrious warrior of the Achaeans out of the war for three-quarters of the epic. Moreover, with the introduction of the οὖλος Ὄνειρος at the beginning of Book II the Iliadic war is in danger of being aborted,[13] of turning, that is, into a shameful withdrawal by the Danaans. Such an inglorious end is prevented at the last minute by the drastic interventions of Athena and of Odysseus. Following this, the opposing armies regroup and rearray, but once again the fighting is postponed, as the poet decides here to introduce the two forces through long catalogues. Next, and contrary to all expectation, the Iliadic war meets with a new postponement as a result of the

false hope that its outcome might be decided through a duel between Menelaus and Paris. This duel is, however, rendered worthless by Aphrodite, who snatches a clearly beaten Alexander and bears him safe to Troy, compelling Helen to make love to him. This is followed by the council of the Gods at the beginning of Book IV in order to decide if and how the Iliadic war might continue after the breaking of the oaths by the Trojans. Eventually, it is decided that the war will continue and called to play his part in this is the archer Pandarus, who wounds Menelaus, almost mortally, by trickery. This perfidy incites the wrath of the Achaeans, bringing them at last face to face with the Trojans and their allies. It is precisely at this point that the poet of the *Iliad*, albeit with such delay, composes the first collective battle. What follows is the entire scene from the *Iliad* (II. 422-544) in translation.*

> Just as on the thundering coast, Zephyrus with his gusts
> raises high the sea's waves, one after the other—
> first they loom far out to sea, then
> break on land with a loud roar, finally cresting
> curved on the capes and spewing forth sea foam;
> so advanced the ranks of the Danaans, in endless succession,
> one behind the other,
> to enter the battle. Each commander leading his own men,
> who silently surged forward—no one could imagine
> such an army behind with a voice in its breast;
> in fear and silence they heeded the commands,
> an in array they wore their shining weapons;
> scattering their gleam all round.
> The Trojans opposite, just as sheep in the fold of a rich lord—
> stand in their thousands to be drained and their white milk,
> and hearing the lambs bleating,
> answer with their own bleats;
> so to a cry went up from the Trojans' wide
> ranks—though not in one voice,
> this was the sound of men gathered from many parts
> who spoke in a mix of different tongues.
> These it was who Ares stirred, the others Pallas Athena
> through the gleam of her eyes. And they were joined
> by Terror who strikes terror, by Fear who shows fear;
> and, her appetite insatiable, by Strife,
> sister of many-slaying Ares, his faithful companion—
> small and weak before taking arms, then growing gigantic,

and while her feet touch the ground, her head
supports the skies.
She it was who then shared out the hate, passing from the one
side to the other,
that the screams of battle might increase.
When the two armies met in the same place,
bucklers, spears, and breaths were merged by warriors
clad in bronze breastplates.
And when the shields clashed boss to boss,
an unprecedented clatter was heard;
inseparable the cries and screams of those meting out death
and of those slipping into death, as their blood
flooded the earth.
Just as rivers descend from the mountains in torrents,
merging in a ravine their raging water,
and this surges into the abyss of the bottomless gorge,
while far off the shepherd hears the pounding on the mountain
and reflects; so also the cries and screams
were heard merging.
Antilochus was the first to kill one of the Trojans
a renowned champion and fighter; his name was
Echepolus, son of Thalysius.
Quicker of the two, his spear found the horn of the helmet,
with its flowing plume, and the bronze tip wedged
in his brow, passing through the bone,
and darkness covered his eyes.
He collapsed at once like a tower, falling in the fierce fighting.
Seeing him fallen, Elephenor, son of Chalkodon,
chief of the great-hearted Abantes, ran up
and with his usual rashness began dragging him by the legs.
Wanting to take his armor, he pulled him with all speed
bending low beneath the arrows; yet his onrush was short-lived, for as
he was dragging the victim, he was seen by noble Agenor,
bent and leaving his side uncovered by the shield,
and the bronze spear marked him out—undoing him.
Thus his life was cut off, yet over his body raged
a great and terrible fight between Trojans and Achaeans,
who pounced like wolves, to fight it out,
each chopping at the other's life.
Then Telamonian Ajax singled out and killed
Anthemion's son, a still unwedded lad.

He was called Simoeisius, as it was on the banks of the Simoeis
that his mother had borne him, while coming down from Mount Ida,
where
with her parents she'd gone to tend their sheep.
Yet the son was unable to repay his due
to his family; the thread of his life was so soon cut
he was brought down by the spear of the brave-hearted Ajax.
As the young lad went forward, he took aim
and caught him in the right breast; the spear of bronze,
passing through the shoulder, came out the other side.
And as he rolled in the dusty earth,
he resembled a dark poplar, growing beside a great marsh,
in a watery meadow, slender with the branches crowning
no more than its tree top;
it was seen by a wheelwright, who with his black axe felled it,
to bend into a wheel for his splendid chariot,
and fallen now on the river bank it is left to season;
just as Simoeisius, offspring of Anthemion,
was cut down and laid bare by the divine Ajax.
Then losing no time Priam's son Antiphus, clad
in his resplendent breastplate, entered the fray and cast
his pointed spear.
Missing its aim however, instead of Ajax, it finds
Leukus, Odysseus' precious companion, wounding him
in the groin, as he dragged the dead body
toward his lines.
Immediately he fell upon the corpse that fell
from his hands. Seeing his companion killed,
Odysseus was sorely vexed; he steps out in front,
comes up with his bright helmet, takes his stance and casts
his shining spear at him—
his ever wary gaze glancing all around.
The Trojans moved back on seeing him let fly, and yet
his shot did not go wasted;
it found Demokoön, Priam's bastard son,
who had just arrived from Abydos, from where the swift horses come.
He it was then who Odysseus, full of anger at his companion's loss,
speared through the side of the head,
and the bronze point passed clean through
to the other temple.
Darkness covered his eyes; he fell heavily with a thud,

his armor clanging on top of him.
The Trojan champions then fell back,
among them brave Hector; the Argives hail their victory,
collecting their dead, and advance relentless.
However, Apollo saw them from atop Pergamus and was filled with envy,
he turned to the Trojans and cried:
"Horse-taming Trojans, stand fast. Do not withdraw in fear
before the Argives. Their bodies are not of stone,
nor of metal, that they might withstand
the flesh-destroying bronze blows.
Absent from the battle is Achilles, son of fair Thetis,
who still broods in his wrath beside the ships."
Such were the enjoinders of the terrible god above the fortress;
yet the daughter of Zeus, honored Tritogeneia,
now encouraged the Achaeans, roaming through
their ranks, if somewhere she saw them slacking.
Fate then bound Diores, son of Amarynceus,
who was struck beside the ankle, in the right leg
by a heavy and jagged stone; it was hurled
by the lord of Thrace, Imbrasus' son Peiros,
who had just arrived from Ainus.
The cruel stone slashed the sinews, crushing the bones.
He fell backwards to the ground and breathing his last
he held out his two arms to his comrades.
But Peiros was there before and following the first blow,
he runs and thrusts his spear into the spot beside the navel—
all his innards poured out onto the earth, and the light went from his eyes.
Yet now it was Peiros who was set upon by Thoas the Aetolian,
he pierced him through the chest with his spear, just above
the nipple, and the bronze tip sank straight into the lung.
Soon Thoas was beside him, he pulls the heavy spear
from the chest, draws his sharp sword, and plunges it
in his belly. Thus he finished him, though he was unable
to strip him of his armor; his comrades arrived
and stood by him—Thracians who bind
their hair on the crown of their heads,
brandishing long spears in their hands.
Though Thoas was great, strong, and valiant,
they forced him back, and he felt fear before these warriors.

Thus two lords now lay together dead
on the dusty ground, the one of Thrace,
the other of the bronze-clad Epeians,
and the dead were piled high around them.
No once could complain at the battle's rich harvest.
Suffice that he were there. Uninjured
wandering in the midst unharmed
by the bronze; his hand in that of his protectress
Pallas Athena, with her driving every deathly blow
far from him.
For on that day countless Trojans and Achaeans alike,
face down in the dust, became indistinguishable
bloated by death, the one beside the other.

The informed listener-reader wishing to highlight the poetic ideology of this battle scene through its poetic economy[14] would certainly have a great deal on which to comment. I will confine myself to the absolutely essential:

1. The first battle in the *Iliad* consists of three parts: the prologue, the main part, and the epilogue. In the prologue the two opposing armies gather; in the main part they merge and clash;[15] in the epilogue they concur—I will explain later the significance of this concurrence for the war ideology of the poet and the poem.

2. The battle is narrated in two different ways: in language both literal and metaphorical. In this case, we can talk of parallel mirrors. Through the successive similies,[16] the horror of war is projected onto the screen of both animate and inanimate nature, and is magnified in this way.

3. Through the intervention of the gods, who are divided with rigorous fairness between the two opposing sides, the war acquires its divine dimension. Yet also wandering between the heroes and the gods are warlike demons: Δεῖμος who initiates fear, Φόβος who strikes terror, and above all, ῎Ερις[17]—who, though tiny at first, immediately acquires gigantic proportions, raising her head to the skies. Suddenly, the field of battle is enlarged, embracing the entire world, as if the universe were about to catch fire.[18]

4. The renowned heroes of the main narrative part are surrounded by anonymous warriors,[19] who are the first to mingle their breaths and shields and spears. Yet, through their merging and clashing, they have already become indistinguishable: victors and victims by turns; cries of triumph and of anguish mingle; blood flows in streams; the clamor is heard in the surrounding mountains.

5. This is followed by the hero-slayings (the so-called ἀνδροκτασίαι) between individual heroes in the three successive clashes. Some of the heroes are in their prime, others are virtually boys—as, for example, the young Simoeisius who, struck in the nipple by Ajax, reels and falls like a slender poplar. If one were to make a meticulous count of how the dead are divided, the bitter justice of it would become clear: the same number of Achaeans are killed as of the Trojans and their allies.[20]

6. The overall description of the battle proves to be ironically panoramic: all kinds of weapons (javelins, swords, stones);[21] all kinds of mortal wounds (to the head, the chest, the belly, the groin);[22] single and double blows;[23] companions called upon to save their fellow companions at the moment of their death, and who are killed themselves; victors who the very next moment become victims.[24] And further still, the absurd aspect of the missed aim: the deadly missile is intended for someone specific, but flies off course, eventually killing someone unsuspecting.[25]

7. And we now come to the most crucial point which, in my opinion, signals the war ideology of this first and exemplary battle in the epic, on which, as a kind of model, the Iliadic war is planned as a whole.

The narrative principle assumed is that every traditional type of warlike conflict, sooner or later, results in its unequal outcome, which divides the opponents into conquerors and conquered. A typical example is the Trojan myth and war, which is sealed by the fall and total destruction of Troy by the victorious Achaeans. This traditional principle does not appear to hold, however, in this particular case, where, instead of the unequal outcome of the war, an equal balance between the opponents is first suggested and then implemented.

Already in the second part of the collective battle (where, following the prior gathering of the opposing forces, their collective engagement is now explicitly stated, 11. 446-456), their indiscriminate mingling is strongly emphasized: first, the weapons of all kinds conjoin, then the cries of the warriors, the εὐχωλή and the οἰμωγὴ ὀλλύντων τε και ὀλλυμένων; finally, the indistinguishable blood of death that flows through the battlefield like a torrential river. Consequently, the active and passive voice of war is here confused; triumph and anguish are intermingled. It is impossible to distinguish the two sides. It is unthinkable that they should be divided into victors and vanquished.

There then follows the individual slaying of the heroes, which constitutes the core of the battle scene and which is divided into three episodes: ll. 457-472, 473-526, 527-538. At both the end of the first and third episodes the slaying of the named heroes once again develops into a collective clash, which comes to confirm the deadly balance between the two opposing forces.

The exception is the middle episode. Following Odysseus' anger at the killing of his companion, Leukus, by Priam's son Antiphus and his avenging onrush that results in the killing of Priam's bastard son, Demokoön, the clash becomes equally weighted. The Trojan champions and even Hector himself fall back before the relentless onrush of the Achaeans, who now find time to gather up their dead. Thus, the impression is given that the hitherto balanced encounter ends in an Argive victory, in keeping with the traditional idea that requires distinct victors and vanquished at the end of a battle.

Contrary to all expectation, however, this temporary imbalance is immediately removed. First by the majestic appearance of Apollo, who criticizes the unjustified flight of the Trojans, thereby strengthening their fighting spirit; then, immediately afterwards, by the intervention of Athena, who goes among the Achaeans, in an attempt to prevent the likelihood of their faintheartedness in the face of the Trojans newfound morale. The result is that the opposing armies once again become balanced and, under these conditions, the third round of the hero-slayings takes place. Involved in this, as named heroes, are Peiros, who cruelly kills Diores, and Thoas, who slays Peiros, automatically making a victim of the victor.

From then on, the slaughter becomes more general around the successive dead bodies and the reciprocal killing dominates once again. It is at this point that the curtain might fall on this first and model scene. However, the poet of the *Iliad* continues with an account in the form of an epilogue to show the consequences of the battle he has narrated.[26] What follows is a paraphrase of lines 539-544 in order to more clearly bring out the main points of this account:

> So, then, no mortal man could claim that his toil had gone in vain. Suffice that he were himself there present, wandering over the battlefield. On the condition that he would remain uninjured and unharmed by the deadly blows; protected by the goddess Athena, who would stand beside him, take him by the hand, and lead him away from the spears and arrows. Then, and only then, would he see with his own eyes what had happened in that clash: the battlefield covered with the dead; countless Trojans and Achaeans alike; their bodies face down in the dust, the one beside the other, the one on top of the other, taut and indistinguishable, as if reconciled.

First observation: The tone of the epilogue is seen to be ironic even from the introductory line; its structure expressing a possibility (κεν together

with successive optatives), something hypothetical, an outcome most probably unrealizable; the unrealizable outcome is, however, somewhat moderated by the unexpected help of Athena who provides conditions of supernatural safety for the hypothetical observer, conditions that only a god can guarantee. Suddenly, the optatives give way to the final τέταντο, which, with its subjects and adverbial qualifications, reveals the real outcome of the battle.

Second observation: On the assumption that this is a narrated battle, the hypothetical observer of its epilogue implies the listener-reader of the narration in question.[27] Moreover, with the protective role that she adopts, the goddess Athena corresponds to the poet himself. Consequently, it is a kind of narrative conspiracy between the rhapsode and the listener, who both surreptitiously participate in the final revelation of the battle.

Third observation: In the epilogue to the epic's first and model battle, the report on the battle is carried out at firsthand, through the hypothetical observer, reflected in what he himself sees through his own eyes. This final stage directing of the battle furthers, in my view, the simile of the shepherd, who, far off in the hills, hears the torrents pouring into the mountain glens and wonders at their pounding (ll. 452-456). What we have is a scale, set up in such a way that at first we, too, hear the battle from a distance; at the end, however, the distance is eliminated and the previous hearing now becomes viewing. Both images, that of the shepherd and that of the inserted observer, present, albeit on a different scale, the same conclusion: the opposing forces are indistinguishable; their corpses converge on the battlefield and are ultimately equated.

I have already twice alluded to the fact that this equating of the opponents, through their reciprocal and common deaths, foreshadows the outcome of the Iliadic war.[28] This is confirmed by the narrative fact with which the *Iliad* ends its own cycle of war: two equal killings divided respectively between the two camps; namely, the slaying of Patroclus by Hector and the slaying of Hector by Achilles. Perhaps more important, however, is the fact that the poet, through the events of Book XXIV, also allows the possibility for this balancing of the killing to be seen symbolically; a balancing that leads, also symbolically, to the reconciliation of the opponents. For the long companionate *homilia* between Achilles and Priam, instigated by the gods, takes place on a heroic level in such a way that the two conversing companions (the one old, the other young, both torn by grief) are transformed from mortal enemies into friends when they become aware of

their common loss as a result of the Iliadic war: the father's loss of his beloved son and the friend's loss of his beloved friend.

Thus, the return of Hector's dead body to Troy is accomplished and, following its maltreatment, his honorable burial is secured in keeping with the previous return and burial of Patroclus. As I attempt to show in another study in this volume, the *Iliad* ends with a funeral homecoming, which imposes a twelve-day postponement of the Trojan war, while at the same time, and this is the important point, it reveals the reconciliatory conclusion to the Iliadic war.

Notes

*All English translations of theHomeric and other ancient texts are based on their modern Greek translations by the author.

1. As far as I know with regard to terminology, this is the first time that a distinction has been made between the Iliadic war (and by extension of the Iliadic myth) and the Trojan war and the Trojan myth. Without doubt, this distinction is alluded to in many of the relevant studies, but without being consolidated by the corresponding terms. I hope that the present study justifies, in part at least, my proposal for distinct terms.

2. Se my article "Θεοδικία καὶ ἀνθρωποδικία οτὸν Ἡρόδοτο," 69-78. From the rest of what is a large bibliography on the subject, reference may be made to the volume *Grecs et Barbares*, which contains the articles by H. Schwabl, "Das Bild der fremden Welt bei den frühen Griechen," 1-23, and by H. Diller, "Die Hellenen-Barbaren-Antithese im Zeitalter der Perserkriege," 31-82. See also E. Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian*, 3-47; J. F. de Romilly, "Les barbares dans la pensée de la Gréce classique," 283-292; F. Hartog, "Invention due barbare et inventaire du monde," 87-115; J. Cobet, "Europa und Asien-Griechen und Barbaren-Osten und Westen," 405-419; A Dihle, *Die Griechen und die Fremden*, 14ff., 47 ff; H. Mackie, *Talking Trojan*, 6-10.

3. Cf. the ancient comment ἀεὶ γὰρ ψιλέλλην ὁ ποιητής (H. Erbase, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem*, vol. 3, p. 5, ad 10.14). The poet's supposedly biased attitude in favor of the Greeks is disputed by I. Th. Kakridis, "Ἀεὶ ψιλέλλην ὁ ποιητής", in *Homer Revisited*, 54-67 I de Jong (*Narrators and Focalizers*, 12) attributes the ancient commend concerning the poet's pro-Greek bias to characteristic signs of this involvement in the narration of the *Iliad*.

4. II. 2.867 and 530; cf Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 528.

5. II 2.802-803, 4.437-438.

6. On the meaning of the word κλέος, see G. Steinkopf, Untersuchungen zur Gesch ichte des Ruhmes beiden Gliechen, 4-16, and on its application in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, S. D. Olson, *Blood and Iron*, 1-23. The disconnection between νόστος and νόστος in the *Iliad* and their connection in the *Odyssey* have been pointed out by G. Nagy, *The Best of Achaeans*, 35-41, 94-106; A. T. Edwards, Achilles in the Odysssey, 71-03, and P. Pucci, *Odysseus Polutropos*, 128, 139 ff.

7. The Iliadic war is divided into collective and anonymous clashes or individual and named ones; see J. Latacz, *Kampfparänese*, *Kampfdarstellung und Kampfwirklichkeit in der*

Ilias, *bei Kallinos und Tyrtaios*, esp. 76-77, 118-139. The smaller typical form of the personal and named clashes are the "catalogues of slayings" (see G. Strasburger, *Die kleinen kampfer der Ilias*, 15 ff.), which contain the names of the victim or victor, and the verb of killing and, as a rule, are inflated with the father's name and the birthplace of the victim and with some characterization of his virtues, either in one word or in a phrase. The combination of the catalogues of slayings with the development of one or more of their component parts constitutes the "slaying episode." From the composition of the slaying episodes comes the form of the Iliadic battle (an example being the first and model battle in Book IV, II 422-544). A more extended form of the battle in the *Iliad*, sometimes taking up an entire book is the "duel," where two outstanding heroes clash, while the rest of the warriors form a theatrical circle around them; see B. Fenik, *Typical Battle Scenes in the Iliad*, and N. Bergold, *Der Zweikampf des Paris und Menelaos*. Finally, the most personal, heroic, and extensive form of battle in the *Iliad* is the "aristeia," in which the valiant deeds of some renowned hero are extolled, usually to the point of excess or hybris; see T. Krischer, *Formale Konventionen der homerischen Epik*, 13-89. As a rule, the aristeia also involves the "theomachy," or intervention of the gods in the battle and the fight either between themselves or with the valiant hero.

8. cf. Zeus' invective against Ares (5.889-891): *Do not sit beside me murmuring, capricious wretch, / to me you are the most hateful of all gods on Olympus; / quarrelling, wars and battles are ever dear to you.*

9. There are various categories of words which signal fighting in the *Iliad*: nouns (πόλεμος, ἀγών, μάχη, ὑσμίνη, ἀνδροκτασίη, ψύλοπις, Ἄρης) and verbs ($πολεμῶ, μάχομαι, βάλλω, κτείνω, οὐτάςω, πίπτω, ψεύγω, διώκω etc.). Of greater weight, however, are the adjectives, which accompany the fighting in the *Iliad* as adjectival qualifiers or predicates.

Particularly impressive is the great number of adjectives (more than forty) found in the Homeric language (no doubt the long pre-Homeric tradition has contributed to this), which reveal the quality of the fighting. These adjectives qualifying the fighting in the *Iliad* can be distinguished in many ways and using interchangeable criteria: for example, in terms of their metrical value and their appropriateness for the dactylic hexameter; in terms of their linguistic age (some of these are clearly archaic, others perhaps belong to the age of Homer).

There is still, however, a third distinction, of particular importance: amongst the list of these war-qualifying adjectives, there are some which attribute to war a positive value; some which, from this point of view, could be characterized as being neutral, given that their content is more descriptive and less, or not at all, evaluative; a third category of adjectives, however, continues to give the fighting in the *Iliad* a negative value. More specifically; the adjective κυδιάνειρα as a qualifier for the noun "battle" constitutes an example of a positive value, given that it extols the glory and renown of the warriors (the same is true of the θεῖος ἀγών, etc.). The adjectives θοῦρος, κρατερός, πτολίπορθος, etc., which are used to characterize Ares, assign a neutral value to the fighting in the *Iliad*. While the adjectives αἱματόεις, ἀλίαοτος, ἄλληκτος, ἀλλοπρόσαλλος, ἀντίβιος, ἄπρηκτος, ἀργαλέος, δήιος, δυσηλεγής, δυσηχής, θρασύς, κακός, λευγαλέος, μιαιψόνος, ὀιζυρός, ὀκρυόεις, ὀλοός, ομοίις, πολυάικος, πολύδακρυς, στυγερός, and ψθισήνωρ must, of course, be included in the list of negative values. The crucial question is whether the *Iliad* divides these three categories of adjectives equally or unequally. The answer is the latter: comparatively speaking, the adjectives positively qualifying the fighting in the *Iliad* are few, whereas the negative adjectives are greater in number by far.

10. On the antiwar character of the *Iliad*, see the study by S. Weil, *The Iliad or the Poem of Force*, and the criticism of this by S. Schein, *The Mortal Hero*, 82-84, with whose views I tend to agree.

11. The exceptional and model character of the first battle in the *Iliad* has already been noted by G. Strasburger, *Die kleinen Kämpfer der Ilias*, 43-47, and, more recently, by C. Niens, *Struktur und Dynamik in den Kampfszenen der Ilias*, 1-16. More generally, see M. M. Willcock, "*The Fighting in the Iliad*," 143.

12. On the technique of delay in the *Iliad*, see M. Reichel, "Retardationstechniken in der *Ilias*," 125-151; J. V. Morrison, *Homeric Misdirection*, 35 ff. It should also be noted that incorporated into the intervals of each particular delay are themes and scenes from the Trojan war and myth (e.g., The Catalogue of Ships, the Duel between Alexander and Menelaus, the *Teichoskopia*).

13. The interpolation of subversive episodes and scenes in the course of the Iliadic war and myth has been systematically studied by K. Reinhardt, *Die Ilias und ihr Dichter*, 107 ff. using as a sign of this technique the word "fast"—which means in general that these turning points and deviations might "almost" subvert the traditional myth or even cancel its continuation. See also J. V. Morrison, *Homeric Misdirection*, 7, and H.–G. Nesselrath, *Ungeschehenes Geschehen*, 5 ff.

14. The economy concerns not only the internal composition of the scene, but also, and primarily, its outcome; see G. Strasburger, *Die kleinen Kämpfer der Ilias*, and C. Niens, *Struktur und Dynamik*.

15. A characteristic example is the presence and function of the prefix συν—in the accumulation of verbs in the collective clash (ξυνιόντες ἵκοντο / σὺν ῥ᾽ ἔβαλον ῥινούς, σὺν δ᾽ἔγχεα καὶ μένε᾽ ἀνδρῶν, 4.446-447), which is also reflected in the simile (ὡς δ᾽ ὅτε χείμαρνοι ποταμοὶ κατ᾽ ὄρεσψι ρεόντες / ἐς μισγκάγκειαν συμβάλλετον ὄυβριμον ὕδωρ, 4.452-453).

16. The similes may be divided into those which are extensive (II. 422-428, 433-436, 452-456, 483-489) or concise (II. 462, 471); collective (II. 422-428, 433-436, 452-456, 471) or individual (II. 462, 483-489).

17. Apart from the gods, who are divided between the two camps (first Athena on the side of the Achaeans and Ares on the side of the Trojans, 4.439; then Apollo on the side of the Trojans, 4.507 ff., and Athena on the side of the Achaeans, 4.515 ff.), we have here, and only here, the participation of the three demons (passive Fear, active Terror, and Ayres' sister, Strife). The co-presence of the "abstract trio" refers to the exceptional character of the first collective battle and does not, in my opinion, admit any possibility of being a later addition, as is suggested by G. S. Kirk, *The Iliad*: *A Commentary*; vol. 1, p. 380, ad 4.439-445).

18. The cosmic dimension of the battle recalls the explicit analogy in Hesiod's *Theogony*, II 687-710, which describes the clash between Zeus and the giants.

19. In addition to the introduction and the first part of the confrontation, the anonymous warriors also return in the three rounds of individual slayings: II. 471-472, 505-506, 538.

20. An exaggeration. In reality, there are three named dead heroes from the Greek camp (Elephenor, Leukus, and Diores) and four from the camp of the Trojans and their allies (Echepolus, Semoeisius, Demokoön, and Peiros).

21. Cf. ἔγχεα or δούρατα (II. 461, 469, 479, 490, 501) ξίψη (I. 530), βέλη (II. 465, 498, 542), and also χερμάδια (I. 518).

22. In the head (II 460, 502), in the ribs (1. 468), in the chest (I. 480), in the belly (II. 525, 528), in the groin (I, 492), and in the legs (I. 518). See also C. Niens, *Struktur und Dynamik*, 21.

23. Cf., for example, lines 459-462, 467-470, and 518-526.

24. In the slaying of the named heroes, the warriors pass quickly from the role of the victor to that of the victim: Antilochus kills Echepolus, Elephenor tries to rob him of his armor and is immediately killed by Agenor (ll. 457-472); Pieros kills Diores, but is himself killed by Thoas (ll. 517-531). This is the justice of war: the triumphant cry of victory is quickly transformed into the anguished cry of defeat.

25. The deadly missile often hits the mark; even more often, however, it misses its mark, finding someone else: Antiphus kills Odysseus' companion, Leukus, instead of Ajax, who killed Simoeisius; in his vengeful fury. Odysseus kills Priam's bastard son, Demokoön (ll. 489-504), instead of Priam's legitimate son. In the end, the true marksman is death who in each case chooses his usually unsuspecting and unready victim. In such cases, we talk of fate. Homer does not, preferring silence in the face of this misaimed marksmanship which doubles the fright of battle.

In connection with the range and descriptive differentiation of the hero-slayings see W. -H. Friedrich, *Verwundung und Tod in der Ilias*, 64 ff., where there is a gradation of the style into severe, realistic, and naturalistic.

26. I cannot agree with the view expressed by G. S. Kirk (The *Iliad*: *A Commentary*, vol. 1. 397-399, ad 4.539-544), who expresses doubts concerning the genuineness of the epilogue on the grounds that this is signaled by lines 536-538. Moreover, the fact that the epilogue is required by the narrative is also noted by G. Strasburger, *Die kleinen Kämpfer der Ilias*, 44-45.˜

27. Concerning the hypothetical observer in the epilogue, Eustathius (506.6–8) notes: τοιοῦτος δ' ἂν εἴη θεατὴς ὁ τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἀκροατής ὃς οὐ τῶν τοῦ πολέμου κακῶν μετέχει, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τῶν πολεμικῶν διήγησεων κατὰ νοῦν ἀπολαύει καλοῦ θεάματος. A somewhat different perspective is provided by I. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers*, 58-60.

28. See also G. Strasburger, *Die kleinen Kämpfer der Ilias*, 46.

Chronology

ca. 3000 BC	Beginning of northern invasion of Greece.
ca. 2000 BC	Unification of Minoan power in Crete.
ca. 2000–1700 BC	Achaean invasion.
ca. 1600 BC	Destruction of Phaestos and Cnossos in Crete. Greek linear script replaces hieroglyphs.
ca. 1400 BC	Second destruction of Cretan palaces.
ca. 1400–1200 BC	Great age of Mycenae. Development of Mycenaean trade in Egypt and Eastern Mediterranean.
ca. 1400–200 BC	What is today known as Greece exists as Balkan Peninsula, composed of many small kingdoms.
ca.1250–1200 BC	Troy destroyed. Some historians believe Trojan War did occur, yet Homer's writings are not to be construed as an accounting of that occurrence.
ca.1100 BC	Successive waves of Dorian invaders. Use of iron introduced.
8th century BC	Homer born and lived in Eastern Greece or Asia Minor.
ca. 750–650 BC	Homer composes *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.
776 BC	Panathenaic games, models for modern-day Olympics, first occur. Homer's works recited at such Greek festivals.
ca 600s BC	Written manuscripts of Homer's work available.
1488	First printed works of Homer appear in Florence. Prepared by Chalcondyles of Athens, who taught Greek in Italy.

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